This webpage covers the case law on the relevant provisions of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (“Hong Kong National Security Law”) and the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Hong Kong National Security Law. It also covers the case law on the sedition offences under sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) (“CO”) developed after the coming into force of the Hong Kong National Security Law.
The promulgation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“the Hong Kong National Security Law” or “the Law”) on 30 June 2020 marks an important milestone in the legal development of the HKSAR. The Hong Kong National Security Law has strengthened the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR, thus providing a bedrock to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests and to ensure the full and faithful implementation of the “One Country, Two Systems” principle under the Basic Law.
Under Article 65 of the Hong Kong National Security Law, the power of interpretation of the Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. At the same time, Article 40 of the Law provides for the HKSAR courts’ jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under the Law except under the circumstances specified in Article 55 of the Law, and Article 45 of the Law further provides that unless otherwise provided by the Law, the HKSAR courts shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the HKSAR. In the circumstances, and in line with the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, the HKSAR courts have assumed and exercised jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under the Law, and have accumulated useful jurisprudence to assist us in the understanding and application of various provisions in the Law. Apart from decisions on cases concerning the Hong Kong National Security Law, the courts’ decisions on cases concerning the crime of sedition under sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) have also contributed to the development of national security-related jurisprudence.
All institutions, organisations and individuals in the HKSAR have an obligation to abide by the Hong Kong National Security Law and local laws for safeguarding national security. This body of case-law helps us understand the requirements of our national security laws and how they are being applied by the courts.
To raise public awareness of national security and to promote a better understanding of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the crime of sedition by all sectors of the community, particularly those in the legal, education and public sectors, the Department of Justice has prepared this webpage collating and summarising court cases concerning the Hong Kong National Security Law as well as sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance. The webpage will serve as a convenient and practical tool for promoting national security education and conducting legal research on our national security laws.
I would like to express special thanks to Professor Albert Chen, GBS, JP for his kind assistance to this project by serving as its Honorary Consultant Editor. His admirable guidance and contributions are truly appreciated.
Mr Paul T K Lam, SBS, SC, JP
Secretary for Justice
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
December 2023
Under the constitutional framework of “One Country, Two Systems” established by the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“HKSAR”), the overwhelming majority of laws in force in the HKSAR consists of local legislation, the case law developed by the Hong Kong courts, and the common law that was applicable to Hong Kong before 1997 which continues to have force after the Handover. A small number of national laws are also applicable to Hong Kong in accordance with Article 18 and listed in Annex III to the Basic Law. After 1 July 1997, only four national laws have been added to Annex III and made applicable to the HKSAR, thereby increasing the total number of Annex III laws applicable to the HKSAR to fourteen. The more well-known of such laws include the National Anthem Law enacted in 2017 and the HKSAR National Security Law (“NSL”) enacted in 2020.
As provided for in the NSL, cases concerning offences under this Law are normally tried in the Hong Kong courts. The NSL and HKSAR laws “apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the Region exercises jurisdiction.” (NSL 41) The HKSAR courts “handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the HKSAR”, unless otherwise provided by the NSL. (NSL 45) The application and enforcement of the NSL in Hong Kong is thus a process in which a national law is blended with Hong Kong’s common law system.
In order to enable members of the public in Hong Kong to know what the rules of behaviour established by the NSL and related laws regarding national security are, and in order to facilitate research on the NSL by the legal community, it is imperative that the case law developed by the Hong Kong courts on offences against national security is made easily accessible to all. Dicey, a pioneer in the development of the modern concept of the rule of law, identified three essential features of the rule of law, the first and foremost of which is as follows:
“[By the rule of law] [w]e mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint.”1
This first principle of the rule of law necessarily implies that the content and requirements of legal rules governing citizens’ conduct should be clearly and unambiguously communicated to citizens, so that they may order their conduct accordingly so as to avoid any “breach of law” and the legal liability that may flow from it.
One of the advantages of our living in the age of the Internet is that information can be disseminated more efficiently and widely than ever before in human history. The efforts of the Department of Justice in compiling and making available online the present summary of the case law relating to offences against national security in Hong Kong and annotations of the relevant legislation are to be welcomed. It is hoped that the present publication can facilitate public understanding of the relevant law and offences in Hong Kong, and thus to contribute to the rule of law in the HKSAR in the domain of national security.
Professor Albert H.Y. Chen
Cheng Chan Lan Yue Professor and Chair of Constitutional Law
Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong
December 2023
1 | A.C. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan Press, 10th ed., ELBS ed., 1968), p 188. |
1. This webpage collates and summarizes court cases concerning the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (“NSL”) as well as sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) (“CO”) concerning the offences of sedition. It consists of the following five parts:
(a) | Part A: Introduction; |
(b) | Part B: The provisions of the NSL and related case law; |
(c) | Part C: The provisions of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the NSL (“IR”) and the related case law; and |
(d) | Part D: The provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the CO and the related case law since the NSL came into effect. |
2. This webpage is designed to be bilingual. The English edition is the version currently available. The Chinese edition is under preparation, and will be available in due course.
3. In the annotations sections of this webpage, the provisions of the NSL, the IR and sections 9 and 10 of the CO are elucidated largely on the basis of the judgments given by the HKSAR courts. The depth or language of the exposition of a particular provision of the said laws is thus often dependent on the availability of decided cases and what the courts have said in the relevant judgments. Moreover, it should be underlined that while this body of case law has shed useful light on the construction and application of these laws, it is still developing and should be read in this light.
4. As compared with case summaries, case digests provide shorter briefs of those cases which are considered to have less significance in terms of the development of jurisprudence. The case summaries and digests are drafted in the language of the original judgment which may be in English or Chinese. English translations of Chinese case summaries/digests are available in the English edition of this webpage. Chinese translations of English case summaries/digests will be available in the Chinese edition of this webpage when it is launched.
5. To assist the readers, when we refer to a case summary or digest in our annotations, we use:
(a) | the abbreviation “ET” (a shorthand for “English translation”) where the case summary/digest is an English summary/digest of a judgment originally written in Chinese, and |
(b) | the abbreviation “CT” (a shorthand for “Chinese translation”) where the case summary/digest is a Chinese summary/digest of a judgment originally written in English. |
6. Every case summary/digest includes a hyperlink to the original judgment on the Judiciary’s website. In our annotations, cases are referred to by their neutral citation numbers assigned by the Judiciary, e.g. A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801. A neutral citation starts with the year of the judgment (being 2021 in the example), followed by an abbreviation of the court which handed down the judgment (being the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in the example), and a sequential number which indicates the judgment number in the year (being 1801 in the example).
7. For abbreviations used in this webpage, please refer to the Index of Abbreviations at the end of this Preface.
8. The content of this webpage will be updated regularly in light of the development of the law. For this edition, the law is stated as at 30 June 2023 except that the Court of Final Appeal’s judgment in HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26 (22 August 2023) is also covered due to its importance.
9. The contents on this webpage should not be regarded as the Department of Justice’s legal advice or position.
10. The Department of Justice does not accept responsibility for any errors and omissions on this webpage or for any loss or damage however arising from the use of, or reliance on, its contents.
Art./Arts. | Article / Articles |
Basic Law | Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC |
BL | Basic Law / Basic Law Article1 |
BOR | Hong Kong Bill of Rights / Hong Kong Bill of Rights Article2 |
CA | Court of Appeal of the High Court |
Cap. | Chapter3 |
CE | Chief Executive of the HKSAR |
CFA | Court of Final Appeal |
CFI | Court of First Instance of the High Court |
CJ | Chief Justice of the CFA |
CJHC | Chief Judge of the High Court |
CO | Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) |
Constitution | Constitution of the PRC |
CPG | Central People’s Government |
CPO | Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) |
CSNS / NSC | Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR |
DC | District Court |
ET | English translation |
HKSAR | Hong Kong Special Administrative Region |
HKSARG | Government of the HKSAR |
ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 |
ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 |
IGCO | Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) |
IR | Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the NSL |
LegCo | Legislative Council |
NPC | National People’s Congress |
NPC 5.28 Decision | “Decision of the NPC on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR” adopted on 28 May 2020 |
NPCSC | Standing Committee of the NPC |
NSL | Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR / NSL Article6 |
OSNS | Office for Safeguarding National Security of the CPG in the HKSAR |
para./paras. | paragraph / paragraphs |
PRC | People’s Republic of China |
r./rr. | rule / rules |
s./ss. | section / sections |
Sch. | Schedule |
SJ | Secretary for Justice |
《憲法》 | 《中華人民共和國憲法》 |
《基本法》 | 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法》 |
《全國人大 5.28 決定》 | 《全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定》(2020年5月28日通過) |
《香港國安法》 | 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法》 |
《實施細則》 | 《中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法第四十三條實施細則》 |
《人權法案 》 | 《香港人權法案 》 |
《釋義及通則條例》 | 香港法例第1章《釋義及通則條例》 |
全國人大 | 全國人民代表大會 |
全國人大常委會 | 全國人民代表大會 常務委員會 |
香港特區 | 香港特別行政區 |
國安公署 | 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署 |
國安委 | 香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會 |
CT | 中文翻譯 |
1 | E.g. Articles 6 and 105 of the Basic Law: BL 6 and 105 |
2 | E.g. Article 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights: BOR 10 |
3 | E.g. (Chapter 200): (Cap. 200) |
4 | E.g. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 14 of ICCPR |
5 | E.g. Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Article 8 of ICESCR |
6 | E.g. Articles 7 and 42 of the NSL: NSL 7 and 42 |
1 | For abbreviations used in this introduction, please refer to the Index of Abbreviations annexed to the Preface. |
2 | The case law on the relevant provisions of the NSL and the IR is covered by Parts B and C of this webpage respectively. As mentioned in the Preface of this webpage, while such body of case law has shed useful light on the construction and application of the NSL and the IR, it is still developing and should be read in this light. |
3 | The matters mentioned in BL 23 all concern national security. |
4 | Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision (22 May 2020), 2nd paragraph, available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/doc/exp_a301_zh-hant.pdf (Chinese version only), with an unofficial English translation available at Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision (22 May 2020), unofficial English translation. The English translation of the quote is provided in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary), at para. 12, which is in line with the said unofficial English translation. |
5 | Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision (22 May 2020), Part 1, 2nd to 4th paragraphs. |
6 | The NPC 5.28 Decision is available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A301. |
7 | See the Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (30 June 2020), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A117!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y. For the background of the above Decision, see the Explanation on the “Draft Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC” (30 June 2020), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/doc/exp_a117_zh-hans.pdf (Chinese version only) with an unofficial English translation available at Explanation on the “Draft Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC” (30 June 2020), unofficial English translation. |
8 | Promulgation of National Law 2020, 30 June 2020, available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A302!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y and https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2020/ln136!en. |
9 | Explanation on the “Draft Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”(18 June 2020), available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/doc/exp_a302_zh-hant.pdf (Chinese version only), with an unofficial English translation of its summary as reported by Xinhuanet available at Explanation on the “Draft Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”(18 June 2020), unofficial English translation of its summary as reported by Xinhuanet . |
10 | See NSL 1 and 2. BL 1 provides: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.” BL 12 provides: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People’s Government.” |
11 | NSL 5 and 39. |
12 | NSL 4. |
13 | Paragraph 9 supra. |
14 | NSL 3. |
15 | See, for example, NSL 7 to 11. |
16 | The CE is accountable to the CPG for affairs relating to safeguarding national security in the HKSAR: NSL 11. |
17 | NSL 12 and 13. |
18 | NSL 16(1) and 18(1). |
19 | NSL 40. |
20 | NSL 41. |
21 | NSL 41 to 47. |
22 | NSL 62. |
23 | NSL 44. |
24 | NSL 41(4). |
25 | NSL 42(1). |
26 | Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. |
27 | NSL 48 and 50. |
28 | NSL 49. |
29 | NSL 60(1). |
30 | NSL 50. |
31 | The Chinese text of the NSL is published in the Schedule of Promulgation of National Law 2020, available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A302!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y and https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2020/ln136!en. The English translation of the NSL is published in G.N. (E.) 72 of 2020, available at https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20202448e/egn2020244872.pdf. |
32 | The relevant case law on these provisions after the coming into force of the NSL is covered by Part D of this webpage. As mentioned in the Preface of this webpage, while such body of case law has shed useful light on the construction and application of these provisions post-NSL, it is still developing and should be read in this light. |
33 | This would include the enactment of laws on those matters specified in BL 23 that are not covered by the NSL and other existing laws. |
34 | HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) , at para. 53(c)(ii), fn 40. |
35 | HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42 (Case Summary) , at paras. 30-31. |
36 | BL 160(1) provides: “Upon the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be adopted as laws of the Region except for those which the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress declares to be in contravention of this Law. If any laws are later discovered to be in contravention of this Law, they shall be amended or cease to have force in accordance with the procedure as prescribed by this Law.” |
37 | Available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/capA206. |
38 | Cf Section 2A(1) of the IGCO, which provides: “All laws previously in force shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, limitations and exceptions as may be necessary so as not to contravene the Basic Law and to bring them into conformity with the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.” |
The text of the Hong Kong National Security Law, with the relevant case law, may be accessed by scrolling the table of contents presented below.
為堅定不移並全面準確貫徹“一國兩制”、“港人治港”、高度自治的方針,維護國家安全,防範、制止和懲治與香港特別行政區有關的分裂國家、顛覆國家政權、組織實施恐怖活動和勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全等犯罪,保持香港特別行政區的繁榮和穩定,保障香港特別行政區居民的合法權益,根據中華人民共和國憲法、中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法和全國人民代表大會關於建立健全香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制的決定,制定本法。
This Law is enacted, in accordance with the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and the Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, for the purpose of:
The NSL was adopted by the NPCSC on 30 June 2020 on the basis of the “Decision of the NPC on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR” adopted on 28 May 2020 (“NPC 5.28 Decision”)2. The NSL was added to the list of national laws in Annex III to the Basic Law on 30 June 2020 pursuant to BL 18 and the “Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC” adopted on the same day3. The NSL was promulgated in the HKSAR by the Promulgation of National Law 2020 (L.N. 136 of 2020)4. It applies in the HKSAR as from 11:00 pm on 30 June 2020. The legislative history of the NSL is set out in the Introduction. The related background materials (including: (a) the Explanation on the “Draft Decision of the NPC on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR” of 22 May 2020; (b) the Explanation on the “Draft Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR” of 18 June 2020; and (c) the Explanation on the “Draft Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC” of 30 June 2020) are collected in Articles and Reference Materials on the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (中華人民共和國香港特別行政區維護國家安全法:文獻匯編)5 published by the Department of Justice and the Security Bureau in 2021. As a national law applied to the HKSAR, the NSL has a special constitutional status focusing specifically on safeguarding national security and preventing and suppressing acts endangering national security in the HKSAR. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 37 (Case Summary)) |
The NPC 5.28 Decision was made pursuant to Arts. 31, 62(2), 62(14) and 62(16) of the Constitution6 and the relevant provisions of the Basic Law for the purposes of safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, upholding and improving the “One Country, Two Systems” regime, safeguarding the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and protecting the lawful rights and interests of Hong Kong residents. The Explanation on the Draft Decision of the NPC on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the HKSAR to Safeguard National Security of 22 May 2020 (“Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision”)7 states that under the new situations, the overall requirements of the establishment and improvement of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR at the national level are: (a) to thoroughly implement the holistic approach to national security8; (b) to uphold and improve the “One Country, Two Systems” regime; (c) to organically reconcile the preservation of the comprehensive jurisdiction of the Central Authorities over the HKSAR with the protection of the HKSAR’s high degree of autonomy; (d) to strengthen the establishment of systems for safeguarding national security and law enforcement; (e) to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests; (f) to safeguard the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong; (g) to ensure that the “One Country, Two Systems” policy would not be changed or undermined; and (h) to ensure that the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” would not be bent or distorted. According to the Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, for the implementation of the above overall requirements, the following five basic principles must be followed:
As discussed by the court in HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, at para. 51 (Case Summary) , the above basic principles are contained and reflected in NSL 1. Regarding the Constitution and the Basic Law both expressly referred to in NSL 1, they jointly constitute the constitutional order in the HKSAR. The constitutional order of the HKSAR established by the Constitution and the Basic Law must be resolutely upheld. The HKSAR must be administered in strict accordance with the Constitution and the Basic Law. The authority of the rule of law must be firmly established and resolutely upheld. Any person who contravenes the law or undermines the rule of law must be held liable in accordance with the law. (Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, 22.5.2020, basic principle 3) |
6 | Art. 31 of the Constitution provides: “The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems instituted in special administrative regions shall, in light of specific circumstances, be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress.” According to Art. 62(14) of the Constitution, the NPC has the function and power to decide on the establishment of special administrative regions and the systems to be instituted there. Art. 62(2) and (16) of the Constitution respectively provide that the NPC has the function and power to oversee the enforcement of the Constitution, and exercises other functions and powers that the highest state organ of power should exercise. |
7 | See footnote 2 above. |
8 | The notion of “holistic approach to national security” (“總體國家安全觀”) appears in Article 3 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015). |
The “One Country” is the premise and basis of the “Two Systems”; the “Two Systems” is subordinate to and derived from “One Country”9. The policy of “One Country, Two Systems” under which Hong Kong people administer Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy must be implemented resolutely, fully and faithfully. The correct direction of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy must be accurately understood. The institutional advantages of “One Country, Two Systems” must be fully developed. The system and mechanisms of the HKSAR for the implementation of the Constitution and the Basic Law must be improved. (Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, 22.5.2020, basic principle 2) The Central Authorities have comprehensive jurisdiction over the HKSAR under the Constitution, the Basic Law and the relevant laws. The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the HKSAR is derived from the authorization by the Central Authorities. The NPCSC enacting the NSL [NSL 1] and deciding to list it in Annex III to the Basic Law, and the CPG establishing in the HKSAR an office for safeguarding national security [NSL 48(1)], which may exercise jurisdiction over cases concerning offences endangering national security under the NSL in specified circumstances [NSL 55], are important manifestations of the comprehensive jurisdiction of the Central Authorities. Concurrently, the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the HKSAR perform the duty to safeguard national security in accordance with the law [NSL 3(2) and (3) and NSL 8], the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR assumes primary responsibility for safeguarding national security [NSL 12], and the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the HKSAR exercise jurisdiction over the overwhelming majority of cases concerning offences endangering national security [NSL 40], are concrete manifestations of the HKSAR’s high degree of autonomy. These provisions bring together organically the comprehensive jurisdiction and the high degree of autonomy, both of which come under the practice of “One Country, Two Systems”. (Speech delivered by the Chairman of the NPCSC on 30 June 2020)10 |
9 | See The Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, a White Paper published by the Information Office of the State Council in June 2014, Part V(1) (Fully and Accurately Understanding the Meaning of “One Country, Two Systems”), at http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986578.htm (English version). |
10 | Speech delivered at the Twentieth Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth NPC by the Chairman of the NPCSC, Li Zhanshu, on 30 June 2020, available at [Speech delivered at the Twentieth Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth NPC by the Chairman of the NPCSC, Li Zhanshu, on 30 June 2020, Chinese version], with an unofficial English translation available at [Speech delivered at the Twentieth Session of the Standing Committee of the Thirteenth NPC by the Chairman of the NPCSC, Li Zhanshu, on 30 June 2020, unofficial English translation]) |
Safeguarding national security is the prerequisite for guaranteeing the long-term peace and stability of the country and the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. It is the common responsibility of all the people of China, including the people of Hong Kong, and the collective duty of the country and the HKSAR. All activities that endanger the security of national sovereignty, challenge the power of the Central Authorities and the authority of the Basic Law, or use Hong Kong to carry out infiltration or sabotage against the Mainland, are activities that cross the red line, and are absolutely impermissible. (Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, 22.5.2020, basic principle 1) |
The affairs of the HKSAR are the internal affairs of the PRC. They must not be interfered with by any external elements. Any interference by any means in Hong Kong’s affairs by a foreign country, a foreign organisation or a foreigner must be firmly objected to. Any interference in Hong Kong’s affairs and any acts of secession, subversion, infiltration and sabotage by external elements must be firmly prevented and suppressed. (Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, 22.5.2020, basic principle 4) |
Safeguarding national security is fundamentally consistent with respecting and protecting human rights. The purpose of effectively preventing, suppressing and punishing the tiny number of offences endangering national security in accordance with the law is to better protect the lives and property of the overwhelming majority of Hong Kong residents as well as to better protect fundamental rights and freedoms. Any work or law enforcement for safeguarding national security must be carried out in strict compliance with the legal requirements, in accordance with statutory functions, and in observance of statutory procedures. The lawful rights and interests of Hong Kong residents, legal persons and other organizations shall not be violated. (Explanation on the Draft NPC Decision, 22.5.2020, basic principle 5) |
The promulgation of the NSL as a law of the HKSAR was done in accordance with BL 18(2) and (3) on the footing that safeguarding national security is a matter outside the limits of the HKSAR’s autonomy and within the purview of the Central Authorities, and the CPG has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the HKSAR. In the light of Ng Ka Ling v Director of Immigration (No. 2) (1999) 2 HKCFAR 141, the legislative acts of the NPC and NPCSC leading to the promulgation of the NSL as a law of the HKSAR, done in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein, are not subject to constitutional review by the CFA on the basis of any alleged incompatibility as between the NSL and the Basic Law or the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 32, 37 and 70(a) (Case Summary)) |
Under NSL 65, the power of interpretation of the NSL shall be vested in the NPCSC. At the same time, NSL 40 provides for the HKSAR courts’ jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under the NSL except under the circumstances specified in NSL 55, and NSL 45 further provides that unless otherwise provided by the NSL, the HKSAR courts shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of HKSAR. In the circumstances, and in line with the principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, the HKSAR courts have assumed and exercised jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under the NSL, and have accumulated useful jurisprudence to assist in the understanding and application of various provisions in the NSL. The approach of the HKSAR courts to the construction of the NSL has been authoritatively laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) which provided a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the NSL. The CFA laid down the approach of adopting a purposive and contextual construction to an NSL provision in its application to the HKSAR by examining the matrix in which it existed, consisting of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and the NSL, the applicable corpus of local laws including human rights and rule of law principles, the statutory norms and the common law rules, with a view to ascertaining how it was intended to operate in that context. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 13 (Case Summary), citing HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 above) The articles in the NSL had to be read as a coherent whole, taking into account the constitutional basis upon which it was applied to Hong Kong. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 39 (Case Summary) ; Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 45 (Case Summary) ) One of the working principles adopted in drafting the NSL was stated to be accommodating the differences between Mainland China and the HKSAR and striving to address the “convergence, compatibility and complementarity” between the NSL, and the relevant national laws and local laws of the HKSAR11. While the NSL is intended to operate in tandem with the laws of the HKSAR, seeking “convergence, compatibility and complementarity” with local laws, NSL 62 provides for how to deal with possible inconsistencies, giving priority to NSL provisions in such cases. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 18 and 29 (Case Summary)) Given the special status of the NSL as a national law applied under BL 18 and the express reference in NSL 1 to the NPC 5.28 Decision, regard might properly be had to the Explanations and Decisions made in proceedings of the NPC and NPCSC regarding promulgation of the NSL as a law of the HKSAR as extrinsic materials relevant to the consideration of the context and purpose of the NSL. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 11 (Case Summary)) Cf. HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 43-48 (Case Summary) The court held that as far as Hong Kong courts were concerned, the common law approach should continue to be adopted in the construction of the NSL. If the Basic Law, which was right at the interface of “One Country, Two Systems”, was to be construed using the common law approach, there was no valid basis to adopt any other approach in the construction of the NSL. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, para. 49 (Case Summary)) |
11 | (a) Explanation on the Draft Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (18 June 2020), 9th paragraph; and (b) Explanation on the Draft NPCSC Decision on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (30 June 2020), 7th paragraph. See also [62.1]. |
關於香港特別行政區法律地位的香港特別行政區基本法第一條和第十二條規定是香港特別行政區基本法的根本性條款。香港特別行政區任何機構、組織和個人行使權利和自由,不得違背香港特別行政區基本法第一條和第十二條的規定。
The provisions in Articles 1 and 12 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law. No institution, organisation or individual in the Region shall contravene these provisions in exercising their rights and freedoms.
The preamble to the Basic Law declares that the HKSAR is established in accordance with the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution to uphold national unity and territorial integrity and to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. BL 1 provides that the HKSAR is an inalienable part of the PRC. BL 12 provides that the HKSAR shall be a local administrative region of the PRC, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the CPG. NSL 2 refers to BL 1 and 12 as the lynchpin for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR. These articles are essential to upholding national unity and territorial integrity. In so prescribing the constitutional order of the HKSAR, they underscore the general constitutional duty of the Region to safeguard national security. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, para. 28 (Case Summary)) |
The effect of NSL 2 is that when anyone exercises his rights and freedoms, he cannot refuse to recognise the HKSAR being an inalienable part of the PRC, or that the HKSAR enjoys only a high degree of autonomy rather than complete autonomy. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 107 (Case Summary)) |
中央人民政府對香港特別行政區有關的國家安全事務負有根本責任。
香港特別行政區負有維護國家安全的憲制責任,應當履行維護國家安全的職責。
香港特別行政區行政機關、立法機關、司法機關應當依據本法和其他有關法律規定有效防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全的行為和活動。
The Central People’s Government has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
It is the duty of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Constitution to safeguard national security and the Region shall perform the duty accordingly.
The executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the Region shall effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for any act or activity endangering national security in accordance with this Law and other relevant laws.
Safeguarding national security being a matter falling within the remit of the Central Authorities, the CPG has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the HKSAR. (Explanation on the Draft Decision of the NPCSC on Adding a Law to the List of National Laws in Annex III to the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC, 30 June 2020, 6th paragraph: see footnote 3 in [1.1] above) |
Pursuant to NSL 3, the CPG deals with national security affairs at the national level while the HKSAR deals with the same at the local level. The respective roles of the CPG and the HKSAR ensure that the Region works in tandem with the CPG in safeguarding national security. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, para. 31 (Case Summary)) Since the HKSAR is part and parcel of the PRC, safeguarding national security in the HKSAR must be a component of the overall national security framework of the PRC, which must be a matter outside the limits of the HKSAR’s autonomy but within the purview of the Central Authorities. In other words, there is nothing called defending against “national security risk of Hong Kong”, but we should defend against “national security risk in the HKSAR”. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 60 (Case Summary)) |
Art. 3 of the NPC 5.28 Decision provides that the HKSAR has a constitutional duty to safeguard national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. The fact that the HKSAR is under a constitutional responsibility to safeguard national security in the HKSAR is not inconsistent with the CPG having the responsibility for safeguarding national security in the Region under the Basic Law. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 60 (Case Summary)) |
The courts of the HKSAR are fully committed to safeguarding national security and to acting effectively to prevent, suppress and impose punishment for any act or activity endangering national security as required by NSL 3. That duty would unfailingly be carried out whenever national security issues are properly raised and duly explored, enabling the courts to undertake a proper adjudication of those issues. (Secretary for Justice v Timothy Wynn Owen, KC [2022] HKCFA 23, para. 33 (Case Summary)) There was a need for the court to give due weight to the views of the law enforcement agencies in matters of national security and related risk assessment. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 64 (Case Summary)) |
Viewed purposively having regard to NSL 3, 8 and 41, the intent of the NSL is plainly for national security to be safeguarded by the complementary application of the laws which it created together with the existing laws of the HKSAR, such as those contained in Part II of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200). (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, paras. 22-24 (Case Summary)) The imperative in NSL 3(3), 8 and 42(1) on strict and full application of laws to further the prevention, suppression and punishment of offences endangering national security covers not only the NSL but also local laws. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 53 (Case Summary)). |
香港特別行政區維護國家安全應當尊重和保障人權,依法保護香港特別行政區居民根據香港特別行政區基本法和《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》、《經濟、社會與文化權利的國際公約》適用於香港的有關規定享有的包括言論、新聞、出版的自由,結社、集會、遊行、示威的自由在內的權利和自由。
Human rights shall be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The rights and freedoms, including the freedoms of speech, of the press, of publication, of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration, which the residents of the Region enjoy under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as applied to Hong Kong, shall be protected in accordance with the law.
NSL 4 stipulates that human rights should be respected and protected in safeguarding national security in the HKSAR. However, freedoms and rights of individuals in a society underpinned by the rule of law are neither infinite nor absolute. Otherwise, their destructive and disruptive force would be self-evident. Neither could the overriding principle of BL 1, i.e. “the [HKSAR] is an inalienable part of the [PRC]”, be neglected or ignored. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325, paras. 46-47 and 65 (Case Summary: ET)) The court held that jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights had to be approached with great caution as the NSL was a national law designed to safeguard national security in the local context, in particular the “One Country, Two Systems” policy which is the very foundation of the HKSAR. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 40 (Case Summary)) See also the annotations to NSL 2. |
BL 39(1) provides that the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the HKSAR. |
防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全犯罪,應當堅持法治原則。法律規定為犯罪行為的,依照法律定罪處刑;法律沒有規定為犯罪行為的,不得定罪處刑。
任何人未經司法機關判罪之前均假定無罪。保障犯罪嫌疑人、被告人和其他訴訟參與人依法享有的辯護權和其他訴訟權利。任何人已經司法程序被最終確定有罪或者宣告無罪的,不得就同一行為再予審判或者懲罰。
The principle of the rule of law shall be adhered to in preventing, suppressing, and imposing punishment for offences endangering national security. A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the law shall be convicted and punished in accordance with the law. No one shall be convicted and punished for an act which does not constitute an offence under the law.
A person is presumed innocent until convicted by a judicial body. The right to defend himself or herself and other rights in judicial proceedings that a criminal suspect, defendant, and other parties in judicial proceedings are entitled to under the law shall be protected. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he or she has already been finally convicted or acquitted in judicial proceedings.
As an important facet of the principle of the rule of law, the principle of legality required that if a statute did not expressly or by necessary implication override or restrict fundamental rights, it would not be construed as doing so. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 23 (Case Summary)) |
Where the NSL refers to “offence[s] endangering national security” without distinguishing between those offences which it creates and other offences of that nature, subject to any contextual or purposive arguments to the contrary in any particular case, it is referring to all such offences without distinction. (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, para. 27 (Case Summary)) |
In Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, the construction of NSL 42(2) was discussed. One of the issues was whether an applicant for bail had to acknowledge that he had already committed acts endangering national security or the judge or magistrate had to form a view that the applicant had committed such acts and that he would not continue to commit them. The court held that it would be wholly illogical to read NSL 42(2) as meaning that the person seeking bail was first required to admit his guilt. Such a construction of NSL 42(2) would be wholly inconsistent with the presumption of innocence expressly recognised in NSL 5. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 29-30 (Case Summary)) |
維護國家主權、統一和領土完整是包括香港同胞在內的全中國人民的共同義務。
在香港特別行政區的任何機構、組織和個人都應當遵守本法和香港特別行政區有關維護國家安全的其他法律,不得從事危害國家安全的行為和活動。
香港特別行政區居民在參選或者就任公職時應當依法簽署文件確認或者宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法,效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區。
It is the common responsibility of all the people of China, including the people of Hong Kong, to safeguard the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China.
Any institution, organisation or individual in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall abide by this Law and the laws of the Region in relation to the safeguarding of national security, and shall not engage in any act or activity which endangers national security.
A resident of the Region who stands for election or assumes public office shall confirm in writing or take an oath to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China in accordance with the law.
Art. 54 of the Constitution provides: “Citizens of the PRC shall have the obligation to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the motherland; they must not behave in any way that endangers the motherland’s security, honor or interests.” |
The Public Offices (Candidacy and Taking Up Offices) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2021 (Ord. No. 13 of 2021) seeks to implement the oath-taking requirements for public officers as stipulated in the NPCSC Interpretation of BL 104 (7 November 2016) and NSL 6, thereby fulfilling the HKSAR Government's constitutional responsibility. The Ordinance clearly explains the meaning of a reference to “upholding Basic Law and bearing allegiance to HKSAR”. “Upholding Basic Law and bearing allegiance to HKSAR” is a fundamental obligation and responsibility of public officers. The Ordinance further ensures that public officers understand their constitutional responsibility, and safeguards that only a person who meets the fundamental requirement of “upholding Basic Law and bearing allegiance to HKSAR” could hold the relevant public office in order to ensure “Hong Kong being administered by patriots”12. |
12 | See Press Release of the HKSAR Government on 21 May 2021, available at https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202105/21/P2021052100273.htm. See also the Legislative Council Brief on the Public Offices (Candidacy and Taking Up Offices) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2021, CMAB C4/9/1, 23 February 2021, available at https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr20-21/english/bills/brief/b202102261_brf.pdf. |
香港特別行政區應當儘早完成香港特別行政區基本法規定的維護國家安全立法,完善相關法律。
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete, as early as possible, legislation for safeguarding national security as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall refine relevant laws.
That stipulation is in BL 23 which provides that the HKSAR shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the CPG, or theft of State secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies. (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, para. 31 (Case Summary)) |
The HKSAR should amend and refine relevant local legislation (including the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159)) in a timely manner, and resolve legal issues encountered in the implementation of the NSL through local legislation as far as practicable. (Answers of the Head of the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission to Media Questions on the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, Q&A 413; Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the motion concerning the draft Interpretation of NSL 14 and 4714) |
13 | “Answers of the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC to the Questions of the Media on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the ‘Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR’ by the NPCSC”, 30 December 2022, available at “Answers of the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC to the Questions of the Media on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the ‘Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR’ by the NPCSC”, 30 December 2022 (Chinese version only) |
14 | “Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the Results of Its Deliberation over the Motion on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (Proposed Draft)”, 30 December 2022, available at Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the Results of Its Deliberation over the Motion on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (Proposed Draft)”, 30 December 2022 (Chinese version only) |
香港特別行政區執法、司法機關應當切實執行本法和香港特別行政區現行法律有關防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全行為和活動的規定,有效維護國家安全。
In order to safeguard national security effectively, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall fully enforce this Law and the laws in force in the Region concerning the prevention of, suppression of, and imposition of punishment for acts and activities endangering national security.
香港特別行政區應當加強維護國家安全和防範恐怖活動的工作。對學校、社會團體、媒體、網絡等涉及國家安全的事宜,香港特別行政區政府應當採取必要措施,加強宣傳、指導、監督和管理。
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen its work on safeguarding national security and prevention of terrorist activities. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall take necessary measures to strengthen public communication, guidance, supervision and regulation over matters concerning national security, including those relating to schools, universities, social organisations, the media, and the internet.
Art. 4 of the NPC 5.28 Decision provides that the HKSAR must establish and improve the institutions and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security, strengthen the enforcement forces for safeguarding national security, and step up enforcement to safeguard national security15. |
15 | The NPC 5.28 Decision is available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A301!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y. |
香港特別行政區應當通過學校、社會團體、媒體、網絡等開展國家安全教育,提高香港特別行政區居民的國家安全意識和守法意識。
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall promote national security education in schools and universities and through social organisations, the media, the internet and other means to raise the awareness of Hong Kong residents of national security and of the obligation to abide by the law.
香港特別行政區行政長官應當就香港特別行政區維護國家安全事務向中央人民政府負責,並就香港特別行政區履行維護國家安全職責的情況提交年度報告。
如中央人民政府提出要求,行政長官應當就維護國家安全特定事項及時提交報告。
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable to the Central People’s Government for affairs relating to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall submit an annual report on the performance of duties of the Region in safeguarding national security.
The Chief Executive shall, at the request of the Central People’s Government, submit in a timely manner a report on specific matters relating to safeguarding national security.
Art. 5 of the NPC 5.28 Decision provides that the CE of the HKSAR must regularly report to the CPG on the HKSAR’s performance of the duty to safeguard national security, carry out national security education, and forbid acts and activities endangering national security in accordance with the law, etc. |
16 | The NPC 5.28 Decision is available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A301!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y. |
By virtue of BL 43 and 60, the CE is both the head of the HKSAR representing the Region and the head of the Government of the HKSAR, and is accountable to both the CPG and the Region. |
NSL 3 provides that the CPG has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the HKSAR and the HKSAR has a constitutional duty to safeguard national security. NSL 11 tasks the CE as the first person responsible for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR being accountable to the CPG, which follows from the constitutional status of the CE as the head of the HKSAR representing the Region and being accountable to the CPG under BL 43. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, para. 32 (Case Summary)) |
香港特別行政區設立維護國家安全委員會,負責香港特別行政區維護國家安全事務,承擔維護國家安全的主要責任,並接受中央人民政府的監督和問責。
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish the Committee for Safeguarding National Security. The Committee shall be responsible for affairs relating to and assume primary responsibility for safeguarding national security in the Region. It shall be under the supervision of and accountable to the Central People’s Government.
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會由行政長官擔任主席,成員包括政務司長、財政司長、律政司長、保安局局長、警務處處長、本法第十六條規定的警務處維護國家安全部門的負責人、入境事務處處長、海關關長和行政長官辦公室主任。
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會下設秘書處,由秘書長領導。秘書長由行政長官提名,報中央人民政府任命。
The Chief Executive shall be the chairperson of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The other members of the Committee shall be the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary for Justice, the Secretary for Security, the Commissioner of Police, the head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force established under Article 16 of this Law, the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, and the Director of the Chief Executive’s Office.
A secretariat headed by a Secretary-General shall be established under the Committee. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Central People’s Government upon nomination by the Chief Executive.
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會的職責為:
(一) | 分析研判香港特別行政區維護國家安全形勢,規劃有關工作,制定香港特別行政區維護國家安全政策; |
(二) | 推進香港特別行政區維護國家安全的法律制度和執行機制建設; |
(三) | 協調香港特別行政區維護國家安全的重點工作和重大行動。 |
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會的工作不受香港特別行政區任何其他機構、組織和個人的干涉,工作信息不予公開。香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會作出的決定不受司法覆核。
The duties and functions of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:
(1) | analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, making work plans, and formulating policies for safeguarding national security in the Region; |
(2) | advancing the development of the legal system and enforcement mechanisms of the Region for safeguarding national security; and |
(3) | coordinating major work and significant operations for safeguarding national security in the Region. |
No institution, organisation or individual in the Region shall interfere with the work of the Committee. Information relating to the work of the Committee shall not be subject to disclosure. Decisions made by the Committee shall not be amenable to judicial review.
On 30 December 2022, the NPCSC adopted the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 4717in accordance with the provisions of Art. 67(4) of the Constitution and NSL 65. |
17 | Available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A304!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y (L.N. 5 of 2023). |
NSL 14 had to be understood against the matrix in which it existed and this called for a closer examination of other relevant NSL articles read as a coherent whole, in particular, NSL 2, 3 and 7 to 11. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 27-32 (Case Summary)) |
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 35-39 (Case Summary), the court held that reading NSL 12 and 14 together as a coherent whole, by subjecting the CSNS to direct supervision and control of the CPG and at the same time prohibiting any interference with the CSNS’s work by institutions, which plainly included the courts, and specifically excluding judicial review of the CSNS’s decisions, the legislative intent was clear:
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In accordance with the provisions of NSL 14, the CSNS assumes statutory duties and functions for safeguarding national security in the HKSAR and has the power to make judgements and decisions on the question whether national security is involved. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, para. 1) |
No institution, including the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary, organisation or individual in the HKSAR shall interfere with the work of the CSNS; they shall all respect and implement the decisions of the CSNS. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, para. 1) (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, para. 59 (Case Summary) , holding that the Director of Immigration had to implement the CSNS’s decision faithfully.) |
Decisions made by the CSNS have enforceable legal effect. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, para. 1) |
Neither the SJ nor the Director of Immigration owed a duty to inform the solicitors of an accused person or his preferred overseas counsel of the CSNS’s decision about the proposed representation of the accused by the overseas counsel in the trial, particularly when information relating to the work of the CSNS was protected from disclosure under NSL 14(2). (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 85 (Case Summary)) |
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 35-39 (Case Summary), the court held that the duties and functions of the CSNS under NSL 14 fell within the exclusive purview of the CPG having the overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the HKSAR. On a proper construction, the NSL had not vested the HKSAR courts with any jurisdiction over the work of the CSNS under NSL 14 in the exercise of their judicial function. NSL 14 enjoined in clear and unqualified terms the courts from doing so. This prescribed the jurisdictional limit on the courts’ exercise of their judicial function in national security cases under the NSL. It had been argued that there would be no effective control over the work of the CSNS and any person aggrieved by its decision would have no recourse or remedy if the CSNS was not subject to judicial review by the HKSAR courts. This argument was rejected by the court, which held that such argument ignored NSL 12 which subjected the CSNS to the direct supervision and control of the CPG. The challenge over the effectiveness of the supervision and control of the CPG over the CSNS on the ground that they were ultra vires NSL 14 was also rejected as entirely baseless and wholly unwarranted. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 42-43 (Case Summary)) It had been argued that NSL 14 was subject to the common law rule that a statutory provision which ousted the court’s supervisory jurisdiction over a public body did not apply if the impugned decision was made outside the public body’s powers (“the Ultra Vires Rule”). The court held that such reliance on the Ultra Vires Rule was entirely misplaced. Under the constitutional norm of the HKSAR, the courts had not been vested with any jurisdiction over the work of the CSNS under NSL 14 to begin with. The question of NSL 14 ousting the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over the CSNS simply did not arise. In any event, in light of NSL 62, priority had to be given to NSL 14 over the Ultra Vires Rule, which meant that the rule could have no application to the work and decisions of the CSNS. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 26 and 41 (Case Summary)) |
The question whether overseas lawyers not qualified to practise generally in the HKSAR may serve as defence counsel or legal representatives in cases concerning an offence endangering national security is a question that requires certification under NSL 47, and a certificate from the CE shall be obtained. If the courts of the HKSAR have not requested or obtained a certificate on such question from the CE, the CSNS shall perform its statutory duties and functions in accordance with the provisions of NSL 14 to make relevant judgements and decisions on such situation and question. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, para. 3) The court held that the NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 catered for the specific scenario where the HKSAR courts had not requested or obtained a certificate from the CE on the Question (i.e. whether overseas lawyers not qualified to practise generally in the HKSAR serving as defence counsel or legal representatives in cases concerning an offence endangering national security might pose national security risks) under NSL 47. In this situation, the CSNS should make relevant judgements and decisions on the Question under NSL 14. It was beyond doubt that the Question fell within the purview of the CSNS. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 46 and 57 (Case Summary)) |
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會設立國家安全事務顧問,由中央人民政府指派,就香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會履行職責相關事務提供意見。國家安全事務顧問列席香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會會議。
The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have a National Security Adviser, who shall be designated by the Central People’s Government and provide advice on matters relating to the duties and functions of the Committee. The National Security Adviser shall sit in on meetings of the Committee.
香港特別行政區政府警務處設立維護國家安全的部門,配備執法力量。
警務處維護國家安全部門負責人由行政長官任命,行政長官任命前須書面徵求本法第四十八條規定的機構的意見。警務處維護國家安全部門負責人在就職時應當宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法,效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區,遵守法律,保守秘密。
警務處維護國家安全部門可以從香港特別行政區以外聘請合格的專門人員和技術人員,協助執行維護國家安全相關任務。
The Police Force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a department for safeguarding national security with law enforcement capacity.
The head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be appointed by the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive shall seek in writing the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When assuming office, the head of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation of secrecy.
The department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force may recruit qualified professionals and technical personnel from outside the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to provide assistance in the performance of duties for safeguarding national security.
警務處維護國家安全部門的職責為:
(一) | 收集分析涉及國家安全的情報信息; |
(二) | 部署、協調、推進維護國家安全的措施和行動; |
(三) | 調查危害國家安全犯罪案件; |
(四) | 進行反干預調查和開展國家安全審查; |
(五) | 承辦香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會交辦的維護國家安全工作; |
(六) | 執行本法所需的其他職責。 |
The duties and functions of the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force shall be:
(1) | collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security; |
(2) | planning, coordinating and enforcing measures and operations for safeguarding national security; |
(3) | investigating offences endangering national security; |
(4) | conducting counter-interference investigation and national security review; |
(5) | carrying out tasks of safeguarding national security assigned by the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; and |
(6) | performing other duties and functions necessary for the enforcement of this Law. |
香港特別行政區律政司設立專門的國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門,負責危害國家安全犯罪案件的檢控工作和其他相關法律事務。該部門檢控官由律政司長徵得香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會同意後任命。
律政司國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門負責人由行政長官任命,行政長官任命前須書面徵求本法第四十八條規定的機構的意見。律政司國家安全犯罪案件檢控部門負責人在就職時應當宣誓擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法,效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區,遵守法律,保守秘密。
The Department of Justice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a specialised prosecution division responsible for the prosecution of offences endangering national security and other related legal work. The prosecutors of this division shall be appointed by the Secretary for Justice after obtaining the consent of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
The head of the specialised prosecution division of the Department of Justice shall be appointed by the Chief Executive, who shall seek in writing the opinion of the Office established under Article 48 of this Law before making the appointment. When assuming office, the head of the specialised prosecution division shall swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, and swear to abide by the law and to observe the obligation of secrecy.
經行政長官批准,香港特別行政區政府財政司長應當從政府一般收入中撥出專門款項支付關於維護國家安全的開支並核准所涉及的人員編制,不受香港特別行政區現行有關法律規定的限制。財政司長須每年就該款項的控制和管理向立法會提交報告。
The Financial Secretary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval of the Chief Executive, appropriate from the general revenue a special fund to meet the expenditure for safeguarding national security and approve the establishment of relevant posts, which are not subject to any restrictions in the relevant provisions of the laws in force in the Region. The Financial Secretary shall submit an annual report on the control and management of the fund for this purpose to the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
任何人組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施以下旨在分裂國家、破壞國家統一行為之一的,不論是否使用武力或者以武力相威脅,即屬犯罪:
(一) | 將香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分從中華人民共和國分離出去; |
(二) | 非法改變香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分的法律地位; |
(三) | 將香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國其他任何部分轉歸外國統治。 |
犯前款罪,對首要分子或者罪行重大的,處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑;對積極參加的,處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑;對其他參加的,處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts, whether or not by force or threat of force, with a view to committing secession or undermining national unification shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) | separating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People’s Republic of China from the People’s Republic of China; |
(2) | altering by unlawful means the legal status of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or of any other part of the People’s Republic of China; or |
(3) | surrendering the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or any other part of the People’s Republic of China to a foreign country. |
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction.
Regardless of whether it is the offence of secession or incitement to secession, both provisions are of utmost importance in upholding national unity and territorial integrity, as well as the foundation of the constitutional system and the legal status of the HKSAR as an inalienable part of the PRC under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 71 (Case Summary: ET)) |
The actus reus of the offence of secession under NSL 20 is the organisation, planning, commission or participation in any of the acts specified in NSL 20(1)(1) to (3). Whether an act allegedly done by a defendant amounts to an act so specified is a matter of fact based on the evidence and the specific circumstances surrounding a particular case. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 12 (Case Summary)) |
The use of force or a threat to use force is not a necessary element of the offence of secession. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 11 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, para. 18 (Case Summary)) The court rejected the submission that the “not by force” component in the phrase “whether or not by force or threat of force” in NSL 20 referred to “non-violent acts that are both unlawful and unacceptable, such as certain terrorist act(s)” and “other serious unlawful acts” such as hacking or attacking of computers operated by authorities or institutions concerning national security. Those situations were dealt with by NSL 24 (terrorist activities) which would be rendered largely redundant if NSL 20 was so construed. Comparing NSL 20 (secession) with NSL 22 (subversion), the court found that there was a highly arguable case that the acts prohibited by NSL 20 did not require violence as an element. The principle of legal certainty required reasonably clear boundaries to be set so that people knew how to conduct their activities accordingly. The proposed criteria “unlawful and unacceptable” were so imprecise that they were capable of leading to great conceptual uncertainty and practical difficulties. Such proposed construction was also held to be objectionable as it put a strained meaning on the phrase “whether or not by force or threat of force” in NSL 20 by reading words into the article which were not there. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2020] HKCFI 3132, paras. 20-23 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 20(1) specifies three types of acts that are caught by the offence of secession, namely: (1) separating the HKSAR or any other part of the PRC from the PRC; (2) altering by unlawful means the legal status of the HKSAR or of any other part of the PRC; or (3) surrendering the HKSAR or any other part of the PRC to a foreign country. |
The offence under NSL 20(1) is committed by persons who organise, plan, commit or participate in secessionist acts. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 49 (Case Summary)) For illustration of actus reus of organising, planning, committing or participating in secession or undermining national unification, see HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, paras. 4 and 10 (Case Summary: ET). It is unnecessary for the defendant to have a concrete and specific plan to achieve secession. (HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, para. 18 (Case Summary: ET)) |
The culpable mind is one which does the prohibited act(s) with a view to committing secession or undermining national unification. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 13 (Case Summary)) |
Citing BL 1 and 12 as well as NSL 2, and given the background leading to the enactment of the NSL, the court held that NSL 20 was, at the very least, not indefensible notwithstanding the freedom of speech and freedom of expression as provided in BL 27 and BOR 16 which were not absolute and could be subject to restrictions. BOR 16 also provides that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2020] HKCFI 3132, para. 25 (Case Summary)) |
The proper approach to construing provisions of the NSL (including its sentencing provisions) is laid down in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3. The NSL is intended to operate coherently with the HKSAR’s legal system, to converge with and be complementary to local laws, which are applicable unless expressly or by necessary implication displaced by inconsistent provisions of the NSL. Local sentencing laws and principles operate within the sentencing scheme laid down by the NSL. Pursuant to NSL 64, penalties under the NSL converge with the corresponding penalties under the local laws. In case of any inconsistency, the corresponding NSL provisions shall prevail pursuant to NSL 62. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 20-30 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, paras. 57-67 (Case Summary: ET)) As a matter of principle, it is not objectionable for the legislature to prescribe a fixed punishment or a range of sentences (including a maximum and minimum sentence) for any particular offence, leaving it to the judge to determine the appropriate sentence on the facts of any given case. NSL 20, 21 and 24 only prescribe ranges of sentences for offences under those Articles, but not the penalty to be imposed in any particular case. They do not impermissibly interfere with the exercise of judicial powers in sentencing. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 3(6) and 66-68 (Case Summary)) The process of sentencing of offences under the NSL was discussed in HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151 (Case Summary: ET) and HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 69-73 (Case Summary). See annotations to NSL 21. Step 1: The court is required to undertake an evaluative assessment of the seriousness of the circumstances of the offence to decide whether the sentence should fall within the upper or lower band of sentence as provided for in the NSL offence provisions. When the court assesses the seriousness of the circumstances of the case, the prime focus is on the offender’s acts, as well as the actual consequences, potential risks and possible influence entailed. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 75 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 53 and 69-71 (Case Summary)) Step 2: The court proceeds to apply local sentencing laws and principles in exercising its discretion to determine the appropriate nature and level of sentence and the starting-point within the appropriate band, taking account of aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the individual’s circumstances. The court has a discretion to determine at which level within the band the sentence should be imposed. The weight, if any, to be given to particular sentencing principles and aggravating or mitigating factors will vary with each case. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 37, 39, 53 and 72 (Case Summary)) The court will at this stage consider whether any of the NSL 33 conditions may be engaged. If so, it should temporarily leave those mitigating factors under NSL 33 to one side to be dealt with after a provisional sentence has been determined. That provisional sentence, arrived at by applying local sentencing laws and principles, must be located within the applicable penalty band. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 72 (Case Summary)). Step 3: If the court finds that one of the NSL 33 conditions applies, it then considers to what extent a lightening (從輕處罰) or reduction (減輕處罰) of the sentence provisionally determined may be merited. Guidance may be sought from non-NSL examples of mitigation involving circumstances similar to those referred to in the three sub-paragraphs of NSL 33(1). Having weighed up the relevant circumstances, the court arrives at its final sentence. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 73 (Case Summary)) For discussion on NSL 33, see annotations to NSL 33. The entire sentencing process represents implementation of the primary purpose of the NSL in safeguarding national security, and preventing, suppressing and imposing punishment for the NSL offences. The approach of giving effect to the principle of convergence, compatibility and complementarity without excising any potentially relevant sentencing principles should be adopted. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 39 and 42 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 20 (secession) distinguishes between different roles that may be played by an offender in the performance of the prohibited acts, laying down a framework of three bands or tiers of potential sentences of differing severity and assigns one such band to each such class of offender: (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 50 (Case Summary))
Since the maximum term of imprisonment that the District Court could impose is limited to 7 years, the District Court sentencing an offence under NSL 20 only considers the sentencing categories under items (b) and (c) above. (HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, para. 14 (Case Summary: ET)) Any person who commits secession or carries out any act undermining national unification (or inciting others to do so) must be suitably punished for contravening BL 1 and 12 which are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law under NSL 2. The punishment must have as its aim a general deterrent effect on the community as a whole and a specific deterrent effect on the individual in question. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, para. 15 (Case Summary)) |
See NSL 64. |
For illustration of active participation in the offence of secession under NSL 20, see: HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, para. 15 (Case Summary: ET). |
任何人煽動、協助、教唆、以金錢或者其他財物資助他人實施本法第二十條規定的犯罪的,即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的,處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑;情節較輕的,處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of the offence under Article 20 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction.
Regardless of whether it is the offence of secession or incitement to secession, both provisions are of utmost importance in upholding national unity and territorial integrity, as well as the foundation of the constitutional system and the legal status of the HKSAR as an inalienable part of the PRC under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 71 (Case Summary: ET)) The offence under NSL 21 is committed by persons who incite, assist in, abet or provide pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of the NSL 20 offence. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 49 (Case Summary)) The offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21 is a pre-emptive offence. “Incitement” (煽動) literally means instigation and prompt with encouragement. The nature of “incitement” (煽動) is similar to that of the common law offence of “incitement” (煽惑). Since its nature is similar to that of the (common law) offence of “incitement”, the gravamen of the offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21 may be expressed as follows: (a) stop people from inciting (including by way of persuading or encouraging) others to commit the offence of secession, even if no one so incited carried out the crime; and (b) allow intervention of the law at the earliest possible stage to stop a person who has been incited from carrying out the offence of secession. Its purpose is to sufficiently protect important public interests such as national security and territorial integrity as well as the foundation of the constitutional system and legal status of the HKSAR, to ensure that the offence of secession could be nipped in the bud by timely and effective suppression and punishment. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, paras. 72-73 (Case Summary: ET)) NSL 21 provides for liability which is either inchoate (incitement) or secondary (assisting, abetting or financing) by reference to the commission of an NSL 20 offence by others. There is no further refinement by reference to the offender’s participatory role. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 51 (Case Summary)) |
In HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 16 (Case Summary) , the court applied the legal principles on the offence of incitement at common law to consider the actus reus and mens rea of the offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21. The actus reus of the common law offence is the incitement by the defendant of another to do something which is a criminal offence. He must do so with the intention that if the other person does as he asks he will commit a criminal offence. That is the mens rea. An incitement can be addressed to the public at large, whether in the form of a published article, an advertisement, or a speech. When examining the subject matter said to constitute the incitement, the subject matter has to be looked at as a whole and all the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into account, including the background leading up to the event complained of. The natural and reasonable effect of the article or the words has to be examined in deciding whether the words used are capable of the incitement alleged. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 33 (Case Summary)) The offence of incitement does not require that someone is actually incited to commit the relevant offence. It is also not a legal requirement for the offence of incitement that there be parity of mens rea on the part of the incitee. The prosecution is not required to prove that the incitee indeed carried out the offence incited. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 143 (Case Summary) ; HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325, paras. 50 and 81 (Case Summary: ET)) It is also immaterial whether the inciter takes any actual action to commit secession, nor is this an element of the offence. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325, paras. 50, 66 and 81 (Case Summary: ET)) The absence of any evidence as to how the incited act of separating the HKSAR from the PRC is to be carried out is immaterial to the prosecution’s case of incitement. There is no requirement that the inciter must specify the means by which the offence is to be carried out. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 143 (Case Summary)) There is nothing to support the claim that an incitement to the public at large will be less effective an incitement when compared with that by way of a one-to-one communication. The criminality of the offence of incitement does not depend on the incitee actually acting upon the incitement to commit the offence but on the inciter who seeks to influence another to commit an offence. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, paras. 20-21 (Case Summary)) There is no direct connection between incitement and the number of inciters. It is a misunderstanding of the spirit and purpose of the law to suggest that a lone wolf will not commit incitement to secession. No response from anyone does not mean absence of inciting acts. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325, paras. 57-58 (Case Summary: ET)) One has to assess incitement by looking at the overall environment, the social context at the time, and individual behaviour, but not solely based on the reaction at the scene. Incitement can take place by osmosis. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325, para. 77 (Case Summary: ET)) |
For illustration, in HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200 (Case Summary), the CFI held that the slogan “光復香港 時代革命” (“Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”) ought to be viewed as a phrase of words or slogan as a whole. The focus should be on whether the words or message was capable of inciting others to commit the offence in question, rather than whether the slogan meant one and only one thing. Having regard to the natural and reasonable effect of displaying a flag with the slogan on it in the particular circumstances of the case and taking into account the contextual matters, the slogan as at 1 July 2020 was capable of carrying the meaning of separating the HKSAR from the PRC and such display of the slogan was capable of inciting others to commit secession. (See paras. 135, 137, 141 and 171(1)) In the subsequent case of HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208 (Case Summary: ET), the court accepted the prosecution expert’s submission that the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” had “the fundamental idea and meaning to bring about the separation of the territory of residence from the State sovereignty; in the context of Hong Kong’s political parlance, these words were put forth necessarily for the objective of separating the HKSAR from the PRC”. (See paras. 59-61, 64 and 68) By including the slogan “香港人要獨立建國” (which may be translated as “Hong Kong people need to establish a sovereign state independently” or “Hong Kong people need to be independent and establish a sovereign state”) in a leaflet, the leaflet incited Hong Kong people to establish an independent sovereign state, which meant to separate the HKSAR from the PRC. (HKSAR v Cho Suet-sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119, para. 50 (Case Summary)) See HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2021] HKDC 1325 (Case Summary: ET) for another illustration of incitement to secession in individual case. |
See annotations to NSL 20 for general principles on sentencing of offences under the NSL and the sentencing process. Any person who commits secession or carries out any act undermining national unification (or inciting others to do so) must be suitably punished for contravening BL 1 and 12 which are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law under NSL 2. The punishment must have as its aim a general deterrent effect on the community as a whole and a specific deterrent effect on the individual in question. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, para. 15 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 21 establishes a two-tier penalty regime for the offence of incitement to secession by reference to its severity: (a) if the circumstances of the offence are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 5 years but not more than 10 years (“the upper band/tier”); and (b) if the circumstances of the offence are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than 5 years, short-term detention or restriction (“the lower band/tier”). (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 52 (Case Summary) HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 67 (Case Summary: ET)) Whether the circumstances of a case of incitement to secession are serious or minor depends on the overall actual circumstances of the case. Taking into account the gravamen of the charge of incitement to secession, the prime focus of the court in assessing the seriousness of the circumstances of the case is on the offender’s acts, the actual consequences, potential risks and possible influence entailed. In this regard, the factors (non-exhaustive) which the court needs to consider include but are not limited to the following:
(HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, paras. 68-75 (Case Summary: ET) ; HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 71 (Case Summary)) The seriousness of a particular offence varies from case to case. There are limits to the extent to which comparisons with other cases can assist the sentencing court in determining the seriousness of the offence and the appropriate sentence before it. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 33 (Case Summary)) The cases in which the circumstances of the offence of incitement to secession were held to be “of a serious nature” under NSL 21 include: (a) HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239 (Case Summary); (b) HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151 (Case Summary: ET); (c) HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780 (Case Summary). In Lui Sai Yu the use of social media for committing incitement was an aggravating feature. The aggravation laid in the extreme effectiveness of social media in providing platforms or means to individuals with the ease and ability to communicate or disseminate messages or content to a vast audience instantly without physical contact or geographical constraints, thereby amplifying the effects of the incitement and increasing exponentially the threats and risks it posed to national security. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 34 (Case Summary)) NSL 21 sets a framework of penalty bands tied to the relative seriousness of an individual offence, prescribing a sentence within the specified range. It prescribes in mandatory language the nature and length of the sentence to be imposed. It cannot be the legislative intention that a “serious” offence should be dealt with by a sentence falling below the prescribed range. Viewing NSL 21 purposively, the minimum of 5 years for a case in the upper band/tier is mandatory. Subject to the effect of NSL 33(1), whatever discount the court may give on account of mitigation, the ultimate sentence imposed cannot go below the minimum of 5 years. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 64-66 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 63 (Case Summary)) |
See annotations to NSL 33. |
任何人組織、策劃、實施或者參與實施以下以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段旨在顛覆國家政權行為之一的,即屬犯罪:
(一) | 推翻、破壞中華人民共和國憲法所確立的中華人民共和國根本制度; |
(二) | 推翻中華人民共和國中央政權機關或者香港特別行政區政權機關; |
(三) | 嚴重干擾、阻撓、破壞中華人民共和國中央政權機關或者香港特別行政區政權機關依法履行職能; |
(四) | 攻擊、破壞香港特別行政區政權機關履職場所及其設施,致使其無法正常履行職能。 |
犯前款罪,對首要分子或者罪行重大的,處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑;對積極參加的,處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑;對其他參加的,處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
A person who organises, plans, commits or participates in any of the following acts by force or threat of force or other unlawful means with a view to subverting the State power shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) | overthrowing or undermining the basic system of the People’s Republic of China established by the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China; |
(2) | overthrowing the body of central power of the People’s Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; |
(3) | seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions in accordance with the law by the body of central power of the People’s Republic of China or the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; or |
(4) | attacking or damaging the premises and facilities used by the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to perform its duties and functions, rendering it incapable of performing its normal duties and functions. |
A person who is a principal offender or a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; a person who actively participates in the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction.
任何人煽動、協助、教唆、以金錢或者其他財物資助他人實施本法第二十二條規定的犯罪的,即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的,處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑;情節較輕的,處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制。
A person who incites, assists in, abets or provides pecuniary or other financial assistance or property for the commission by other persons of the offence under Article 22 of this Law shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years; if the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a minor nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction.
Inciting the commission by other persons of the offence of subversion is a pre-emptive offence, the gravamen of which is to: (a) stop people from inciting (including by way of persuading or encouraging) others to commit the offence of subversion, even if no one so incited carried out the crime; and (b) allow intervention of the law at the earliest possible stage to stop a person who has been incited from carrying out the offence of subversion. Its purpose is to sufficiently protect important public interests such as national security and territorial integrity as well as the foundation of the constitutional system and legal status of the HKSAR, to ensure that the offence of subversion could be nipped in the bud by timely and effective suppression and punishment. (HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 75 (Case Summary: ET)) Cases in which the defendants were convicted of offences of incitement to subversion under NSL 23 include: HKSAR v Cho Suet-sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119 (Case Summary) ; HKSAR v Yuen Ka Him and Others [2022] HKDC 1147 (Case Summary: ET) ; HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210 (Case Summary: ET) ; HKSAR v Wong Denis Tak Keung and Another [2023] HKDC 168 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214 (Case Summary: ET) . |
For general principles on sentencing of offences under the NSL and the sentencing process, see annotations to NSL 20. The range of penalties stipulated in NSL 23 is divided into two bands/tiers:
The penalty provisions in NSL 23 are the same as NSL 21. See annotations to NSL 21. |
Where the defendant is not convicted of the offence under NSL 23 but rather the offence of conspiracy under s. 159A of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), the penalty regime under NSL 23 is not directly or mandatorily applicable. Subject to the maximum term of imprisonment for the NSL 23 offence, the court has the discretion to impose any appropriate sentence. (HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214, para. 80 (Case Summary: ET)) See also HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 70 (Case Summary: ET). When exercising its discretion, the court is not obliged to impose a lower sentence on a defendant found guilty of conspiracy than the sentence for the same defendant committing the substantive offence of the relevant charge. As long as the facts reflected that the defendant has committed the substantive offence of the relevant charge, even if he is only charged with and convicted of conspiracy, the court, in exercising its sentencing discretion, can still impose the same sentence as he would have received for having committed the substantive offence. In general, the court should exercise its discretion in this way because the ultimate goal of sentencing is to impose an appropriate sentence on a defendant based on the true seriousness of the crime. (HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214, para. 81 (Case Summary: ET)) Where the defendants charged with conspiracy to incite others to commit subversion have already implemented their conspiracy with others, the gravity of their offence is equivalent to their actually committing the substantive offence. The appropriate sentence should be equivalent to the sentence they would have received for contravening NSL 23. This includes the applicable sentencing tier under NSL 23 and the valid mitigating factors at common law. (HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214, paras. 82 and 104 (Case Summary: ET)) |
In considering whether the circumstances of a case of incitement to subversion are “serious” or “minor”, the approach in HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 75 (as endorsed by the CFA in HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 71 (Case Summary)), is to be followed. (HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214, para. 83 (Case Summary: ET)) . See also the sentencing considerations under NSL 33 and the annotations to NSL 33. In Choi Wing Kit and Yuen Ka Him, the defendants charged with conspiracy to incite others to commit subversion had already acted according to the relevant unlawful agreement. Both cases were found to be circumstances “of a serious nature”. The seriousness of the case laid in the fact that they had individually and as an enterprise committed on multiple occasions acts of incitement to subversion. (HKSAR v Choi Wing Kit and Another [2023] HKDC 214, paras. 84-85 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Yuen Ka Him and Others [2022] HKDC 1147, paras. 63 and 74 (Case Summary: ET)) That the substantive offence has not been completed may well be a mitigating factor but it is not a pivotal element in deciding whether the inchoate offence of incitement under NSL 23 has been committed in circumstances of a serious or minor nature. (HKSAR v Wong Denis Tak Keung and Another [2023] HKDC 168, paras. 25-27 (Case Summary)) |
The gravamen of the offence of incitement to subversion is pre-emptive. The fact that no one has been incited by the defendants would not reduce their culpability. (HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 91 (Case Summary: ET)) That the defendant has no remorse does not constitute a factor that would add to the gravity of the case under NSL 23. Nor does it constitute an aggravating factor under the common law. (HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, paras. 96-97 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 97 (Case Summary: ET)) The CA stated in Ma Chun Man that unless otherwise provided for by the NSL, the local corpus of the law on sentencing are applicable. According to common law sentencing principles, young people’s immaturity and susceptibility to instigation are mitigating factors. Where the defendant is immature, reckless and misled by others at the material time, the court can lower his culpability. In determining whether the circumstances of the case are “serious”, consideration must be given to the age and immaturity of the offender as well as other circumstances leading to his wrong and not fully informed decision. In Yuen Ka Him, the court did not rule out the possibility that each defendant committed the offence because of these factors. Hence, under the premise that the benefit of doubt should go to the defendants, the circumstances of the offence committed by each defendant were lowered to the “minor” tier. (HKSAR v Yuen Ka Him and Others [2022] HKDC 1147, paras. 77 and 79 (Case Summary: ET)) |
By reason of the penalty provisions in the NSL, a defendant who has pleaded guilty but has been found to have committed the offence of incitement to subversion in circumstances “of a serious nature” cannot in some circumstances avail himself of the full customary discount for pleading guilty. Nonetheless, the court may take into account his guilty plea and absence of previous transgressions in reducing his sentence to no less than 5 years’ imprisonment. (HKSAR v Wong Denis Tak Keung and Another [2023] HKDC 168, para. 61 (Case Summary)) |
為脅迫中央人民政府、香港特別行政區政府或者國際組織或者威嚇公眾以圖實現政治主張,組織、策劃、實施、參與實施或者威脅實施以下造成或者意圖造成嚴重社會危害的恐怖活動之一的,即屬犯罪:
(一) | 針對人的嚴重暴力; |
(二) | 爆炸、縱火或者投放毒害性、放射性、傳染病病原體等物質; |
(三) | 破壞交通工具、交通設施、電力設備、燃氣設備或者其他易燃易爆設備; |
(四) | 嚴重干擾、破壞水、電、燃氣、交通、通訊、網絡等公共服務和管理的電子控制系統; |
(五) | 以其他危險方法嚴重危害公眾健康或者安全。 |
犯前款罪,致人重傷、死亡或者使公私財產遭受重大損失的,處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑;其他情形,處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑。
A person who organises, plans, commits, participates in or threatens to commit any of the following terrorist activities causing or intended to cause grave harm to the society with a view to coercing the Central People’s Government, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or an international organisation or intimidating the public in order to pursue political agenda shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) | serious violence against a person or persons; |
(2) | explosion, arson, or dissemination of poisonous or radioactive substances, pathogens of infectious diseases or other substances; |
(3) | sabotage of means of transport, transport facilities, electric power or gas facilities, or other combustible or explosible facilities; |
(4) | serious interruption or sabotage of electronic control systems for providing and managing public services such as water, electric power, gas, transport, telecommunications and the internet; or |
(5) | other dangerous activities which seriously jeopardise public health, safety or security. |
A person who commits the offence causing serious bodily injury, death or significant loss of public or private property shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years; in other circumstances, a person who commits the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years.
NSL 24(1) specifies five types of activities that are caught by the offence of terrorist activities, namely:
|
The actus reus of the offence of terrorist activities is the organisation, planning, commission, participation in, or threatening to commit any of the activities specified under NSL 24(1)(1) to (5) and which causes grave harm to the society or which is intended by the defendant to cause such harm. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, paras. 37 and 38 (Case Summary)) |
The mens rea for the offence under NSL 24 is doing the prohibited act(s) with a view to coercing the CPG, the HKSARG or an international organisation or intimidating the public in order to pursue a political agenda. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 39 (Case Summary)) |
The prosecution has to prove grave harm being caused or intended to be caused to the society when the defendant committed the prohibited acts. The ordinary meaning of the word “harm” is wide. The acts itemised in NSL 24(1)(1) to (5) are of such a broad range that it cannot be suggested that “grave harm” means only physical harm. Harm therefore is not restricted to physical harm. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 161 (Case Summary)) |
The agenda of separating the HKSAR from the PRC was clearly a political agenda. The slogan “光復香港 時代革命 Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” which was capable of bearing a secessionist meaning, still advocated a political agenda even if it was taken to mean a desire to recover what was lost and the need for a fundamental change in Hong Kong. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, paras. 164-165 (Case Summary)) Intimidation is for the purpose of pursuing one’s political agenda if it is targeted against those in the community who do not support the political agenda, thereby seeking to contain or suppress counter voices. An intimidation to a section of the public is intimidation to the public all the same for a society is made up of individuals and different groups of such individuals. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, paras. 167-168 (Case Summary)) |
Serious violence against persons does not mean serious injuries caused to the persons. It is the nature of the act embarked upon which is required to be proved. Whether such act results in or causes serious bodily injury is a matter relevant to sentence, not an element of the offence of terrorist activities. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, para. 159 (Case Summary)) |
For general principles on sentencing of offences under the NSL and the sentencing process, see annotations to NSL 20. NSL 24 adopts a tiered sentencing regime depending on whether the defendant committed the offence “causing serious bodily injury, death or significant loss of public or private property” or “in other circumstances”. A case where the “other circumstances” limb of the sentencing regime was applicable in determining the starting point is HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, para. 35 (Case Summary). NSL 24 is in similar terms as the statutory provisions dealing with terrorist activities in other jurisdictions. However, as the structure and substance of the statutes are different and the cultural and socio-economic situations pertaining at the material time when a sentence was considered by the court were not identical, it is unhelpful to refer to the sentences passed in other jurisdictions. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, para. 27 (Case Summary)) Having pleaded not guilty to the offences, the defendant cannot then rely on his expressed remorse as a mitigating factor to ask for a reduction in sentence. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, para. 40 (Case Summary)) |
There is an added degree of criminality where the political agenda is of a secessionist nature (which involves a contravention of BL 1 and 12 which are the fundamental provisions in the Basic Law under NSL 2) in that such an agenda is seeking to undermine national unification. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2239, paras. 36-37 (Case Summary)) |
組織、領導恐怖活動組織的,即屬犯罪,處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑,並處沒收財產;積極參加的,處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑,並處罰金;其他參加的,處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制,可以並處罰金。
本法所指的恐怖活動組織,是指實施或者意圖實施本法第二十四條規定的恐怖活動罪行或者參與或者協助實施本法第二十四條規定的恐怖活動罪行的組織。
A person who organises or takes charge of a terrorist organisation shall be guilty of an offence and shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years, and shall be subject to confiscation of property; a person who actively participates in a terrorist organisation shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years and shall be imposed with a criminal fine; and other participants shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be liable to a criminal fine.
For the purpose of this Law, a terrorist organisation means an organisation which commits or intends to commit the offence under Article 24 of this Law or participates or assists in the commission of the offence.
為恐怖活動組織、恐怖活動人員、恐怖活動實施提供培訓、武器、信息、資金、物資、勞務、運輸、技術或者場所等支持、協助、便利,或者製造、非法管有爆炸性、毒害性、放射性、傳染病病原體等物質以及以其他形式準備實施恐怖活動的,即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的,處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑,並處罰金或者沒收財產;其他情形,處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制,並處罰金。
有前款行為,同時構成其他犯罪的,依照處罰較重的規定定罪處罰。
A person who provides support, assistance or facility such as training, weapons, information, funds, supplies, labour, transport, technologies or venues to a terrorist organisation or a terrorist, or for the commission of a terrorist activity; or manufactures or illegally possesses substances such as explosive, poisonous or radioactive substances and pathogens of infectious diseases or uses other means to prepare for the commission of a terrorist activity, shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
If the act referred to in the preceding paragraph also constitutes other offences, the person who commits the act shall be convicted and sentenced for the offence that carries a more severe penalty.
宣揚恐怖主義、煽動實施恐怖活動的,即屬犯罪。情節嚴重的,處五年以上十年以下有期徒刑,並處罰金或者沒收財產;其他情形,處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制,並處罰金。
A person who advocates terrorism or incites the commission of a terrorist activity shall be guilty of an offence. If the circumstances of the offence committed by a person are of a serious nature, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than ten years, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine or subject to confiscation of property; in other circumstances, a person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years, short-term detention or restriction, and shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
本節規定不影響依據香港特別行政區法律對其他形式的恐怖活動犯罪追究刑事責任並採取凍結財產等措施。
The provisions of this Part shall not affect the prosecution of terrorist offences committed in other forms or the imposition of other measures such as freezing of property in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
An example of the current laws of the HKSAR is the anti-terrorism freezing regime under the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575). Given NSL 28, it is clear that Part 3 (terrorist activities) in Chapter III of the NSL is intended to operate as a separate regime. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 78 (Case Summary)) |
為外國或者境外機構、組織、人員竊取、刺探、收買、非法提供涉及國家安全的國家秘密或者情報的;請求外國或者境外機構、組織、人員實施,與外國或者境外機構、組織、人員串謀實施,或者直接或者間接接受外國或者境外機構、組織、人員的指使、控制、資助或者其他形式的支援實施以下行為之一的,均屬犯罪:
(一) | 對中華人民共和國發動戰爭,或者以武力或者武力相威脅,對中華人民共和國主權、統一和領土完整造成嚴重危害; |
(二) | 對香港特別行政區政府或者中央人民政府制定和執行法律、政策進行嚴重阻撓並可能造成嚴重後果; |
(三) | 對香港特別行政區選舉進行操控、破壞並可能造成嚴重後果; |
(四) | 對香港特別行政區或者中華人民共和國進行制裁、封鎖或者採取其他敵對行動; |
(五) | 通過各種非法方式引發香港特別行政區居民對中央人民政府或者香港特別行政區政府的憎恨並可能造成嚴重後果。 |
犯前款罪,處三年以上十年以下有期徒刑;罪行重大的,處無期徒刑或者十年以上有期徒刑。
本條第一款規定涉及的境外機構、組織、人員,按共同犯罪定罪處刑。
A person who steals, spies, obtains with payment, or unlawfully provides State secrets or intelligence concerning national security for a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China shall be guilty of an offence; a person who requests a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, or conspires with a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, or directly or indirectly receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a foreign country or an institution, organisation or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, to commit any of the following acts shall be guilty of an offence:
(1) | waging a war against the People’s Republic of China, or using or threatening to use force to seriously undermine the sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China; |
(2) | seriously disrupting the formulation and implementation of laws or policies by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Central People’s Government, which is likely to cause serious consequences; |
(3) | rigging or undermining an election in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences; |
(4) | imposing sanctions or blockade, or engaging in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the People’s Republic of China; or |
(5) | provoking by unlawful means hatred among Hong Kong residents towards the Central People’s Government or the Government of the Region, which is likely to cause serious consequences. |
A person who commits the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than ten years; a person who commits an offence of a grave nature shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years.
The institution, organisation and individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China referred to in the first paragraph of this Article shall be convicted and punished for the same offence.
Art. 2 of the NPC 5.28 Decision provides that the country resolutely opposes interference in the HKSAR’s affairs by any foreign or external forces in any form, and will take necessary countermeasures to prevent, stop and punish in accordance with the law activities of secession, subversion, infiltration and sabotage carried out by foreign or external forces in Hong Kong. |
為實施本法第二十條、第二十二條規定的犯罪,與外國或者境外機構、組織、人員串謀,或者直接或者間接接受外國或者境外機構、組織、人員的指使、控制、資助或者其他形式的支援的,依照本法第二十條、第二十二條的規定從重處罰。
A person who conspires with or directly or indirectly receives instructions, control, funding or other kinds of support from a foreign country or an institution, organisation, or individual outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China to commit the offences under Article 20 or 22 of this Law shall be liable to a more severe penalty in accordance with the provisions therein respectively.
公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織實施本法規定的犯罪的,對該組織判處罰金。
公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織因犯本法規定的罪行受到刑事處罰的,應責令其暫停運作或者吊銷其執照或者營業許可證。
An incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which commits an offence under this Law shall be imposed with a criminal fine.
The operation of an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation shall be suspended or its licence or business permit shall be revoked if the body has been punished for committing an offence under this Law.
因實施本法規定的犯罪而獲得的資助、收益、報酬等違法所得以及用於或者意圖用於犯罪的資金和工具,應當予以追繳、沒收。
Proceeds obtained from the commission of an offence under this Law including financial aid, gains and rewards, and funds and tools used or intended to be used in the commission of the offence shall be seized and confiscated.
有以下情形的,對有關犯罪行為人、犯罪嫌疑人、被告人可以從輕、減輕處罰;犯罪較輕的,可以免除處罰:
(一) | 在犯罪過程中,自動放棄犯罪或者自動有效地防止犯罪結果發生的; |
(二) | 自動投案,如實供述自己的罪行的; |
(三) | 揭發他人犯罪行為,查證屬實,或者提供重要線索得以偵破其他案件的。 |
被採取強制措施的犯罪嫌疑人、被告人如實供述執法、司法機關未掌握的本人犯有本法規定的其他罪行的,按前款第二項規定處理。
A lighter penalty may be imposed, or the penalty may be reduced or, in the case of a minor offence, exempted, if an offender, criminal suspect, or defendant:
(1) | in the process of committing an offence, voluntarily discontinues the commission of the offence or voluntarily and effectively forestalls its consequences; |
(2) | voluntarily surrenders himself or herself and gives a truthful account of the offence; or |
(3) | reports on the offence committed by other person, which is verified to be true, or provides material information which assists in solving other criminal case. |
Sub-paragraph (2) of the preceding paragraph shall apply to a criminal suspect or defendant who is subjected to mandatory measures and provides a truthful account of other offences committed by him or her under this Law which are unknown to the law enforcement or judicial authorities.
NSL 33 is not tied to any particular offence but operates in relation to all NSL offences. It operates after determination of the penalty in question and presupposes an identifiable penalty which may then be lightened, reduced or exempted. It applies not only to convicted offenders, but also defendants who are charged but not yet convicted, and criminal suspects who have not yet been charged. Any of such persons may benefit from an alleviating penalty adjustment under NSL 33 if they bring themselves within one of the NSL 33(1) conditions. In the case of a defendant or criminal suspect, the reference to “penalty” must evidently be understood to mean a potential or projected penalty at the end of an eventual or notional sentencing exercise. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 55 (Case Summary)) The purpose of NSL 33 is to encourage offenders and potential offenders not to go through with an offence and to assist the authorities in safeguarding national security and enforcing the law. It provides an incentive for such actions by permitting a downward adjustment of the penalty. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 56 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 33(1) provides for three disposal options: 從輕處罰 (imposing a lighter penalty), 減輕處罰 (reducing the penalty) and 免除處罰 (exempting the penalty) to adjust an otherwise appropriate penalty if one of the three conditions set out in sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) is applicable. 從輕處罰 means that a lighter penalty may be imposed “within the applicable tier as prescribed by the relevant NSL provisions”. 減輕處罰 means that the penalty may be reduced “from the applicable tier to a lower tier”. 減輕處罰 is a more lenient option of adjusting the penalty than 從輕處罰, and they are alternatives to each other. 免除處罰represents the “most lenient” way of dealing with the person concerned. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, paras. 65-68 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, paras. 54 and 59-61 (Case Summary)) |
The legislative purpose of NSL 33 is to provide offenders and potential offenders with an incentive to desist from committing offences, to assist the authorities in the suppression of activities endangering national security and to facilitate law enforcement. Construing NSL 33 contextually and purposively, it is not intended that extenuating sentencing adjustments to terms of imprisonment should be available in respect of mitigating factors unconnected with the clear rationale of NSL 33. The specified conditions under NSL 33 are therefore exhaustive. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 68 (Case Summary) ; HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 71 (Case Summary)) |
It is the weight attached to the mitigating circumstances that determines if the court should 從輕處罰 (impose a lighter penalty) or 減輕處罰 (reduce the penalty). They essentially involve the same qualitative assessment in which the court evaluates and weighs all the available mitigating factors. In sentencing an NSL offence, if the court decides to 從輕處罰, it may impose a lighter penalty within either of the upper band/tier or lower band/tier (depending on which band/tier is applicable in the case). For serious offences, whatever discount the court may give, the ultimate sentence cannot go below the mandatory minimum of 5 years in the upper band/tier. In contrast, if the court decides to 減輕處罰, it may reduce the penalty from the upper band/tier to the lower band/tier. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 69 (Case Summary)) Mitigating factors not specified in NSL 33(1) but recognised under common law, such as guilty pleas, can operate in full for the court to consider 從輕處罰, i.e. imposing a lighter sentence within the respective range of the lower and upper bands/tiers. For whatever the discount those mitigating factors may afford, the ultimate sentence should stay within the range of either band/tier. Those other mitigating factors cannot apply to 減輕處罰 to reduce the sentence below the minimum of 5 years in the upper band/tier. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, paras. 72-73 (Case Summary)) |
That a defendant charged with conspiracy to incite the commission by other persons of the offence of subversion had opted out of or not participated in the activities of the political organization concerned before their arrest does not constitute a ground for sentence reduction or lowering of the penalty tier under NSL 33. It is because the alleged opt-out defendant had already committed the substantive offence according to the unlawful agreement before he opted out. Hence, it cannot be said that he voluntarily discontinued the commission of the offence when opting out; that is, he does not meet the requirements of NSL 33. The defendant may only suggest his culpability be limited to the substantive offence committed by him before opting out, whereas the offence subsequently committed by the others would have nothing to do with him. (HKSAR v Yuen Ka Him and Others [2022] HKDC 1147, para. 76 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin and Others [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 92 (Case Summary: ET)) |
Voluntary surrender is an act that takes place before any appearance of the offender before the court. It would be too far-fetching to suggest that it covers the making of a plea by him at trial. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 94 (Case Summary)) |
不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份的人實施本法規定的犯罪的,可以獨立適用或者附加適用驅逐出境。
不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份的人違反本法規定,因任何原因不對其追究刑事責任的,也可以驅逐出境。
A person who is not a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may be subject to deportation as the sole or an additional punishment if he or she commits an offence under this Law.
A person who is not a permanent resident of the Region may be subject to deportation if he or she contravenes the provisions of this Law but is not prosecuted for any reason.
任何人經法院判決犯危害國家安全罪行的,即喪失作為候選人參加香港特別行政區舉行的立法會、區議會選舉或者出任香港特別行政區任何公職或者行政長官選舉委員會委員的資格;曾經宣誓或者聲明擁護中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法、效忠中華人民共和國香港特別行政區的立法會議員、政府官員及公務人員、行政會議成員、法官及其他司法人員、區議員,即時喪失該等職務,並喪失參選或者出任上述職務的資格。
前款規定資格或者職務的喪失,由負責組織、管理有關選舉或者公職任免的機構宣佈。
A person who is convicted of an offence endangering national security by a court shall be disqualified from standing as a candidate in the elections of the Legislative Council and district councils of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, holding any public office in the Region, or serving as a member of the Election Committee for electing the Chief Executive. If a person so convicted is a member of the Legislative Council, a government official, a public servant, a member of the Executive Council, a judge or a judicial officer, or a member of the district councils, who has taken an oath or made a declaration to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China and swear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, he or she shall be removed from his or her office upon conviction, and shall be disqualified from standing for the aforementioned elections or from holding any of the aforementioned posts.
The disqualification and removal from offices referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be announced by the authorities responsible for organising and managing the relevant elections or for the appointment and removal of holders of public office.
任何人在香港特別行政區內實施本法規定的犯罪的,適用本法。犯罪的行為或者結果有一項發生在香港特別行政區內的,就認為是在香港特別行政區內犯罪。
在香港特別行政區註冊的船舶或者航空器內實施本法規定的犯罪的,也適用本法。
This Law shall apply to offences under this Law which are committed in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by any person. An offence shall be deemed to have been committed in the Region if an act constituting the offence or the consequence of the offence occurs in the Region.
This Law shall also apply to offences under this Law committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered in the Region.
香港特別行政區永久性居民或者在香港特別行政區成立的公司、團體等法人或者非法人組織在香港特別行政區以外實施本法規定的犯罪的,適用本法。
This Law shall apply to a person who is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or an incorporated or unincorporated body such as a company or an organisation which is set up in the Region if the person or the body commits an offence under this Law outside the Region.
不具有香港特別行政區永久性居民身份的人在香港特別行政區以外針對香港特別行政區實施本法規定的犯罪的,適用本法。
This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.
本法施行以後的行為,適用本法定罪處刑。
This Law shall apply to acts committed after its entry into force for the purpose of conviction and imposition of punishment.
The NSL was promulgated and applied in the HKSAR as from 11:00 pm on 30 June 2020. Although what an accused had done before 1 July 2020 could not in law form the subject matter of an NSL charge, his words and conduct before that date are capable of forming the background in the light of which his subsequent conduct could be interpreted and his state of mind inferred. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2020] HKCFI 3161, para. 18 (Case Summary)) Where the facts of the case covered events before 1 July 2020, the basis of the sentence imposed by the court would still be confined to the relevant offence period after 30 June 2020. (HKSAR v Chung Hon Lam [2021] HKDC 1484, para. 9 (Case Summary: ET)) |
香港特別行政區對本法規定的犯罪案件行使管轄權,但本法第五十五條規定的情形除外。
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall have jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under this Law, except under the circumstances specified in Article 55 of this Law.
香港特別行政區管轄危害國家安全犯罪案件的立案偵查、檢控、審判和刑罰的執行等訴訟程序事宜,適用本法和香港特別行政區本地法律。
未經律政司長書面同意,任何人不得就危害國家安全犯罪案件提出檢控。但該規定不影響就有關犯罪依法逮捕犯罪嫌疑人並將其羈押,也不影響該等犯罪嫌疑人申請保釋。
香港特別行政區管轄的危害國家安全犯罪案件的審判循公訴程序進行。
審判應當公開進行。因為涉及國家秘密、公共秩序等情形不宜公開審理的,禁止新聞界和公眾旁聽全部或者一部分審理程序,但判決結果應當一律公開宣佈。
This Law and the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the Region exercises jurisdiction.
No prosecution shall be instituted in respect of an offence endangering national security without the written consent of the Secretary for Justice. This provision shall not prejudice the arrest and detention of a person who is suspected of having committed the offence or the application for bail by the person in accordance with the law.
Cases concerning offence endangering national security within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be tried on indictment.
The trial shall be conducted in an open court. When circumstances arise such as the trial involving State secrets or public order, all or part of the trial shall be closed to the media and the public but the judgment shall be delivered in an open court.
Where the NSL refers to “offence[s] endangering national security” without distinguishing between those offences which it created and other offences of that nature, subject to any contextual or purposive arguments to the contrary in any particular case, it is referring to all such offences without distinction. (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, para. 27 (Case Summary)) Offences endangering national security under HKSAR law (as opposed to those under the NSL) include the offences of treason, incitement to disaffection and sedition under Parts I and II of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200). (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 53(c)(ii) and footnote 40 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 40 provides that the HKSAR shall have jurisdiction over cases concerning offences under the NSL, except under the circumstances specified in NSL 55. NSL 45 provides that unless otherwise provided by the NSL, magistrates’ courts, the District Court, the High Court (comprising the CFI and the CA) and the CFA shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the HKSAR. |
NSL 41(1) makes it clear that in respect of offences endangering national security, the NSL and the laws of the HKSAR “shall apply to procedural matters”, including matters related to criminal investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty. In HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3 (Case Summary: ET) , the defendant was charged with doing an act or acts with a seditious intention, contrary to s. 10(1)(a) of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), and the issue was whether the relevant evidence was admissible. (paras. 1, 17-18 and 26-27) Applying the relevant laws of the HKSAR, the court held that the search did not infringe the defendant’s right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination and allowed the admission of the disputed evidence (paras. 140-142 and 177). It was held that adding a charge which fell outside the ambit of the NSL (e.g. causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving) as an alternative to a count of NSL offence (e.g. terrorist activity) was not an abuse of process where there was a close factual nexus between the two counts. It would be absurd to suggest that simply because the alternative count was not an offence endangering national security, that per se mandated a separate trial for that count. It would also be absurd to suggest that s. 51(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) was not applicable merely because the court was a panel of three judges formed under NSL 461. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 1644, paras. 10-15 (Case Summary)) In Chow Hang Tung v Secretary for Justice [2022] HKCFI 2225 (Case Summary) where the applicant and three interested parties were prosecuted for one charge of incitement to subversion contrary to NSL 22 and 23, the court considered whether s. 87A(2) of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227) imposed a mandatory duty on a magistrate to lift the reporting restrictions upon application by an accused pursuant to that subsection. The court in considering bail under NSL 42 applied the two thresholds laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary): see annotations to NSL 42 for details. In considering the first threshold, the court had to make a predictive and evaluative exercise. It was only if the applicant had passed the first threshold that the court would consider the second threshold which would be consideration under the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221). (HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2021] HKCFI 1261, para. 14 (Case Summary) ; HKSAR v Chan Chi Chuen Raymond [2021] HKCFI 2997, paras. 26-31 (Case Summary)) |
1 | Editor’s note: Section 51(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) provides: “If a person is arraigned on an indictment, … he may plead not guilty to the offence specifically charged in the indictment but guilty to another offence of which he might be found guilty on that indictment”. |
Under s. 88(1) of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227) (“MO”), a magistrate could not transfer the indictable offences specified in Part III of the Second Schedule to the MO (“excepted offences”) to the District Court (“DC”). The excepted offences include “any offence against Part I or Part II of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200)” (the 5th category). The issue in HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2021] HKDC 424, para. 34 (Case Summary) was whether the sedition offences, being offences under Part II of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) (“CO”), were excepted offences in respect of which a magistrate could not transfer to the DC. The District Judge in Tam Tak Chi held that the excepted offences under Part III of the Second Schedule to the MO did not cover sedition offences under s. 10 of the CO because they were summary offences before the enactment of the NSL. The prosecution was then entitled to transfer the summary offences to the DC for trial if the conditions under s. 88(1)(b) of the MO were met. By virtue of NSL 41(3), sedition offences, being offences endangering national security, became indictable offences despite the fact that the words “on indictment” did not appear in s. 10 of the CO. It was the intention of the NSL that indictable offences endangering national security could be heard in or handled by the Magistrates’ Courts, the DC, the High Court and the CFA: NSL 45. As the NSL prevailed over local laws of the HKSAR under NSL 62 where inconsistencies appeared, the excepted offences relating to Parts I and II of the CO as stated in Part III of the Second Schedule to the MO, being inconsistent with the General Principles under Chapter I and the relevant Articles of the NSL, would not be valid. Part III of the Second Schedule to the MO would have to be “adapted” to cater for offences endangering national security because of the enactment of the NSL. This meant that the sedition offence could be transferred to the DC for trial because the sedition offence was no longer an excepted offence in the Second Schedule to the MO. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2021] HKDC 424, paras. 44, 46, 48-50 and 54 (Case Summary)) In the subsequent case of HKSAR v Chan Tai Sum [2022] HKDC 815 (Case Summary) , another District Judge held that sedition had always been a summary offence and it remained so after the promulgation of the NSL. Sedition was a summary offence and triable summarily only under s. 14A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221). The court pointed out that the sedition offence was the only offence in the whole of Part I and Part II of the CO that had an offence-creating provision which did not contain any words to indicate that it was an indictable offence under s. 14A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. The fact that sedition was treated differently by the Legislature from the other eight offences in Parts I and II of the CO clearly indicated that sedition was intended by the Legislature to be a summary offence. Since BL 23 provided that the HKSAR “shall enact laws on its own” to prohibit any act of sedition, the NSL could not have the intention of amending the offence-creating provision in s. 10 of the CO and changing sedition from a summary offence into an indictable offence. If the NSL had such intention, it would have said so explicitly. Since the NSL did not seek to change the local laws relating to the sedition offence (including the provisions creating the offence of sedition), sedition remained to be triable summarily only and not on indictment, and the term “offence endangering national security” in NSL 41(3) did not include the sedition offence. Hence, a magistrate would have no jurisdiction to transfer a charge in respect of the sedition offence to the DC under s. 88(1)(a) of the MO. However, if the accused faced not only a charge in respect of the sedition offence but also other charges which could be properly transferred to the DC under s. 88(1)(a) of the MO, a magistrate would then have the jurisdiction and power, in the exercise of his discretion, to order the charge for sedition to be transferred to the DC together with the charges that could be properly transferred to the DC under s. 88(1)(b). (paras. 59, 68, 73, and 79-81) |
In Chow Hang Tung v Secretary for Justice [2022] HKCFI 2225, para. 51 (Case Summary) , it was held that the common law principles of open justice and press freedom were eminently featured in BL 27, BL 87, BOR 10, NSL 4 and NSL 41(4). The right to a fair trial was entrenched by the Basic Law; the common law principles of open justice (subject to well-defined exceptions) remained the norm after Hong Kong returned to China, and the NSL did not change that. |
香港特別行政區執法、司法機關在適用香港特別行政區現行法律有關羈押、審理期限等方面的規定時,應當確保危害國家安全犯罪案件公正、及時辦理,有效防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全犯罪。
對犯罪嫌疑人、被告人,除非法官有充足理由相信其不會繼續實施危害國家安全行為的,不得准予保釋。
When applying the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region concerning matters such as the detention and time limit for trial, the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Region shall ensure that cases concerning offence endangering national security are handled in a fair and timely manner so as to effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for such offence.
No bail shall be granted to a criminal suspect or defendant unless the judge has sufficient grounds for believing that the criminal suspect or defendant will not continue to commit acts endangering national security.
For the meaning of “offence endangering national security”, see annotations to NSL 5 and NSL 41. In HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2021] HKCFI 1261 (Case Summary) , although the prosecution pointed out that the alleged offences (contrary to s. 10(1)(a) of the CO) were committed against national security and therefore the NSL instead of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) (“CPO”) would apply when considering bail, the court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused in view of the fact that he was charged under the CO and not under the NSL, thus proceeding to consider his bail application under the CPO. (para. 15) This approach would probably be inconsistent with the subsequent decision by the CFA in HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42 mentioned above. The offence of non-compliance with a notice under s. 3(3)(b) of Sch. 5 to the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the NSL (“IR”) is an offence endangering national security rather than an ancillary offence for the purposes of NSL 42(2). Therefore, the thresholds laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) for bail applications made by defendants in cases concerning offences endangering national security pursuant to NSL 42(2) apply to persons charged with such offence. (HKSAR v Leung Kam Wai and Another [2021] HKCFI 3214, para. 9 (Case Summary)) |
An assertion that the bail application would effectively be determined under closed door was inaccurate when the bail proceedings were in fact conducted in open court with the public gallery opened to the public and broadcasting facilities outside the courtroom. (HKSAR v Ho Kwai Lam [2021] HKCFI 2707, para. 3 (Case Summary)) With the full cooperation of the parties, magistrates and judges should proactively seek ways to bring NSL-related matters to trial expeditiously, consistently of course with the interests of justice. There should be proactive case management and a monitoring of the progress of the court. The court should set and enforce strict timetables and should critically consider whether any prescribed procedural steps could be eliminated, re-sequenced, modified, split up or made to run concurrently to avoid delay and wasted effort, consistent always with a fair trial. (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, para. 34 (Case Summary)) Where the defendants had been in pre-trial custody for a year, the lower courts should consider case management exercise to impose milestone dates, namely, dates which were set in concrete and parties would have to work around those dates unless there were exceptional circumstances to move a date. (HKSAR v Fan Kwok Wai Gary [2022] HKCFI 1173, para. 12 (Case Summary)) The direction for timely disposal of the trial under NSL 42(1) strongly militated against the contention that the SJ’s decision to issue a non-jury trial certificate under NSL 46(1) was amenable to conventional judicial review challenge. Such a challenge would definitely breed elaborate and protracted satellite proceedings, thereby frustrating the directive of NSL 42(1) by delaying if not derailing the criminal process. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 69-70 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 42(2) should be construed in the light of the context and purpose of the NSL as a whole, taking into account the constitutional basis upon which the NSL is applied in the HKSAR. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 8 (Case Summary)) NSL 41 and 42 make it clear that in respect of offences of endangering national security, the laws of the HKSAR “shall apply to procedural matters”, including matters related to criminal investigation, prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, as well as matters such as detention and time limit for trial. The rules governing bail in general therefore operate in national security cases subject to any specific changes effected by NSL 42(2) which are made to prevail by NSL 622. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 40 (Case Summary)) The court held that as far as Hong Kong courts were concerned, the common law approach should continue to be adopted in the construction of the NSL. If the Basic Law, which was right at the interface of “One Country, Two Systems”, was to be construed using the common law approach, there was no valid basis to adopt any other approach in the construction of the NSL. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, para. 49 (Case Summary)) In HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 42 and 70(c) (Case Summary), the CFA held that NSL 42(2) was to be construed and applied with the guarantees of human rights and the rule of law values affirmed by NSL 4 and 5, as well as with the general procedural rules made applicable by NSL 41 and 42, read as a coherent whole. As far as possible, NSL 42(2) was to be given a meaning and effect compatible with those rights, freedoms and values. Cf. Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, para. 38 (Case Summary) where the court held that NSL 42 should be construed and applied, so far as reasonably possible, in a manner consistent with the protection of fundamental rights, including the right to liberty of the person under BL 28 and BOR 5. NSL 42(2), in substance, targeted the risk of the accused committing offences endangering national security while on bail. Withholding bail in such a situation would not give rise to arbitrary detention. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, para. 50 (Case Summary)) |
2 | NSL 62 provides that the NSL shall prevail where provisions of the local laws of the HKSAR are inconsistent with the NSL. |
Where the accused was charged with offences contrary to the NSL and was refused bail by a magistrate, the proper procedure to challenge the refusal decision ought to be an application to the High Court under s. 9J of the CPO for review of refusal of bail, instead of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The sole consideration of the court in a habeas corpus application was whether the magistrate had lawful authority to make an order remanding the accused in custody pending the next court hearing, not whether the magistrate’s decision was correct; the latter being a matter to be determined in a bail review which proceeded on the basis that the detention was lawful. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 3(2), 13 and 21 (Case Summary)) |
The court rejected the argument that a magistrate was not “independent” merely because he was one of the judges designated by the CE under NSL 44. There was nothing to suggest that the magistrate was not free from influence or pressure when considering the accused’s bail application. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 56 and 64 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 42 (2) creates a specific exception to the HKSAR rules and principles governing the grant and refusal of bail, and imports a new and more stringent threshold requirement for bail applications. Under s. 9G(1) of the CPO, the rule is “grant bail unless there are substantial grounds to believe violation will occur” which embodies the presumption in favour of bail, while under NSL 42(2) it is “no bail unless there are sufficient grounds to believe violation will not occur”, thus excluding the presumption of bail in the first instance. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 53(b) and 70(b) (Case Summary), overruling the CFI’s rulings on NSL 42(2) in Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133 (Case Summary) and HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2020] HKCFI 2196 (Case Digest), which rulings had been applied in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2020] HKCFI 3161 (Case Summary)) The more stringent threshold for the grant of bail under NSL 42(2) applies to both offences safeguarding national security created by the NSL and those offences existing under HKSAR law, including the offence under s. 10(1)(c) of the Crimes Ordinance. (HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, paras. 29 and 32 (Case Summary)) |
The decision whether or not to grant bail involved a predictive and evaluative exercise. The judge should regard the NSL 42(2) “sufficient grounds” question as a matter for the court’s evaluation and judgment and not as involving the application of a burden of proof, so that there was no burden resting on either party. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 67, 68 and 70(d)(iii) (Case Summary)) All bail decisions involved a risk assessment looking to the future. In deciding whether he had sufficient grounds for believing that the accused would not continue to commit acts endangering national security, the judge should consider everything that appeared to the court to be relevant to making that decision, including the possible imposition of appropriate bail conditions and materials which would not be admissible as evidence at the trial. The court should not be confined to looking only at the evidence available at the time of the bail hearing and to exclude consideration of matters which might have a bearing on the accused’s likely conduct pending trial. It might in particular cases be helpful to have regard to factors such as those set out in s. 9G(2) of the CPO3. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 57, 58, 60 and 70(d)(i) (Case Summary); applied in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFI 448, para. 16 (Case Summary), contrasting s. 9N(e) of the CPO which spoke in terms of “any other materials or representations which it considers credible or trustworthy in the circumstances”) The court could take into account all the relevant matters, including matters of public record and assertions, which might not be of public record, including the applicant’s past performance, and conduct, and the bail conditions offered, in carrying out the “predictive and evaluative exercise”. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFI 448, para. 23 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Chan Chi Chuen Raymond [2021] HKCFI 2997, para. 26 (Case Summary)) This approach of carrying out “a predictive and evaluative exercise” on all the materials before the court has been followed in a number of bail review decisions: see, for example, HKSAR v Wong Ji Yuet [2022] HKCFI 1136 (Case Digest) ; Secretary for Justice v Ho Kai Ming Kalvin [2021] HKCFI 864 (Case Digest); and HKSAR v Wong Pak Yu [2021] HKCFI 2875 (Case Digest). Although one’s financial might, political ideology, and associations were not, per se, suggestive of the commission of any offence, these were relevant matters in the assessment. Matters like an applicant’s background, associations, community ties and financial position were clearly relevant considerations. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFI 448, paras. 21-22 (Case Summary)) In an appropriate case, an undertaking not to repeat the alleged conducts could serve as a means to satisfy the NSL 42(2) “sufficient grounds” requirement. However, in HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2020] HKCFI 3132, at paras. 32-33 (Case Summary), the court did not accept the applicant’s undertaking offered after having considered his behaviour displayed, including his repeated commission of similar offences whilst under police bail and his speeches appearing to become more radical over time. If, having taken into account all relevant materials, the judge concluded that he did not have such sufficient grounds, bail had to be refused. If, on the other hand, the judge concluded that he did have such sufficient grounds, the court should proceed to consider all other matters relevant to the grant or refusal of bail, applying the presumption in favour of bail. These included consideration of: (a) whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the accused would fail to surrender to custody, or commit an offence (not limited to national security offences) while on bail, or interfere with a witness or pervert or obstruct the course of justice; and (b) whether conditions aimed at securing that such violations would not occur ought to be imposed in accordance with ss. 9D(2) and 9G of the CPO. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 70(e) and (f) (Case Summary)) Accordingly, the court in considering bail under the NSL applied the two thresholds laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary). In considering the first threshold, the court had to make a predictive and evaluative exercise. It was only if the applicant had passed the first threshold that the court would consider the second threshold which would be consideration under the CPO. (HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2021] HKCFI 1261, para. 14 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Chan Chi Chuen Raymond [2021] HKCFI 2997, paras. 26-31 (Case Summary)) |
3 | Section 9G(2) of the CPO lists factors which bear on the risk assessment, including: the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence and potential punishment on conviction; the defendant’s behaviour, demeanour and conduct; his background, associations, employment, occupation, home environment, community ties and financial position; his health, physical and mental condition and age; his history of any previous admissions to bail; his character, antecedents and previous convictions, if any; the nature and weight of the evidence of the commission of the alleged offence by the accused person; and the residual reference to “any other thing that appears to the court to be relevant”. |
The court held that by using the word “continue”, NSL 42(2) recognised that the defendant was alleged to have committed offence(s) involving acts endangering national security, and required assurance that he would not commit acts of such a nature if bail was granted. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 53(c)(i) (Case Summary)) In Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 28-30 (Case Summary), it was held that NSL 42 was part of Chapter IV of the NSL which envisaged a trial to determine the question of guilt of an accused person. The word “continue” in NSL 42(2) merely meant “for a continuing period, ie for the future if bail is granted”. The court also discussed the construction of NSL 42(2) in the above case. One of the issues was whether an applicant for bail had to acknowledge that he had already committed acts endangering national security, or the judge or magistrate had to form a view that the applicant had committed such acts and that he would not continue to commit them. The court held that it would be wholly illogical to read NSL 42(2) as meaning that the person seeking bail was first required to admit his guilt. Such a construction of NSL 42(2) would be wholly inconsistent with the presumption of innocence expressly recognised in NSL 5. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 29-30 (Case Summary)) The court, in considering bail, had to look at the individual circumstances of each particular applicant. While it might be helpful for counsel to refer to other applicants involved in the same case as to their success in being granted bail, it was ultimately for the court to make the evaluation and assessment based on the individual applicant’s background and conduct in the past, whether he, if granted bail, would not continue to commit acts endangering national security. (HKSAR v Chan Chi Chuen Raymond [2021] HKCFI 2997, para. 23 (Case Summary)) |
It was difficult to envisage the accused committing acts endangering national security which would not amount to offences either under the NSL or under HKSAR law such as the offences of treason, incitement to disaffection or sedition under Parts I and II of the Crimes Ordinance. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 53(c)(ii) (Case Summary); HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, paras. 12-13 (Case Summary)) Where the NSL provision refers to “acts endangering national security” (NSL 42(2)) or to “acts and activities endangering national security” (NSL 8), that phrase should be construed as referring to acts endangering national security which are “capable of constituting an offence under the NSL or the laws of the HKSAR safeguarding national security.” (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 53(c)(ii) and 70(d)(ii) (Case Summary); HKSAR v Ng Hau Yi Sidney [2021] HKCFA 42, para. 28 (Case Summary)) In making the assessment, consideration should not be restricted to the likelihood and feasibility of a repetition of the same or similar acts forming the basis of the charge. The CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) did not so limit the ambit and “acts endangering national security” in the context of NSL 42(2) was construed as referring to “acts of that nature capable of constituting an offence under the NSL or the laws of the HKSAR safeguarding national security”. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFI 448, para. 19 (Case Summary)) |
It was not reasonably arguable that generally, the grant of bail by a Judge of the CFI was a final decision falling within the CFA’s appellate jurisdiction under s. 31(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484). The original order granting bail was not final but could be revoked or varied, not just on the application of the accused, but also at the instance of the prosecution. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2020] HKCFA 45, paras. 15-17 (Case Summary)) Where the prosecution had been granted leave to appeal to the CFA on the ground that the Judge might have erred in his construction or application of NSL 42(2) in adopting his approach to the grant of bail, the Appeal Committee of the CFA had jurisdiction to entertain an application by the prosecution for the accused who had been granted bail by the Judge to be held in custody pending determination of the appeal. In order to avoid possible irreparable prejudice to national security and the appeal being rendered nugatory, the status quo ante (involving the accused being remanded in custody pursuant to the order of the Chief Magistrate) ought to be maintained pending determination of the appeal, subject to the Appeal Committee giving directions for the appeal to be heard and determined with exceptional expedition. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2020] HKCFA 45, paras. 20 and 29-31 (Case Summary)) |
The court in considering bail had a duty to protect the integrity of the future proceedings and to ensure that what was said at the preliminary stage in the bail application did not hamper the ultimate handling of the case by counsel for the accused in the trial. (HKSAR v Chan Chi Chuen Raymond [2021] HKCFI 2997, para. 24 (Case Summary)) Should an applicant wish to instruct a new counsel to represent him in the future, the new counsel should not be hampered in his representation of the applicant by what was said by the counsel in the bail application. (HKSAR v Ho Kwai Lam [2021] HKCFI 2707, para. 2 (Case Summary)) |
For case law on NSL 42, reference may be made to those cases cited in the above paragraphs as well as the following bail review cases (in the alphabetical order of the names of the parties):
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香港特別行政區政府警務處維護國家安全部門辦理危害國家安全犯罪案件時,可以採取香港特別行政區現行法律准予警方等執法部門在調查嚴重犯罪案件時採取的各種措施,並可以採取以下措施:
(一) | 搜查可能存有犯罪證據的處所、車輛、船隻、航空器以及其他有關地方和電子設備; |
(二) | 要求涉嫌實施危害國家安全犯罪行為的人員交出旅行證件或者限制其離境; |
(三) | 對用於或者意圖用於犯罪的財產、因犯罪所得的收益等與犯罪相關的財產,予以凍結,申請限制令、押記令、沒收令以及充公; |
(四) | 要求信息發佈人或者有關服務商移除信息或者提供協助; |
(五) | 要求外國及境外政治性組織,外國及境外當局或者政治性組織的代理人提供資料; |
(六) | 經行政長官批准,對有合理理由懷疑涉及實施危害國家安全犯罪的人員進行截取通訊和秘密監察; |
(七) | 對有合理理由懷疑擁有與偵查有關的資料或者管有有關物料的人員,要求其回答問題和提交資料或者物料。 |
香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會對警務處維護國家安全部門等執法機構採取本條第一款規定措施負有監督責任。
授權香港特別行政區行政長官會同香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會為採取本條第一款規定措施制定相關實施細則。
When handling cases concerning offence endangering national security, the department for safeguarding national security of the Police Force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take measures that law enforcement authorities, including the Hong Kong Police Force, are allowed to apply under the laws in force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in investigating serious crimes, and may also take the following measures:
(1) | search of premises, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other relevant places and electronic devices that may contain evidence of an offence; |
(2) | ordering any person suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security to surrender travel documents, or prohibiting the person concerned from leaving the Region; |
(3) | freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of property used or intended to be used for the commission of the offence, proceeds of crime, or other property relating to the commission of the offence; |
(4) | requiring a person who published information or the relevant service provider to delete the information or provide assistance; |
(5) | requiring a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, or an agent of authorities or a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, to provide information; |
(6) | upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out interception of communications and conducting covert surveillance on a person who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having involved in the commission of an offence endangering national security; and |
(7) | requiring a person, who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having in possession information or material relevant to investigation, to answer questions and furnish such information or produce such material. |
The Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of the measures stipulated in the first paragraph of this Article by law enforcement authorities including the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force.
The Chief Executive shall be authorised, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to make relevant implementation rules for the purpose of applying the measures under the first paragraph of this Article.
The court held that one of the primary objectives of the NSL was to effectively suppress, prevent and punish offences and acts endangering national security. Effective investigation by the police was crucial to achieving such objective. The police must have sufficient powers to take all necessary measures in carrying out investigation. The legislative purpose of NSL 43(1) was to give effect to the above objective of the NSL. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 17(1) (Case Summary)) |
For the meaning of “offence endangering national security”, see annotations to NSL 5 and NSL 41. |
It is reasonably clear from the wording of NSL 43 that the powers granted thereunder are in addition to those existing at the time when the NSL was made. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 29 (Case Summary)) By the clear wording of NSL 43, the NPCSC intended to confer on the Police additional powers in handling cases concerning offence endangering national security. The Police are vested with power both under the NSL and the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) in investigating offences endangering national security, and are entitled to invoke both powers in their investigations. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 13(1) (Case Summary)) |
It is incorrect that the NSL only confers power on police officers posted in the National Security Department of the Police (“NSD”) to apply the measures under NSL 43(1). It is clear from NSL 43(2) that the measures stipulated in NSL 43(1) are to be applied by law enforcement authorities not limited to the NSD. The provisions of r. 2 of the “Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (see next section) refer to “a police officer” as opposed to an officer in the NSD. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 76 (Case Summary)) |
The CE in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR has made the “Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (“IR”) (L.N. 139 of 2020) which came into force on 7 July 20204. |
4 | See LC Paper No. CB(2)1307/19-20(01) titled “The Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” dated July 2020 (available at https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr19-20/english/panels/se/papers/ajlscase20200707cb2-1307-1-e.pdf). |
It is clear from NSL 43(3) that the phrase “the measures stipulated in [or under] the first paragraph of [Article 43]” (“本條第一款規定措施”) refers to the powers under NSL 43(1)(1) to (7). The IR was accordingly made, with its seven schedules each dealing with one measure under NSL 43(1)(1) to (7). (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 76(3) (Case Summary)) |
NSL 43(1), in its terms, mandates that the NSL and the laws of the HKSAR shall apply to procedural matters including criminal investigation in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the HKSAR exercises jurisdiction. Accordingly, both the NSL and local laws on search apply in the investigation of an offence endangering national security, indicating that Sch. 1 of the IR and the local laws on search are to work in tandem as a coherent whole. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 16 and 17(2) (Case Summary)) In Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 13(3) and (4) (Case Summary), the court held that the regime under Part XII of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (“IGCO”) did not enjoy any constitutional status. Since the IR were a necessary part of the NSL and its implementation, in case of any inconsistencies between local laws (including the IGCO) and the IR (which were made pursuant to NSL 43), the latter should prevail because of NSL 62 which expressly provided that the NSL should prevail where provisions of the local laws of the HKSAR were inconsistent with the NSL. |
Pursuant to NSL 43(1)(3), a property may be subject to different measures taken by the authority, namely, freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of property. The property which may be subject to such actions is: (a) property used or intended to be used for the commission of an offence; (b) proceeds of crime; or (c) other property relating to the commission of an offence. It was implicit that the offence or crime referred to in NSL 43(1)(3) was intended to be NSL offence or crime. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 45-46 (Case Summary)) |
香港特別行政區行政長官應當從裁判官、區域法院法官、高等法院原訟法庭法官、上訴法庭法官以及終審法院法官中指定若干名法官,也可從暫委或者特委法官中指定若干名法官,負責處理危害國家安全犯罪案件。行政長官在指定法官前可徵詢香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會和終審法院首席法官的意見。上述指定法官任期一年。
凡有危害國家安全言行的,不得被指定為審理危害國家安全犯罪案件的法官。在獲任指定法官期間,如有危害國家安全言行的,終止其指定法官資格。
在裁判法院、區域法院、高等法院和終審法院就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序應當分別由各該法院的指定法官處理。
The Chief Executive shall designate a number of judges from the magistrates, the judges of the District Court, the judges of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of the High Court, and the judges of the Court of Final Appeal, and may also designate a number of judges from deputy judges or recorders, to handle cases concerning offence endangering national security. Before making such designation, the Chief Executive may consult the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal. The term of office of the aforementioned designated judges shall be one year.
A person shall not be designated as a judge to adjudicate a case concerning offence endangering national security if he or she has made any statement or behaved in any manner endangering national security. A designated judge shall be removed from the designation list if he or she makes any statement or behaves in any manner endangering national security during the term of office.
The proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in the magistrates’ courts, the District Court, the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal shall be handled by the designated judges in the respective courts.
“Designated judges” are the judges in each level of courts designated by the CE to handle cases concerning offences endangering national security pursuant to NSL 44(1). (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 355, paras. 15-16 (Case Summary)) |
In HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 44-46 (Case Summary), it was held that the appointment of judges by the Executive did not per se compromise the independence of those judges. All judicial officers in Hong Kong, whether designated under NSL 44 or not, were appointed by the CE under BL 88. Although the CE had a wide discretion under NSL 44 as to designation of judges, he did not have a free rein because the appointment of judges was governed by the Basic Law (BL 85 and 88-92) and relevant local legislation, including the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance (Cap. 92). In the above case, it was further held that apart from the qualities and qualification of the person who was appointed to judicial office, the following factors were also conducive to public confidence in the independence of the Judiciary: (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 48-49 and 52-53 (Case Summary))
It had been submitted that there was no public information about the criteria for designation of judges, the consultation process, or the number, identity, renewal or removal of designated judges. The court held that NSL 44 on its face did not require the CE to disclose such information. In any event, any legal duties on the CE to make such disclosure would be overridden by NSL 62. The absence of such information in the public domain would not render the trial unfair or apparently unfair. Designations were only made from serving judicial officers who had already been considered as fit and proper persons to perform judicial function at their respective levels. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 58-60 (Case Summary)) |
The court held that the setting up of a list of designated judges was conducive to improving the efficiency of trials and consistency. NSL 42(1) read with NSL 58(2) required the fair and timely disposal of NSL cases. The CE had to designate sufficient number of judges at different levels of courts so that NSL cases could be dealt with as expeditiously as fairness demanded. The size of the pool of designated judges would depend on the number of cases to be dealt with, the numbers of judicial officers with the relevant expertise available, and generally operational needs. In view of the number of judges which had already been designated and since assignment of trial judges for any given case was a matter entirely for the court leaders, the CE could not manipulate the allocation of trial judges. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 56-57 (Case Summary)) |
As regards deputy judges and judicial officers at different levels of trial courts5, they are all appointed by the CJ without any involvement of the CE. Their appointments are temporary and are usually on short-term basis. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 47 (Case Summary)) |
5 | There can be no deputy judges in the CA. |
For the meaning of “offence endangering national security”, see annotations to NSL 5 and NSL 41. |
In one case, the CFI quoted an open statement by Ma CJ that in considering the suitability of judges to be designated, any legal objections would have to be taken into account, such as those set out in NSL 44 or any objections based on bias or reasonable perceptions of bias. Judges of foreign nationality are not excluded from designation. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440 , paras. 54-55 (Case Summary)) If reports of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission to the CE should be privileged and confidential under ss. 9 and 11 of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance (Cap. 92), there was no reason why the advice given by the CJ to the CE under NSL 44 should not similarly be confidential. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 59 (Case Summary)) |
Even if the designation of a judge is not renewed or is revoked, the judge still enjoys the security of tenure guaranteed by the Basic Law. A designation under NSL 44 gives a judge no advantage and in case of non-renewal the judge suffers no loss. The proposition that a judge would be perceived by a reasonable person to be likely to seek to maintain his status as a designated judge by subconsciously favouring the Government borders on an insinuation about the integrity of members of the Judiciary. NSL cases comprise only a small proportion of all criminal cases, and elevation to a higher judicial post is based on the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission’s recommendation. General security of tenure as entrenched by the Basic Law is sufficient to protect judges, designated or not, from Executive interference. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 61 and 69 (Case Summary)) |
The requirement that a judge is not to be designated and, if designated, should be removed from the list of designation, if he has made any statement or behaved in any manner endangering national security, is legitimate, reasonable and necessary. The threshold for revocation of designation is extremely high. Any suggestion that designated judges would not be renewed or would be removed for an illegitimate purpose is based on pure speculation. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 50, 60 and 61(1) (Case Summary)) |
NSL 44(3) provides that the proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in each level of courts “shall be” handled by designated judges in the respective courts. The court held that by using the word “shall”, NSL 44(3) made it mandatory that all proceedings relating to the prosecution for “offences endangering national security” in each level of courts had to be and could only be handled by the designated judges in that level of courts. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 355, paras. 15-16 (Case Summary)) |
A request by the prosecution to the Registrar of the District Court that a case concerning the offence of sedition be handled by a designated judge pursuant to NSL 44(3) was made solely for the purpose of ensuring that the ensuing legal proceedings would be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the law. Whether or not the presiding judge had the jurisdiction to hear the case was an important matter that had to be resolved the sooner the better. If such an issue had arisen, the prosecutor in charge of the criminal prosecution had the primary duty to raise the issue with the Court to ensure that the ensuing legal proceedings would not be rendered null and void. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 355, paras. 43-44 (Case Summary)). |
The court held that listing and handling of cases and the assignment of which judge to handle a case were matters within the sole responsibility of the Judiciary. The function of a listing judge was to ensure that cases were listed before appropriate judges with minimum delay. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2020] HKDC 1153, para. 7 (Case Summary)) Where there was a dispute between the parties as to whether a designated judge should be assigned to determine an application or to handle the proceedings of a case, the substantive argument should be listed before a designated judge to avoid any potential ultra vires problems and so that the parties could focus on their substantive argument without being sidetracked by collateral matters. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2020] HKDC 1153, paras. 5 and 7 (Case Summary)) |
In Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 3(5), 54 and 55 (Case Summary), it was held that NSL 44 only enabled the CE to designate a number of judges at different levels of courts in Hong Kong to handle cases concerning offence endangering national security. The question of which designated judge was assigned to hear any given case remained a matter for the Judiciary, not the CE or the Government. There was no proper or sufficient basis to contend that, in relation to such cases, the CE or the Government was in a position to interfere in matters that were directly and immediately relevant to the adjudicative function. In the above case, it was further held that NSL 44 had nothing to do with a designated judge’s security of tenure which was protected by BL 89(1). Judges were duty-bound by the judicial oath to discharge their functions strictly in accordance with the law, and to be completely free of any interference from, or influence by, the Government. A reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer would not think that judges designated by the CE were, or might be, no longer be independent of the Government. (Tong Ying Kit v HKSAR [2020] HKCFI 2133, paras. 3(5) and 58-59 (Case Summary)) Judicial independence is guaranteed by BL 85. The court held that professional judges would not be affected in any way by public statements concerning the case which were attributed to people or entities perceived to represent the views of the authorities. The case was to be determined according to applicable laws and solely on the basis of available evidence of which those public statements formed no part. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 78 (Case Summary)) |
除本法另有規定外,裁判法院、區域法院、高等法院和終審法院應當按照香港特別行政區的其他法律處理就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序。
Unless otherwise provided by this Law, magistrates’ courts, the District Court, the High Court and the Court of Final Appeal shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
In Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 27 (Case Summary), it was held that by virtue of the introductory words in NSL 45 (“Unless otherwise provided by this Law”), NSL 46(1), if invoked, would allow a non-jury trial to be conducted in the Court of First Instance of the High Court. Thus, even assuming that there was a right to jury trial entrenched in BL 86 which provided that the principle of trial by jury previously practised in Hong Kong should be maintained, it was not absolute and might be abrogated by NSL 46(1). The court further noted in the above case that it was provided in NSL 45 and NSL 62 that in respect of the procedure for trials of NSL offences, the provisions in the NSL should prevail over other laws in Hong Kong. Hence, insofar as there was conflict between s. 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) and NSL 46, the latter should prevail. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 81 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 45 provides that unless otherwise provided by the NSL, all courts in Hong Kong, including the District Court, shall handle proceedings in relation to the prosecution for offences endangering national security in accordance with the laws of the HKSAR. The court held that if sedition offences under s. 10 of the Crimes Ordinance (“CO”) were offences endangering national security, it would be absurd that the NPCSC would “exclude” those s. 10 offences from being tried in the District Court. It was the intention of the NSL that indictable offences endangering national security, including the sedition offences under s. 10 of the CO, could be heard in or handled by the Magistrates’ Courts, the District Court, the High Court and the CFA: NSL 41(3) and 45. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2021] HKDC 424, paras. 39-40, 46 and 54 (Case Summary)) Cf. HKSAR v Chan Tai Sum [2022] HKDC 815, para. 80 (Case Summary), holding that sedition had always been a summary offence and it remained so after the promulgation of the NSL.6 |
6 | See annotations to NSL 41(3). |
對高等法院原訟法庭進行的就危害國家安全犯罪案件提起的刑事檢控程序,律政司長可基於保護國家秘密、案件具有涉外因素或者保障陪審員及其家人的人身安全等理由,發出證書指示相關訴訟毋須在有陪審團的情況下進行審理。凡律政司長發出上述證書,高等法院原訟法庭應當在沒有陪審團的情況下進行審理,並由三名法官組成審判庭。
凡律政司長發出前款規定的證書,適用於相關訴訟的香港特別行政區任何法律條文關於“陪審團”或者“陪審團的裁決”,均應當理解為指法官或者法官作為事實裁斷者的職能。
In criminal proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the High Court concerning offences endangering national security, the Secretary for Justice may issue a certificate directing that the case shall be tried without a jury on the grounds of, among others, the protection of State secrets, involvement of foreign factors in the case, and the protection of personal safety of jurors and their family members. Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the case shall be tried in the Court of First Instance without a jury by a panel of three judges.
Where the Secretary for Justice has issued the certificate, the reference to “a jury” or “a verdict of the jury” in any provision of the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region applicable to the related proceedings shall be construed as referring to the judges or the functions of the judge as a judge of fact.
Before the promulgation of the NSL, trial before a judge and a jury was the only mode of criminal trial available in the CFI because of the procedural requirement of s. 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) (“CPO”). After the promulgation of the NSL, there are two possible ways to deal with criminal proceedings concerning offences endangering national security in the CFI: (i) the conventional mode of having a trial before a judge and a jury; and (ii) the new mode of having a trial before a panel of three judges. In the absence of a certificate issued under NSL 46(1), the procedural requirements contained in the local legislation including those of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227), the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) and the CPO should be followed. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, paras. 13 and 23 (Case Summary)) Since the NSL is not subject to review on the basis of any alleged incompatibility as between the NSL and the BL or the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong, NSL 46(1) cannot be reviewed in courts. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 26 (Case Summary)) |
The court held that in construing NSL 46(1), the court should apply the same well-established common law technique of purposive and contextual construction adopted by the CFA in interpreting NSL 42(2) in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3. The context in which NSL 46(1) operated consisted of the legislative process of the NSL, various articles in the NSL, the relevant articles of the Basic Law and the BOR that shed light on context and purpose, and the corpus of law concerning jury trial and prosecutorial decisions protected by BL 63. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 31 and 34-35 (Case Summary)) As the NSL is consistent with the Basic Law, there can be no inconsistency or incompatibility between NSL 46(1) and BL 63 or 86. NSL 46(1), BL 63 and BL 86 should be read as a coherent whole. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 45 (Case Summary)) NSL 46(1) had to be read together with NSL 4 and 5, BL 87, and BOR 10 and 11, to ensure that the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial as embodied in those provisions was not compromised. The prosecution also had a legitimate interest in maintaining the fairness of the trial. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 42 (Case Summary)) |
The court noted the following basic features of NSL 46(1): (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 36 (Case Summary))
|
NSL 46 provides that in “criminal proceedings in the [CFI] concerning offences endangering national security”, the SJ may issue a certificate directing that the case shall be tried without a jury, and by a panel of three judges instead. It does not provide that such a certificate can only be issued in a case which “only concerned” offences endangering national security. Where the accused is charged with an NSL offence and the prosecution applies for leave to add an alternative count which is not of an offence endangering national security, the proceedings remain to be criminal proceedings “concerning” offences endangering national security. NSL 46 should not be construed as requiring different tribunals of fact (i.e. a panel of three judges, and a jury) to be formed in one single set of criminal proceedings to deal separately with offences endangering national security and other offences which could properly be included in one indictment. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 1644, para. 7 (Case Summary)) |
The decision-making process undertaken by the SJ under NSL 46(1) may involve classified information such as State secrets, confidential intelligence concerning involvement of foreign factors, sensitive materials on risks of personal safety of jurors or their family members or threats to due administration of justice. The information or materials are ordinarily of such a nature that it would not be in the public interest to disclose, or for the SJ to reveal to, or discuss with, the accused before trial. The court held that the SJ had to take into account all the relevant circumstances in assessing all the materials available, some of which might not be admissible in evidence, and made a judgment call. It was usually of the impressionistic and instinctual variety. NSL 46(1) entrusted the SJ alone with this enormous task. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 64 (Case Summary)) The Appeal Committee of the CFA decided in Chiang Lily v Secretary for Justice (2010) 13 HKCFAR 208 that the SJ’s decision on venue of trial, which resulted in a non-jury trial by operation of a statutory provision, was a prosecutorial decision protected under BL 63 and was not reviewable on conventional judicial review grounds. The Court of Appeal held that likewise, issuing a certificate under NSL 46(1) was undeniably a prosecutorial decision made by the SJ in the criminal process, and BL 63 shielded that decision from any conventional judicial review challenge. Hence, the SJ’s decision under NSL 46(1) was not amenable to conventional judicial review challenge such as the principle of legality and procedural safeguards. It was only amenable to judicial review on the limited grounds of dishonesty, bad faith and exceptional circumstances. By definition and as confirmed in the case law, these challenges were rare. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 54, 56, 68, 71 and 73 (Case Summary)) The mere absence of any or any detailed reasons given in the certificate was plainly insufficient to meet the very high evidential threshold for reviewing a prosecutorial decision. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, para. 44 (Case Summary)) The direction for timely disposal of the trial under NSL 42(1) strongly militated against the contention that the SJ’s decision to issue a non-jury trial certificate under NSL 46(1) was amenable to conventional judicial review challenge. Such a challenge would definitely breed elaborate and protracted satellite proceedings, thereby frustrating the directive of NSL 42(1) by delaying if not derailing the criminal process. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 69-70 (Case Summary)) The express grounds given in NSL 46(1) were such that it would neither be reasonable nor appropriate for SJ to seek an accused’s views on them before trial. It would be unwise to have a mini-trial (before verdict) for the parties to argue whether the case would involve State secrets; whether there were foreign factors; whether there was any attempt (by the accused or someone else) to interfere with jury and so forth. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, para. 31 (Case Summary)) A right to be consulted or be heard before the SJ issued his certificate under NSL 46(1) could not be derived from BL 86. Just as BL 86 could not be relied upon to mount a conventional judicial review against the SJ’s decision on venue, neither could it be relied upon to mount such challenge against the decision to issue a certificate under NSL 46(1). (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 78 and 83 (Case Summary)) |
The NSL focused specifically on safeguarding national security and preventing and suppressing acts endangering national security in the HKSAR. NSL 46(1) sought to give full effect to that primary purpose of the NSL in that: (a) it applied to criminal proceedings in the CFI concerning offences endangering national security; and (b) the first two stated grounds upon which the SJ might issue a non-jury trial certificate (namely, protection of State secrets and involvement of foreign factors) plainly arose from the special nature and needs of the offences endangering national security. The third ground stated in NSL 46(1) (namely, protection of personal safety of jurors and their family members) had to be understood with fairness of a criminal trial in mind. When the personal safety of jurors or their family members was under threat, it would seriously undermine the integrity of the criminal process. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 37-38 and 43 (Case Summary)) A non-jury trial by a panel of three judges as mandated by NSL 46(1) served the prosecution’s legitimate interest in maintaining a fair trial and safeguarded the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The two reasons specified in the certificate in Tong Ying Kit’s case (namely, the threat to personal safety of jurors and their family members and the risk of impairment to due administration of justice) were amply supported by considerations of fair trial. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 43-44 (Case Summary)) The new mode of trial in the CFI could be used if and only if the SJ genuinely believed that the grounds stated in the certificate existed. The grounds given in NSL 46(1) for invoking the new mode were non-exhaustive. There could be grounds other than the three given which might justify a trial without jury. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, para. 23 (Case Summary)) |
Jury trial is not the only means of achieving fairness in the criminal process. Neither BL 87 nor BOR 10 specifies trial by jury as an indispensable element of a fair trial in the determination of a criminal charge. When there is a real risk that the goal of a fair trial by jury would be put in peril by reason of a threat to the personal safety of jurors and their family members, the only assured means for achieving a fair trial is a non-jury trial. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 43 (Case Summary)) Where an accused person’s right to a fair trial was not engaged and he did not have a right to a jury trial, the SJ’s decision to issue a non-jury trial certificate under NSL 46 would not constitute a restriction of his rights and the 4-step proportionality test set out in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board would not be engaged. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, para. 46 (Case Summary)) In Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 27 (Case Summary), it was held that by virtue of the introductory words in NSL 45 (“Unless otherwise provided by this Law”), NSL 46(1), if invoked, would allow a non-jury trial to be conducted in the Court of First Instance of the High Court. Thus, even assuming that there was a right to jury trial entrenched in BL 86 which provided that the principle of trial by jury previously practised in Hong Kong should be maintained, it was not absolute and might be abrogated by NSL 46(1). In the above case, it was further held that even assuming that there was a right to jury trial under s. 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) for prosecutions brought by way of indictment, such right had been curtailed by NSL 46 because of NSL 45 and 62. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, paras. 79-82 (Case Summary)) The certificate, once issued by the SJ, serves as a mandatory direction that the case should be tried without a jury by a panel of three judges. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCFI 1397, para. 22 (Case Summary)) |
Where a case is presided over by a panel of three judges without a jury, legal principles such as those relating to burden of proof, standard of proof, presumption of innocence, right of silence and right to a fair trial, apply in the case as much as they apply in any criminal case tried in the CFI with a jury: NSL 5, 41 and 45. It could not be suggested that unfairness would result when a defendant is tried without a jury for, in the Magistrates’ Courts and District Court, all the cases are tried without a jury. (HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200, paras. 7 and 8 (Case Summary); and Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 28 (Case Summary) where the applicant accepted that he would still have a fair trial before the panel of three judges even though it was not a jury trial.) |
Section 81DA in Division 6 (appeal by way of case stated) of Part IV of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221)7 provides that if the CFI tries a case concerning offences endangering national security without a jury by a panel of three judges, and the CFI gives a verdict or order of acquittal in relation to a defendant in the case, the SJ may appeal to the CA by way of case stated against the verdict or order. The appeal may relate to matters of law only, which have been interpreted in case authorities to include a perverse conclusion or finding of fact that no reasonable judge, applying his mind to the proper considerations and giving himself the proper directions, could have come to. If the CA is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for interfering with the verdict or order, it must reverse the verdict or order, and direct that the trial be resumed or the respondent be retried. |
7 | Added by s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance 2023. See Legislative Council Brief on the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 2023, May 2023, available at https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr2023/english/brief/cpa95002c_20230523-e.pdf. |
香港特別行政區法院在審理案件中遇有涉及有關行為是否涉及國家安全或者有關證據材料是否涉及國家秘密的認定問題,應取得行政長官就該等問題發出的證明書,上述證明書對法院有約束力。
The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall obtain a certificate from the Chief Executive to certify whether an act involves national security or whether the relevant evidence involves State secrets when such questions arise in the adjudication of a case. The certificate shall be binding on the courts.
The courts of the HKSAR shall request and obtain a certificate from the CE to certify whether an act involves national security or whether the relevant evidence involves State secrets when such questions arise in the adjudication of a case concerning an offence endangering national security. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022), para. 2) 8 Paragraph 2 of the NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022) only requires the HKSAR courts to request and obtain a certificate from the CE as to whether an act involves national security “when such a question arises in the adjudication of a case concerning an offence endangering national security”. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 82 (Case Summary)) |
8 | On the NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022), see also annotations to NSL 14 and NSL 65. |
National security is the responsibility of the Executive and the Government has much greater expertise in the assessment of risks to national security. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 75(3) (Case Summary)) The question whether overseas lawyers not qualified to practise generally in the HKSAR may serve as defence counsel or legal representatives in cases concerning an offence endangering national security is a question that requires certification under NSL 47, and a certificate from the CE shall be obtained. If the courts of the HKSAR have not requested or obtained a certificate on such question from the CE, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR shall perform its statutory duties and functions in accordance with the provisions of NSL 14 to make relevant judgements and decisions on such situation and question. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022), para. 3; considered in Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, para. 61 (Case Summary) and HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 82 (Case Summary)) |
The certificate shall be binding on the courts. (NPCSC Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022), para. 2) NSL 47 is applicable in civil as well as criminal cases and is not restricted to trials by designated judges. That the courts are bound as regards certain matters by a certificate from the Executive does not mean that the courts may be biased. It simply means that their jurisdiction is restricted in relation to those matters, an example of which can be found in BL 19 concerning “acts of state”. Since there can be no challenge to the constitutionality of NSL 47, that article cannot afford the accused person a ground for stay of proceedings or to support his contention of “apparent bias”. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 62-64 (Case Summary)) |
中央人民政府在香港特別行政區設立維護國家安全公署。中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依法履行維護國家安全職責,行使相關權力。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員由中央人民政府維護國家安全的有關機關聯合派出。
The Central People’s Government shall establish in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region an office for safeguarding national security. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform its mandate for safeguarding national security and exercise relevant powers in accordance with the law.
The staff of the Office shall be jointly dispatched by relevant national security authorities under the Central People’s Government.
Art. 4 of the NPC 5.28 Decision provides that when needed, relevant national security organs of the CPG will set up agencies in the HKSAR to fulfil relevant duties to safeguard national security in accordance with the law. |
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的職責為:
(一) | 分析研判香港特別行政區維護國家安全形勢,就維護國家安全重大戰略和重要政策提出意見和建議; |
(二) | 監督、指導、協調、支持香港特別行政區履行維護國家安全的職責; |
(三) | 收集分析國家安全情報信息; |
(四) | 依法辦理危害國家安全犯罪案件。 |
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform the following mandate:
(1) | analysing and assessing developments in relation to safeguarding national security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and providing opinions and making proposals on major strategies and important policies for safeguarding national security; |
(2) | overseeing, guiding, coordinating with, and providing support to the Region in the performance of its duties for safeguarding national security; |
(3) | collecting and analysing intelligence and information concerning national security; and |
(4) | handling cases concerning offence endangering national security in accordance with the law. |
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當嚴格依法履行職責,依法接受監督,不得侵害任何個人和組織的合法權益。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員除須遵守全國性法律外,還應當遵守香港特別行政區法律。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署人員依法接受國家監察機關的監督。
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall perform its mandate in strict compliance with the law and be subject to supervision in accordance with the law. It shall not infringe upon the lawful rights and interests of any individual or organisation.
The staff of the Office shall abide by the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as well as national laws.
The staff of the Office shall be subject to the supervision of the national supervisory authorities in accordance with the law.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的經費由中央財政保障。
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be funded by the Central People’s Government.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當加強與中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室、外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署、中國人民解放軍駐香港部隊的工作聯繫和工作協同。
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall strengthen working relations and cooperation with the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the Hong Kong Garrison of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署應當與香港特別行政區維護國家安全委員會建立協調機制,監督、指導香港特別行政區維護國家安全工作。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署的工作部門應當與香港特別行政區維護國家安全的有關機關建立協作機制,加強信息共享和行動配合。
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall establish a mechanism of coordination with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to oversee and provide guidance on the work of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for safeguarding national security.
The working departments of the Office shall establish mechanisms for collaboration with the relevant authorities of the Region responsible for safeguarding national security to enhance information sharing and operations coordination.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署、外交部駐香港特別行政區特派員公署會同香港特別行政區政府採取必要措施,加強對外國和國際組織駐香港特別行政區機構、在香港特別行政區的外國和境外非政府組織和新聞機構的管理和服務。
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, together with the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, take necessary measures to strengthen the management of and services for organs of foreign countries and international organisations in the Region, as well as non-governmental organisations and news agencies of foreign countries and from outside the mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao of the People’s Republic of China in the Region.
有以下情形之一的,經香港特別行政區政府或者駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署提出,並報中央人民政府批准,由駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署對本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件行使管轄權:
(一) | 案件涉及外國或者境外勢力介入的複雜情況,香港特別行政區管轄確有困難的; |
(二) | 出現香港特別行政區政府無法有效執行本法的嚴重情況的; |
(三) | 出現國家安全面臨重大現實威脅的情況的。 |
The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, upon approval by the Central People’s Government of a request made by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or by the Office itself, exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, if:
(1) | the case is complex due to the involvement of a foreign country or external elements, thus making it difficult for the Region to exercise jurisdiction over the case; |
(2) | a serious situation occurs where the Government of the Region is unable to effectively enforce this Law; or |
(3) | a major and imminent threat to national security has occurred. |
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄有關危害國家安全犯罪案件時,由駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署負責立案偵查,最高人民檢察院指定有關檢察機關行使檢察權,最高人民法院指定有關法院行使審判權。
In exercising jurisdiction over a case concerning offence endangering national security pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall initiate investigation into the case, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate shall designate a prosecuting body to prosecute it, and the Supreme People’s Court shall designate a court to adjudicate it.
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件的立案偵查、審查起訴、審判和刑罰的執行等訴訟程序事宜,適用《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》等相關法律的規定。
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時,本法第五十六條規定的執法、司法機關依法行使相關權力,其為決定採取強制措施、偵查措施和司法裁判而簽發的法律文書在香港特別行政區具有法律效力。對於駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依法採取的措施,有關機構、組織和個人必須遵從。
The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China and other related national laws shall apply to procedural matters, including those related to criminal investigation, examination and prosecution, trial, and execution of penalty, in respect of cases over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law.
When exercising jurisdiction over cases pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, the law enforcement and judicial authorities referred to in Article 56 of this Law shall exercise powers in accordance with the law. The legal documents issued by these authorities on their decisions to take mandatory and investigation measures and on their judicial decisions shall have legal force in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The institutions, organisations and individuals concerned must comply with measures taken by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the law.
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時,犯罪嫌疑人自被駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署第一次訊問或者採取強制措施之日起,有權委託律師作為辯護人。辯護律師可以依法為犯罪嫌疑人、被告人提供法律幫助。
犯罪嫌疑人、被告人被合法拘捕後,享有儘早接受司法機關公正審判的權利。
In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, a criminal suspect shall have the right to retain a lawyer to represent him or her from the day he or she first receives inquiry made by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or from the day a mandatory measure is taken against him or her. A defence lawyer may provide legal assistance to a criminal suspect or defendant in accordance with the law.
A criminal suspect or defendant who is arrested in accordance with the law shall be entitled to a fair trial before a judicial body without undue delay.
根據本法第五十五條規定管轄案件時,任何人如果知道本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件情況,都有如實作證的義務。
In a case over which jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to Article 55 of this Law, any person who has information pertaining to an offence endangering national security under this Law is obliged to testify truthfully.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署及其人員依據本法執行職務的行為,不受香港特別行政區管轄。
持有駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署制發的證件或者證明文件的人員和車輛等在執行職務時不受香港特別行政區執法人員檢查、搜查和扣押。
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署及其人員享有香港特別行政區法律規定的其他權利和豁免。
The acts performed in the course of duty by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its staff in accordance with this Law shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
In the course of performing duty, a holder of an identification document or a document of certification issued by the Office and the articles including vehicles used by the holder shall not be subject to inspection, search or detention by law enforcement officers of the Region.
The Office and its staff shall enjoy other rights and immunities provided by laws of the Region.
駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署依據本法規定履行職責時,香港特別行政區政府有關部門須提供必要的便利和配合,對妨礙有關執行職務的行為依法予以制止並追究責任。
The relevant departments of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide necessary facilitation and support to the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing its mandate in accordance with this Law, and shall stop any act obstructing the performance of such mandate and hold those who commit such act liable in accordance with the law.
香港特別行政區本地法律規定與本法不一致的,適用本法規定。
This Law shall prevail where provisions of the local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are inconsistent with this Law.
While the NSL is intended to operate in tandem with the laws of the HKSAR, seeking “convergence, compatibility and complementarity” with local laws, NSL 62 provides for possible inconsistencies, giving priority to NSL provisions in such cases. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, paras. 18 and 29 ((Case Summary)) |
In general, the rules governing bail in the laws of the HKSAR operate in national security cases subject to any specific changes effected by NSL 42(2) which are made to prevail by NSL 62. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3, para. 40 (Case Summary)) |
It was held that, as the NSL prevailed over local laws of the HKSAR under NSL 62 where inconsistencies appeared, the excepted offences relating to Parts I and II of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) as stated in Part III of the Second Schedule to the Magistrates Ordinance (“MO”), being inconsistent with the General Principles under Chapter I and the relevant Articles of the NSL, would not be valid. Part III of the Second Schedule to the MO would have to be “adapted” to cater for offences endangering national security because of the enactment of the NSL. This meant that the sedition offence could be transferred to the District Court for trial because the sedition offence was no longer an excepted offence in the Second Schedule to the MO. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2021] HKDC 424, paras. 44, 46, 48-50 and 54 (Case Summary)) Cf. HKSAR v Chan Tai Sum [2022] HKDC 815, para. 80 (Case Summary), holding that sedition had always been a summary offence and it remained so after the promulgation of the NSL.9 |
9 | See annotations to NSL 41(3). |
It is provided in NSL 45 and NSL 62 that in respect of the procedure for trials of NSL offences, the provisions in the NSL should prevail over other laws in Hong Kong. Hence, insofar as there is conflict between s. 41(2) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) and NSL 46, the latter should prevail. (Tong Ying Kit v Secretary for Justice [2021] HKCA 912, para. 81 (Case Summary)) |
Local sentencing laws must operate in tandem with the NSL to achieve the aim of safeguarding national security, giving priority to NSL provisions in case of inconsistency. (HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2022] HKCA 1780, para. 56 (Case Summary); affirmed by the CFA in HKSAR v Lui Sai Yu [2023] HKCFA 26, para. 35 (Case Summary)) |
It had been argued that NSL 14 was subject to the common law rule that a statutory provision which ousted the court’s supervisory jurisdiction over a public body did not apply if the impugned decision was made outside the public body’s powers (“the Ultra Vires Rule”). The court held that such reliance on the Ultra Vires Rule was entirely misplaced. Under the constitutional norm of the HKSAR, the courts had not been vested with any jurisdiction over the work of the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR (“CSNS”) under NSL 14 to begin with. The question of NSL 14 ousting the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction over the CSNS simply did not arise. In any event, in light of NSL 62, priority had to be given to NSL 14 over the Ultra Vires Rule, which meant that the rule could have no application to the work and decisions of the CSNS. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382, paras. 26 and 41 (Case Summary)) |
NSL 44 on its face does not require the CE to disclose information about the criteria for designation of judges, the consultation process, or the number, identity, renewal or removal of designated judges. Any legal duties on the CE to disclose such information would be overridden by NSL 62. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, para. 59 (Case Summary)) |
By virtue of NSL 62, the law on “apparent bias” had to be subject to NSL 44 and 46 so that a systemic attack on trials by designated judges could not be entertained. The contention that there was a real possibility that any judge designated under NSL 44 would be biased (actually or apparently) against the accused, if correct, would mean that the accused could not be tried by any HKSAR courts, regardless of the seriousness of the allegations against him. That would plainly be contrary to public interests and the legislative intent of the NSL. (HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2023] HKCFI 1440, paras. 70-71 (Case Summary)) |
In Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 13(3) and (4) (Case Summary), the court held that the regime under Part XII of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (“IGCO”) did not enjoy any constitutional status. Since the IR were a necessary part of the NSL and its implementation, in case of any inconsistencies between local laws (including the IGCO) and the IR (which were made pursuant to NSL 43), the latter should prevail because of NSL 62 which expressly provided that the NSL should prevail where provisions of the local laws of the HKSAR were inconsistent with the NSL. |
辦理本法規定的危害國家安全犯罪案件的有關執法、司法機關及其人員或者辦理其他危害國家安全犯罪案件的香港特別行政區執法、司法機關及其人員,應當對辦案過程中知悉的國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私予以保密。
擔任辯護人或者訴訟代理人的律師應當保守在執業活動中知悉的國家秘密、商業秘密和個人隱私。
配合辦案的有關機構、組織和個人應當對案件有關情況予以保密。
The law enforcement and judicial authorities and their staff who handle cases concerning offence endangering national security under this Law, or the law enforcement and judicial authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and their staff who handle other cases concerning offence endangering national security, shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which they come to know in the process of handling such cases.
A lawyer who serves as defence counsel or legal representative shall keep confidential State secrets, trade secrets or personal information which he or she comes to know in the practice of law.
The relevant institutions, organisations and individuals who assist with the handling of a case shall keep confidential any information pertaining to the case.
香港特別行政區適用本法時,本法規定的“有期徒刑” “無期徒刑” “沒收財產”和“罰金”分別指“監禁” “終身監禁” “充公犯罪所得”和“罰款”,“拘役”參照適用香港特別行政區相關法律規定的“監禁” “入勞役中心” “入教導所”,“管制”參照適用香港特別行政區相關法律規定的“社會服務令” “入感化院”,“吊銷執照或者營業許可證”指香港特別行政區相關法律規定的“取消註冊或者註冊豁免,或者取消牌照”。
In the application of this Law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the terms “fixed-term imprisonment”, “life imprisonment”, “confiscation of property” and “criminal fine” in this Law respectively mean “imprisonment”, “imprisonment for life”, “confiscation of proceeds of crime” and “fine”; “short-term detention” shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as “imprisonment”, “detention in a detention centre” or “detention in a training centre”; “restriction” shall be construed, with reference to the relevant laws of the Region, as “community service” or “detention in a reformatory school”; and “revoke licence or business permit” means “revoke registration or exemption from registration, or revoke licence” as provided for in the relevant laws of the Region.
NSL 64 provides that in the application of the NSL in the HKSAR, the various penalties provided for in the NSL mean the corresponding penalties under local laws, or the corresponding penalties with reference to the relevant local laws. After making such comparison or reference, “fixed-term imprisonment” provided for in the NSL refers to imprisonment under the local law; “short-term detention” refers to imprisonment, detention in a detention centre or detention in a training centre under the local law; and “restriction” refers to community service or detention in a reformatory school under the local law. (HKSAR v Wong Yat Chin [2022] HKDC 1210, para. 68 (Case Summary: ET)) |
本法的解釋權屬於全國人民代表大會常務委員會。
The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
Art. 67(4) of the Constitution provides that the NPCSC has the function and power to interpret laws. Art. 48(2) of the Legislation Law of the PRC (“Legislation Law”) provides that the NPCSC shall interpret a law if: (a) the specific meaning of a provision needs to be further defined; or (b) after its enactment, new developments make it necessary to define the basis on which the law is to be applied. Although the NPCSC has the power to interpret both the Basic Law and the NSL under the Constitution and the Legislation Law, the interpretation of the Basic Law is not the same as that of the NSL as the former has to comply with the provisions of BL 158 which are different from those of NSL 65. (NPCSC Answers to Media Questions on the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, Q&A 3) The purpose of an NPCSC interpretation is to give further clarification to the meaning of relevant provisions and to clarify the basis on which the law is to be applied when new circumstances or a new problem arises. The NPCSC does not directly get involved in judicial proceedings. Its interpretation is in the nature of legislative interpretation which forms part of the norms of the legislative system at the national level. It is different from judicial interpretation by the judicial authorities in the adjudication of cases. (NPCSC Answers to Media Questions on the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, Q&A 4) In exercising its power of interpretation, the NPCSC generally does not deal with a request for interpretation on whether a particular matter is consistent with the legislative intent and objectives of a law without any reference to the relevant provisions of that law. (NPCSC Answers to Media Questions on the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, Q&A 2) |
On 28 November 2022, the CE submitted a report to the CPG pursuant to NSL 11 recommending that a request be made to the NPCSC to issue an interpretation of the NSL in accordance with NSL 65, clarifying whether an overseas lawyer who was not qualified to practise generally in Hong Kong could participate by any means in the handling of work in cases concerning offence endangering national security “based on the legislative intent and objectives of the NSL”. On 30 December 2022, the NPCSC adopted the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (L.N. 5 of 2023)10 in accordance with the provisions of Art. 67(4) of the Constitution and NSL 65. The Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC explained the background, purpose, legal basis, major provisions and legal effect of the Interpretation in his answers to questions of the media on the same day (“NPCSC Answers to Media Questions on the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47”)11. The purpose of the Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47 (2022) is to resolve a problem arising from the implementation of the NSL properly and in a timely manner, to ensure the full and faithful implementation of the NSL, to uphold the constitutional order of the HKSAR established by the Constitution and the Basic Law, and to safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests. (Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the motion concerning the draft Interpretation of NSL 14 and 47, dated 30 December 202212) In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Justice [2023] HKCFI 1382 (Case Summary), the court admitted two expert reports on relevant Mainland law prepared by an eminent jurist on Mainland law. Reading the expert evidence together with the relevant local case law, the court arrived at the following propositions (at paras. 49-55):
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10 | L. N. 5 of 2023, available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A304!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y. |
11 | “Answers of the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC to the Questions of the Media on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the ‘Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR’ by the NPCSC”, 30 December 2022, available at “Answers of the Head of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC to the Questions of the Media on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the ‘Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR’ by the NPCSC”, 30 December 2022, Chinese version (Chinese version only). |
12 | “Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the Results of Its Deliberation over the Motion on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (Proposed Draft)”, 30 December 2022, available at Report of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC on the Results of Its Deliberation over the Motion on the Interpretation of Article 14 and Article 47 of the Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (Proposed Draft)”, 30 December 2022, Chinese version (Chinese version only). |
本法自公佈之日起施行。
This Law shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.
By the Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 49) dated 30 June 202013, President Xi Jinping gave notice that the NSL came into force on 30 June 2020. The NSL applies in the HKSAR as from 11:00 pm on 30 June 2020 by virtue of the Promulgation of National Law 2020 made by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR. See annotations to NSL 1. |
13 | Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 49), Gazette of the NPCSC of the PRC (2020) No. 3, published on 15 August 2020, at p. 591, available at Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China (No. 49), Gazette of the NPCSC of the PRC (2020) No. 3, published on 15 August 2020, at p. 591, Chinese version (Chinese version only). |
The Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Hong Kong National Security Law, with the relevant case law, may be accessed by scrolling the table of contents presented below.
Main Body of the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Hong Kong National Security Law | Download |
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (“NPCSC”) adopted the Hong Kong National Security Law (“NSL”) on 30 June 2020 and added it to the list of national laws in Annex III to the Basic Law for application in the HKSAR in accordance with BL 18. The NSL applies in the HKSAR as from 11 pm the same day.
NSL 43(1) stipulates various measures that law enforcement authorities (including the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force) may take in addition to measures that law enforcement authorities are allowed to apply under the laws of the HKSAR in investigating serious crimes, when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security. NSL 43(2) provides that the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR (“CSNS”) shall be responsible for supervising the implementation of the measures by law enforcement authorities. NSL 43(3) authorizes the CE, in conjunction with the CSNS, to make relevant implementation rules for the purpose of applying the measures under NSL 43(1).
At the first meeting of the CSNS on 6 July 2020, the CE, in conjunction with the CSNS, exercised the power under NSL 43 to make relevant implementation rules for law enforcement authorities to implement the measures under NSL 43. The Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the NSL (“Implementation Rules”, or “IR”) were gazetted on 6 July 2020 (L.N. 139 of 2020) and took effect on 7 July 2020. [IR, rr. 1 and 2]
To improve the enforcement mechanisms for the HKSAR to safeguard national security, the IR provide for : (a) the powers of the relevant officers; (b) the procedural requirements and circumstances that must be met; and (c) conditions for approval etc. that the relevant officers must adhere to, when carrying out the specific measures concerned. The IR also provide for the relevant offences and penalties for the effective implementation of the measures. The IR have the force of law.
One of the primary objectives of the NSL is to effectively suppress, prevent and punish offences and acts endangering national security. Effective investigation by the police is crucial to achieving such objective. The police must have sufficient powers to take all necessary measures in carrying out investigation. The legislative purpose of NSL 43(1) is to give effect to the above objective of the NSL. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 17(1) (Case Summary))
Within the framework of the NSL, the IR are delegated legislation made pursuant to the authorization under NSL 43(3). The NSL being the enabling legislation forms a crucial part of the legislative context in which the IR must be construed. The approach to construing the NSL as expounded by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) is equally apposite for the construction of the IR. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 11, 12 and 14 (Case Summary))
The IR cannot be segregated from the NSL. They are a necessary part of the NSL and its implementation. For instance, the thresholds laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 for bail applications made by defendants in cases concerning offences endangering national security pursuant to NSL 42(2) apply to persons charged with the offence of non-compliance with a notice under s. 3(3)(b) of Sch. 5 of the IR. (HKSAR v Leung Kam Wai and Another [2021] HKCFI 3214, para. 9 (Case Summary))
NSL 43(1) mandates that the NSL and the laws of the HKSAR shall apply to procedural matters including criminal investigation in respect of cases concerning offence endangering national security over which the HKSAR exercises jurisdiction. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 16 (Case Summary)) See also annotations to Sch. 1 of the IR.
The court held that since the IR were a necessary part of the NSL and its implementation, in case of any inconsistencies between local laws and the IR, the latter should prevail because of NSL 62 which expressly provided that the NSL should prevail where provisions of the local laws of the HKSAR were inconsistent with the NSL. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 13 (4) (Case Summary))
By clear wording of NSL 43, the NPCSC intends to confer on the police additional powers in handling cases concerning offences endangering national security. (A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801, para. 43(1) (Case Summary)) It is reasonably clear from the wordings of NSL 43 that the powers granted thereunder are in addition to those existing at the time when the NSL was made. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 29 (Case Summary))
It is entirely a matter for the Commissioner of Police to decide how best to carry out the investigation of an offence endangering national security, whether by a search warrant under s. 2 of Sch. 1 or by a production order under Sch. 7 of the IR. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 42 (Case Summary))
In the context of production orders, see annotations to Sch. 7 under IR/S7.2.
It is incorrect that NSL only confers power on police officers posted in the National Security Department of the Police (“NSD”) to apply the measures under NSL 43(1). NSL 43 and Sch. 1 of the IR have to be read as a whole. It is clear from NSL 43(2) that the measures stipulated in NSL 43(1) are to be applied by law enforcement authorities not limited to the NSD. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 76 (Case Summary))
The magistrate, or the judge of the District Court or the Court of First Instance of the High Court, who handles an application under the IR must be a designated judge under NSL 44. [IR, r. 3]
The Chinese text of the IR is the authentic text; the English translation text is for reference only. [IR, r. 4]
Schedule 1 Rules Relating to Search of Places for Evidence | Download |
NSL 43(1)(1) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR.7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “search of premises, vehicles, vessels, aircraft and other relevant places and electronic devices that may contain evidence of an offence”.
Rule 2(1) of the IR provides that a police officer may, in accordance with Sch. 1 (Rules Relating to Search of Places for Evidence), exercise the power to search places for evidence.
For investigation of an offence endangering national security, a police officer may apply to a magistrate for a warrant to enter and search a place for evidence under Sch. 1 of the IR. The magistrate may issue a warrant if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that any specified evidence is in the place. [s. 2] Under exceptional circumstances (for instance, in urgent situations where it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant), a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police may authorize the search and entry without a warrant. [s. 3]
The provisions in Sch. 1 were formulated with reference to local legislation regarding authorization to conduct urgent search under exceptional circumstances, including the Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance (Cap. 238) and the Import and Export Ordinance (Cap. 60).
See IR.3.
The legislative purpose underlying s. 1 of Sch. 1 of the IR should be consistent with the NSL. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 11, 12 and 14 (Case Summary))
NSL 43(1) mandates, in its terms, that the NSL and the laws of the HKSAR shall apply to procedural matters including criminal investigation in respect of cases concerning offences endangering national security over which the HKSAR exercises jurisdiction. Accordingly, both the NSL and local laws on search apply in the investigation of an offence endangering national security, indicating that Sch. 1 and the local laws on search are to work in tandem as a coherent whole. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 16 and 17(2) (Case Summary))
There is no reason why the police should be confined to the regime under the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (“IGCO”) when s. 2 (Magistrate’s warrants) of Sch. 1 of the IR is capable of covering journalistic materials. The police should be free to choose whichever provision that suits its purpose. Excluding journalistic materials from s. 2 of Sch. 1 of the IR would fundamentally and drastically restrict the Commissioner of Police’s powers under the NSL / IR, which clearly should not be permissible. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 25(3) and (4) (Case Summary))
“Specified evidence” is defined in s. 1 of Sch. 1 of the IR as “anything that is or contains, or that is likely to be or contain, evidence of an offence endangering national security”.
The legislative intention is that Sch. 1 and the local laws on search are to work in tandem as a coherent whole. It means that the local laws on search powerfully inform the construction of “specified evidence” in s. 1 of Sch. 1. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 7 and 17(2) (Case Summary))
On a plain and ordinary reading, the word “anything” in the definition of “specified evidence” in s. 1 of Sch. 1 covers all types of materials so long as they contain (or are likely to contain) evidence of an offence endangering national security. The wide ambit of the natural and ordinary meaning of “specified evidence” is consistent with the intention of NSL 43 and the IR (i.e. to provide the law enforcement authorities with additional investigating measures) and the legislative intention of the NSL (i.e. to “effectively prevent, suppress and impose punishment for any act or activity endangering national security”). (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 14 (Case Summary))
The police officer who lays the information does not have to be posted in the National Security Department (“NSD”) of the Police. NSL 43 and Sch. 1 of the IR have to be read as a whole. It is clear from NSL 43(2) that the measures stipulated in NSL 43(1) are to be applied by law enforcement authorities not limited to the NSD. Both the wording of r. 2(1) of the IR and s. 2(1) of Sch. 1 of the IR refer to “a police officer” as opposed to an officer in the NSD. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 76 (Case Summary))
Section 2(2) of Sch. 1 (providing that a magistrate “may”, not “must” or “shall”, issue a warrant) involves an exercise of judicial discretion after balancing all relevant factors. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, paras. 10(1), 14(8), 15(1) and 21(2) (Case Summary))
Neither s. 50(7) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) nor Sch. 1 of the IR provides for any prescribed form for a search warrant. As a general principle, if the empowering statute does not require any particular form for a warrant, the warrant would be held valid so long as it contains the basic details provided for in the statute. There is a distinction between what is desirable to be included in a warrant and that which if absent renders a warrant invalid. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 60 and 63(1) (Case Summary))
The court held that a pragmatic approach was to be adopted in assessing the sufficiency of information. The difficulty of a police officer to specify a particular piece of information to be relevant should be recognized especially when an investigation was at its initial stage. It might be impracticable to be specific about the offences at the investigation stage and secrecy considerations might come into play (which would be all the more so in criminal investigations in the NSL context). The scope of search was dependent upon the facts of the case and the exigencies of the investigation in question. That it covered a smaller or larger area or fewer or more entities was neither here nor there. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 62(3), 63(2) and 66(1) (Case Summary))
A complaint that a warrant for the collusion offence under NSL 29 did not spell out which of the “offences” under NSL 29 had been relied on is premised upon an erroneous interpretation of that provision. There is only one single offence under NSL 29, i.e. the collusion offence. The various limbs under NSL 29 are different possible acts which can constitute the collusion offence instead of separate offences. There is no requirement that the warrant itself must specify any particular limb of possible acts under NSL 29 to be valid and lawful. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 63(3) and 65(2) (Case Summary))
The Commissioner of Police is entitled to rely on public interest immunity. Details provided in an affirmation need not be included in a search warrant. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 62(3), 63(2), and 66(1) and (3) (Case Summary))
By issuing a warrant, the magistrate must have been satisfied by the information laid before him that the requirement under s. 2(2) of Sch. 1 was met. There is no requirement under s. 2(2) of Sch. 1 that the warrant must contain a statement to point out the obvious (i.e. that the magistrate was satisfied that the statutory conditions were met). (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 70(5) (Case Summary))
Where a warrant specifically provided for “business records, accounting documents, personnel documents, digital documents, digital devices, company kit or any other articles relating to the business operations of the following companies”, it authorized the search and seizure of both the physical digital devices and the digital documents therein, i.e. the contents of such digital devices. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 71-73 (Case Summary))
The court held that there was neither statutory power (whether under the NSL, the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) or any other Ordinance) nor common law power for the police or the courts to compel a person to provide security information (such as numerical, alphabetical and/or biometric passcodes and/or encryption key) to enable access by the police to the contents of digital devices seized under a search warrant. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1128, paras. 2 and 15-16 (Case Summary))
Any challenge as to the lawfulness of a search warrant is within the exclusive purview of judicial review. This springs from the public nature of the remedy sought: a declaration of invalidity of search warrants is by nature a public law matter. The court in an ordinary civil action which is private law proceedings has no jurisdiction to entertain a lawfulness challenge. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, paras. 9-14, 23-25, 30 and 37-40 (Case Summary))
In relation to a challenge to the lawfulness of a warrant on grounds of irrelevance, the court held that it was impermissible for the court to predetermine the question of relevance before the criminal investigation came to an end. There was no basis for a law enforcement agency to deliver up or return materials seized as part of an ongoing police investigation subject to completion of investigation and criminal proceedings. By seeking directions to determine the question of relevance, the court was being asked to impede existing criminal investigation, and to carry out the impossible task of determining at that stage what were and what were not relevant materials for an on-going criminal investigation, which should not be allowed. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 82 (Case Summary))
Overseas cases had to be approached with caution as the relevant empowering statute might be very different. The principles governing the validity requirements of a search warrant in those jurisdictions were different from those set out in the Hong Kong cases. (Next Digital Limited and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1677, para. 65(4) and (7) (Case Summary))
Claims of legal professional privilege (“LPP”) may be made in relation to materials seized under a warrant. It was held that in assessing the evidence in support of a claim for privilege, it was necessary to subject the evidence to “anxious scrutiny”. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 3003, paras. 8-12 (Case Summary))
On a proper interpretation, “specified evidence” in Sch. 1 of the IR is wide enough to cover anything that contains or is likely to contain evidence of an offence endangering national security, including journalistic materials (“JM”). There is no need for any express wording referring to JM. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, para. 14 (Case Summary))
To serve the legislative purpose of furthering the primary objective of the NSL to effectively suppress, prevent and punish offences endangering national security, the police must be able to carry out effective search on anything, including JM that contains or is likely to contain evidence of an offence endangering national security. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 35 (Case Summary))
Press freedom does not equate any blanket prohibition against the seizure, production or disclosure of JM. The protection of JM is not absolute for sometimes it may be in the public interest that JM should be seized or exposed. JM is not immune from search and seizure in the investigation of any criminal offence, including offences endangering national security. JM is no more than a relevant consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The law has not developed or crystallized the confidential relationship in which journalists stand to an informant into one of the classes of privilege known to the law. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, paras. 11-12 (Case Summary); Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 34 (Case Summary))
Such a construction of “specified evidence” does not diminish the protection afforded to freedom of the press by the local laws or violate the principle of legality. Sch. 1 of the IR operates in tandem with the local laws on search as a coherent whole. The same protection and safeguards based on public interest for JM under common law equally apply to a warrant under Sch. 1 of the IR. The magistrate would perform the same judicial gatekeeping role in exercising his discretion under s.2 of Sch. 1 of the IR in ensuring that the search and seizure of JM are justified in the public interest. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, para. 36 (Case Summary))
Part XII of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1), which is not applicable as the IR are not an Ordinance, cannot be taken as the only way in which procedural safeguards can be meaningfully imposed in relation to the search and seizure of JM. (Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCFI 2688, paras. 10 and 13 (Case Summary); Lai Chee Ying v Commissioner of Police [2022] HKCA 1574, paras. 25-32 (Case Summary))
Schedule 2 Rules Relating to Restriction on Persons under Investigation from Leaving Hong Kong | Download |
NSL 43(1)(2) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR. 7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “ordering any person suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security to surrender travel documents, or prohibiting the person concerned from leaving the [HKSAR]”.
Rule 2(2) of the IR provides that a police officer may, in accordance with Sch. 2 (Rules Relating to Restriction on Persons under Investigation from Leaving Hong Kong), exercise the power to restrict a person suspected of having committed an offence endangering national security and under investigation from leaving Hong Kong.
Drafted with reference to the provisions of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201) which restrict a person under investigation from leaving Hong Kong, Sch. 2 of the IR enables a police officer to apply to a magistrate for a notice to require a person who is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence endangering national security to surrender his travel document, and to prohibit him from leaving Hong Kong. [s. 2] A person who has surrendered his travel document in compliance with a notice may make an application to the Commissioner of Police or to a magistrate or both for the return of the travel document. [s. 3] A person on whom a notice is served may make an application to the Commissioner of Police or to a magistrate or both for permission to leave Hong Kong. [s. 4]
Schedule 3 Rules Relating to Freezing, Restraint, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Property | Download |
NSL 43(1)(3) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR. 7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “freezing of, applying for restraint order, charging order and confiscation order in respect of, and forfeiture of property used or intended to be used for the commission of the offence, proceeds of crime, or other property relating to the commission of the offence”.
Rule 2(3) of the IR provides that the Secretary for Justice (“SJ”), the Secretary for Security or a police officer may, in accordance with Sch. 3 (Rules Relating to Freezing, Restraint, Confiscation and Forfeiture of Property), exercise the power to freeze, restrain, confiscate and forfeit property relating to the commission of an offence endangering national security.
Under Sch. 3 of the IR, if the Secretary for Security has reasonable grounds to suspect that any property held by any person is property related to an offence endangering national security, he may, by notice in writing, direct that a person must not deal with the property except under the authority of a licence granted by the Secretary. [s. 3] Any person affected by the notice may make an application to the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) for the notice to be revoked or for the grant or variation of a licence. [s. 4]
Anyone who knows or suspects that any property is property related to an offence endangering national security must disclose the information on which the knowledge or suspicion is based to the police as soon as is reasonably practicable. Any person who knows or suspects that such a disclosure has been made must not disclose to another person any information which is likely to prejudice any investigation which might be conducted following that first-mentioned disclosure. [s. 5]
In addition, the SJ may make an application to the CFI for a restraint order to prohibit any person from dealing with any realisable property, or for a charging order on any realisable property that is specified in the order to secure the payment of money to the Government. [ss. 6, 7 and 8] The SJ may also make an application to the court for a confiscation order, confiscating the proceeds of an offence endangering national security committed by a defendant and ordering him to pay the amount determined by the court within a fixed period [s. 9], or for the forfeiture of property related to an offence endangering national security [s. 13]. Under certain circumstances, the CFI may, on application by a person who held property which was realisable property, order compensation to be paid by the Government to the applicant if it considers it appropriate to make such an order. [s. 14]
The arrangements in Sch. 3 were formulated with reference to the provisions of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575).
Sections 1 and 3 of Sch. 3 of the IR have been amended by the 2023 Implementation Rules for Amending the Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“2023 Amendment Rules”) which were gazetted and took effect on 15 December 2023 1.
The construction of the relevant provisions of the NSL and Sch. 3 of the IR should be made in light of the context and purpose of the NSL. In this regard, the NSL came to be made at a critical moment in the history of Hong Kong when the place was engulfed in violent protests. The purpose of the NSL, as stated explicitly in NSL 1, includes the prevention, suppression and punishment of offences endangering national security. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 40-43 (Case Summary))
See also [IR.3].
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 54-55 (Case Summary), the court held that it was reasonably clear from the provisions of s. 3 (freezing of property), read with the other provisions of Sch. 3, especially s. 9 (confiscation orders) and s. 13 (forfeiture orders), that one of the purposes of a freezing notice was to preserve the property in question so that a confiscation or forfeiture order might be obtained in the future. In addition, a freezing notice might also serve the purposes of: (a) preventing the use of the property in financing or assisting any NSL offence; and (b) preventing any dealing with the property in a manner which might prejudice on-going investigation or proceedings concerning NSL offences.
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 48 (Case Summary), the court held that the power to freeze property under s. 3 of Sch. 3 of the IR might only be invoked in respect of “offence related property”, which is defined in s. 1(1) of Sch. 3 as: (a) the property of a person who commits (or attempts to commit), or participates in (or facilitates) the commission of, an offence endangering national security; or (b) any property that is intended to be used (or was used) to finance or otherwise assist the commission of an offence endangering national security.
The voting right of a shareholder in a company is a property right protected by BL 6 and 105. A freezing notice which directs a person not to deal with the shares in a company held by him restricts the free exercise of the rights represented by the shares. However, the protection of property right is not absolute. If the shares are frozen by the notice, it makes little sense for the prohibition not to apply to an important right attached to the same. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 59-60 (Case Summary))
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 62-63 (Case Summary), the court held that the existence of an avenue for a person to apply for a licence to exercise his voting right and, if refused, to ask the court for adjudication provided a balance between the prevention, suppression and punishment of offences endangering national security and the protection of property right. It also mitigated the imprecision of the phrase “deal with”. There was no reason to read down the provisions of s. 3 to exclude the exercise of voting right.
The court further held in the above case that it did not matter whether the shares which were frozen were those of a public or private company. The exercise of voting right by a controlling shareholder might endanger national security. For example, a controlling shareholder might vote to approve the use of the company’s funds to finance a subversive organization, and agents of a country hostile to China might be appointed to the board of the company. It was not right for the court to have to second guess what or how the plaintiff might exercise his voting right, which might or might not be for a legitimate purpose. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 68-69 (Case Summary))
The court noted that the provisions of s. 3 of Sch. 3 were drafted in wide and embracing terms: (a) The natural and ordinary meaning of “deal with” had a wide ambit. (b) The use of the words “directly or indirectly” was consistent with an intention that the ambit of prohibition imposed by a freezing notice was a wide one. (c) Read in light of the context and purpose of the NSL, in particular, the prevention, suppression and punishment of offences endangering national security, that intention was fortified. (d) The licence regime provided an opportunity for an affected person to obtain a licence to allow his property to be dealt with in a particular manner. This was an important constituent of s. 3 which mitigated the harshness of the freezing regime and further fortified the intention that “deal with” should be construed widely. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 56 (Case Summary))
In Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, the Secretary for Security issued a notice under s. 3 of Sch. 3 directing the plaintiff not to directly or indirectly “deal with” the specified property, including all shares in a company held by him. The notice referred to five inclusive ways in which the shares could be said to have been “dealt with” (“the Five Acts”), namely, (a) receiving or acquiring the specified property; (b) concealing or disguising the specified property; (c) disposing of or converting the specified property; (d) bringing into or removing from Hong Kong the specified property; and (e) using the specified property to borrow money or as security. The court did not accept the argument that “deal with” should be confined to the Five Acts which would be sufficient for purposes of the freezing regime. The Five Acts only prohibited a person from disposing of or diminishing the value of the property in question. They would not prevent a person from utilising the property to facilitate the commission of an NSL offence or to carry out acts which might prejudice the investigation of an NSL offence. The function of the court was to decide the meaning of a provision read in light of the context and purpose of the legislation. The submission that if a director acted in breach of the NSL after his appointment by the controlling shareholder, it was the action of the director and not the exercise of voting right which caused the breach was rejected by the court; it ignored the prevention of NSL offences. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 13, 71-73 and 80 (Case Summary))
In the above case, the court further held that it was unhelpful to refer to the definition of “deal with” in s. 6(12) of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575) (“UNATMO”) which referred to the Five Acts in an exhaustive definition for “deal with” in the context of the anti-terrorism freezing regime: (a) A definition for a particular statutory purpose did not really help one to determine the meaning of the word one had to construe in a different document, even when they involved the same or a similar expression, as the same word in different documents might take on different meanings because of the textual or factual context. (b) The NSL was a national law with a wider purpose than UNATMO. (c) Given NSL 28 which provided that the provisions of Part 3 (terrorist activities) of the NSL “shall not affect the prosecution of terrorist offences committed in other forms or the imposition of other measures such as freezing of property in accordance with the laws of the [HKSAR]”, it was clear that the NSL regime was intended to operate as a separate regime. (d) Even if s. 3 of Sch. 3 was adopted from s. 6 of UNATMO, the definition of “deal with” under s. 6(12) of the Ordinance was deliberately left out, thus suggesting an intention to depart from the restrictive definition in UNATMO. (e) The Five Acts only prohibited a person from disposing of or diminishing the value of the property in question. They would not prevent a person from utilising the property to facilitate the commission of an NSL offence or to carry out acts which might prejudice the investigation of an NSL offence. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, paras. 75-80 (Case Summary))
In considering whether to grant a licence, the Secretary for Security would consider the relevant circumstances, in particular the risk to national security, if any, which the proposed action may generate. There is a need for the court to give due weight to the views of the law enforcement authorities in matters of national security and related risk assessment. (Lai Chee Ying v Secretary for Security [2021] HKCFI 2804, para. 56(4), footnote 5 and para. 64 (Case Summary))
1 | The press release on the gazettal of the 2023 Amendment Rules, dated 15 December 2023, is available at https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202312/15/P2023121500154.htm. It explains that under Sch. 3 of the IR, the Secretary for Security may issue a freezing notice to freeze offence related property. The validity period of a freezing notice must not exceed two years, and the Court may only grant an extension if the investigation of the offence endangering national security could not reasonably have been completed before the expiry of the validity period of the freezing notice. The IR have not clearly specified whether the validity period of a freezing notice can be extended before conclusion of the related proceedings (especially proceedings of criminal prosecutions). Sch. 3, as amended, has put it beyond doubt that a freezing notice is valid while the proceedings to which it relates are pending and remains so until the conclusion of the proceedings. The Gazette version of the English translation of the Amendment Rules, L.N. 166 of 2023, is available at https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20232750/es220232750166.pdf. |
Schedule 4 Rules on Removing Messages Endangering National Security and on Requiring Assistance | Download |
NSL 43(1)(4) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR.7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “requiring a person who published information or the relevant service provider to delete the information or provide assistance”.
Rule 2(4) of the IR provides that a police officer may, in accordance with Sch. 4 (Rules on Removing Messages Endangering National Security and on Requiring Assistance), exercise the power to remove messages endangering national security, and require a platform service provider, a hosting service provider and a network service provider to provide assistance.
Under Sch. 4 of the IR, if the Commissioner of Police has reasonable grounds to suspect that the publication of an electronic message on an electronic platform is likely to constitute an offence endangering national security or is likely to cause the occurrence of an offence endangering national security, he may, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, authorize a designated officer to require the person who has published the electronic message to remove the message, or require the platform service provider, hosting service provider and/or network service provider to take a “disabling action” as defined in s. 5 on the message (e.g. in the cases of the platform service provider and the hosting service provider, removing the message from the platform, or restricting or ceasing access by any person, via the platform, to the message; and in the case of the network service provider, restricting or ceasing access by any person to the platform or part thereof). [ss. 6 and 7]
Any person who fails to comply with a requirement issued by a designated officer under s. 7 commits an offence. It is a defence for the accused to show that it was not reasonable to expect him to comply with the requirement because the technology necessary for complying with the requirement was not reasonably available to him (or, in case the accused is a service provider, apart from the above ground, there was a risk of incurring substantial loss to, or otherwise substantially prejudicing the right of, a third party). [ss. 10 and 12]
If the publisher fails to comply with the requirement to remove the electronic message from the electronic platform and it is necessary to remove the message from the platform to safeguard national security, the police may apply to a magistrate for a warrant to seize his electronic device and to take any reasonably necessary action on the device for removing the message from the platform. [s. 11]
The police may also apply to a magistrate for a warrant which authorizes a police officer to require a service provider to provide an identification record for an electronic message published on an electronic platform or decryption assistance in respect of the message (as the case requires) if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the publication is likely to constitute an offence endangering national security (or is likely to cause the occurrence of such an offence) and the service provider has the identification record or may provide the decryption assistance, and it is necessary to obtain the record or assistance from the service provider for the investigation, containment or prevention of the offence. [s. 9]
Non-compliance with a requirement issued by a police officer under s. 9 is an offence under s. 12.
The power to make a requirement under the relevant provisions of s. 7 or 9 may be exercised with extra-territorial application. [s. 14]
Schedule 5 Rules on Requiring Foreign and Taiwan Political Organizations and Agents to Provide Information by Reason of Activities Concerning Hong Kong | Download |
NSL 43(1)(5) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR.7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “requiring a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, or an agent of authorities or a political organisation of a foreign country or outside the mainland, Hong Kong and Macao of the People’s Republic of China, to provide information”.
Rule 2(5) of the IR provides that the Secretary for Security and the Commissioner of Police may, in accordance with Sch. 5 (Rules on Requiring Foreign and Taiwan Political Organizations and Agents to Provide Information by Reason of Activities Concerning Hong Kong), exercise the power to require a foreign or Taiwan political organization, or a foreign or Taiwan agent, to provide information by reason of activities concerning Hong Kong.
Under Sch. 5 of the IR, if the Commissioner of Police (“CP”) reasonably believes that it is necessary for the prevention and investigation of an offence endangering national security, the CP may, with the approval of the Secretary for Security, by written notice served on a foreign political organization or Taiwan political organization (or a foreign agent or a Taiwan agent) require the organization (or agent) to provide the CP with the prescribed information (including the activities, assets, income, sources of income, and expenditure of the organization in Hong Kong as well as the personal particulars of its staff and members in Hong Kong) in the prescribed manner within the specified period. Non-compliance with a notice issued by the CP is an offence unless the accused has exercised due diligence and he has failed to comply with the notice for reasons beyond his controls. [ss. 2 and 3]
The provisions in Sch. 5 were formulated with reference to the provisions of the Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151) under which the Societies Officer might require the provision of information from a society.
Given the requirements of NSL 3(2) and (3) and the special features of Sch. 5, the IR are intended to provide an effective procedure to facilitate the implementation of the NSL, in particular NSL 43(1)(5). The objective of NSL 43 and Sch. 5 of the IR is the prevention and investigation of offences endangering national security. National security is of cardinal importance to public interest and the whole nation. For the prevention and investigation of offences endangering national security, information is the core of the measures; any obstruction would defeat the whole process. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 30, 70 and 118 (Case Summary))
NSL 43 empowers the police to obtain information either by serving a notice with the approval of the Secretary for Security under Sch. 5 or by applying to a CFI judge for a production order under Sch. 7 of the IR. The court had the following observations after comparing the power to obtain information under Sch. 5 and Sch. 7 of the IR: (a) The measures taken under Sch. 5 were meant to be responsive and effective, which was the purpose of NSL 3. (b) It was not an offence to set up a foreign agent or any associate of it. (c) There was no mandatory scheme for setting up a foreign agent, nor was there any list thereof. (d) Setting up a foreign agent could be as simple as registering as a company. There was no requirement to register an individual as a foreign agent. (e) A foreign agent was inevitably associated with overseas connections. Information could be sought with the assistance of foreign authorities but this would be delayed with unexpected difficulties and even be unfeasible under prevailing climate. (f) The measures under Sch. 5 were less stringent than Sch. 7 for reasons that (i) the former would be taken at a more peripheral stage; (ii) the maximum penalties for non-compliance with the requirements of Sch. 5 were less severe; and (iii) the procedure of Sch. 5 was simpler. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 23 and 27-31 (Case Summary))
It was held that compared with Sch. 1 (search of places for evidence) and Sch. 7 (requirement to furnish information and produce materials through SJ’s ex parte application to a CFI judge for a production order), the measure under Sch. 5 was the mildest of all. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 109-111 (Case Summary))
In HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, a notice served under s. 3(1)(b) of Sch. 5 requiring a foreign agent to provide information with “supporting documents” was held not to go beyond the perimeters of NSL 43(1)(5) and Sch. 5 of the IR. The court considered that “information” was a term with wide coverage of meanings, which included all sort of facts or details about a situation, person and event; “supporting documents” was additional information required for the purpose of verification/corroboration. Relevantly, “data” in s. 2 of the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) was defined to mean “any representation of information (including an expression of opinion) in any document, and includes a personal identifier”. “Investigation” was a broad description of the exercise, including to retrieve information and verification of its correctness. Taking into account the foregoing, the court held that NSL 43(1)(5) embraced s. 3(1) of Sch. 5 and the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance, and that the information required to be provided (i.e. with “supporting documents”) did not go beyond the perimeters of NSL 43(1)(5) and Sch. 5. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 97-102 (Case Summary))
The concept of national security is not just limited to an outbreak at a particular point of time but covers a continuation of a series of acts with accumulative and generative aim to an ultimate end, be it part of the adventure under the same or another different regime. The recipient of a notice served under s. 3(1)(b) of Sch. 5 could not complain that some of the information required to be provided was dated before the promulgation of the NSL. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 105-106 (Case Summary))
While all measures taken for prevention and investigation on national security must be executed with the highest standard of professionalism, a professional investigation body would definitely have its own judgement and strategy to act on the needs arising in different circumstances. Divergence in the deployed tactics per se cannot be criticised as unreasonable unless it is found to be obviously absurd. To evaluate reasonableness of needs, one must not derail the purposes of the NSL, the IR and the reality. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 90-91 (Case Summary))
The court held that it would be unrealistic to expect the police to first obtain a full collection of yearbooks and pamphlets and then approach the target under investigation for assistance in verification as to correctness and completeness at its discretion. Since Sch. 5 was for prevention and investigation, the more direct the approach the better; at least this could minimize the risk of delay and omission. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 107-108 (Case Summary))
The IR set out respectively in s. 2(2) of Sch. 1 (Rules Relating to Search of Places for Evidence) and s. 2(4)(b) of Sch. 7 (Rules Relating to Requirement to Furnish Information and Produce Materials) the thresholds for a search warrant and a production order, but no threshold is provided in Sch. 5 for identification of the foreign agent concerned.
In HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, the Commissioner of Police adopted the threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” by stating in the notice that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the organization in question was a foreign agent specified in s. 1 of Sch. 5. The court noted that: (a) identifying the foreign agent was the initial step to the Sch. 5 measure; (b) when multiple organizations, people and interactions were involved (with some even overseas), adopting a stringent standard of identification would be unrealistic; (c) information obtained at the early stage would normally be in loose pieces; (d) ensuring effectiveness was essential under NSL 3; (e) national security was of cardinal importance; (f) there was no mechanism for registration nor was there any list of foreign agents; and (g) it was difficult and time-consuming to seek information and assistance from foreign authorities which could be unfeasible under the prevailing climate. Having regard to the nature, purpose, necessities and to strike a balance between the measures and the rights concerned, the adoption of the threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” could hardly be criticized. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 31 and 84-87 (Case Summary))
In HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, para. 89 (Case Summary), the court held that the material time relevant to the determination of the legality of a notice served under s. 3(1)(b) was the point of time when the Commissioner of Police made his decision, not in hindsight. Any subsequent information, no matter how significant it was, was irrelevant as the legitimacy had already been frozen at that point of time.
In the above case, it was further held that in considering whether the requirement to provide information was oppressive because the recipient of the notice was required to provide a large amount of information, some even aged, within the specified period, the court looked into the whole picture, including the capabilities, resources and the conduct of the recipient of the notice. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 114-117 (Case Summary))
The overall purpose of Sch. 5 is an effective measure for the prevention and investigation of matters relating to national security. To be effective, the measure has to be responsive and efficient. Sch. 5 is silent on the threshold for identification of a foreign agent; the rule makers were minded to create some flexibility for the Commissioner of Police to exercise professional judgement at that juncture, regardless of the strict rules of evidence and the burden and standard of proof required in a criminal trial. Identifying the foreign agent is the entry to and also part and parcel of the long process of effective prevention and investigation. Having regard to the background and purpose of the promulgation coupled with the deliberate silence on the threshold, it is clear that the lawmakers and rule-makers did not intend to make proof of foreign agent as a matter of fact an element of the offence of non-compliance. Prevention and investigation being a state of surmise, the threshold must be relatively low, not even requiring prima facie proof. The concept of foreign agent is the conclusion of an administrative decision at that juncture; it is not an essential element of the offence of non-compliance under s. 3(3)(b) that the prosecution has to prove at the trial. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 32-33 (Case Summary))
The offence of non-compliance with a notice under s. 3(3)(b) of Sch. 5 is a continuing offence. Outright refusal to provide the information required by the notice would hinder the investigation of offences endangering national security and may result in the potential loss of evidence and escape of offenders. (HKSAR v Leung Kam Wai and Another [2021] HKCFI 3214, para. 10 (Case Summary))
The offence under s. 3(3)(b) of Sch. 5 of the IR is an offence endangering national security rather than an ancillary offence for the purposes of NSL 42(2). The IR cannot be segregated from the NSL. They are a necessary part of the NSL and its implementation. Therefore, the thresholds laid down by the CFA in HKSAR v Lai Chee Ying [2021] HKCFA 3 (Case Summary) for bail applications made by defendants in cases concerning offences endangering national security pursuant to NSL 42(2) apply to persons charged with the offence under s. 3(3)(b). (HKSAR v Leung Kam Wai and Another [2021] HKCFI 3214, paras. 6 and 9 (Case Summary))
In HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 4, paras. 6 and 10-11 (Case Summary), the court held that the measure under Sch. 5 was intended for the prevention and investigation of an offence endangering national security. Information being the core of the measure, any obstruction to the provision of information would defeat the whole purpose. There was a need to impose a sentence that was punitive and sufficiently deterrent. In general, an immediate custodial sentence was inevitable. A defendant’s political rationale and criticism of the law and the case were irrelevant to mitigation.
In the above case, the court further held that where a defendant had not exercised due diligence and had not taken any actual steps to retrieve the information required by the Commissioner of Police, the statutory defence under s. 3(3)(b) of Sch. 5 would not be available. (HKSAR v Chow Hang Tung and Others [2023] HKMagC 2, paras. 131-132 (Case Summary))
Schedule 6 Rules on Application for Authorization to Conduct Interception and Covert Surveillance | Download |
NSL 43(1)(6) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR.7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “upon approval of the Chief Executive, carrying out interception of communications and conducting covert surveillance on a person who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having involved in the commission of an offence endangering national security”.
Rule 2(6) of the IR provides that an officer of the Police Force may, in accordance with Sch. 6 (Rules on Application for Authorization to Conduct Interception and Covert Surveillance), apply for the authorization to conduct interception of communications and covert surveillance for preventing or detecting offences endangering national security or for protecting national security.
In order to effectively protect national security and prevent and detect offences endangering national security and to protect the confidentiality of information relating to national security, all applications for interception of communications and covert surveillance by the police under Sch. 6 of the IR must be approved by the CE. Applications for less intrusive covert surveillance (Type 2 surveillance) may be approved by a directorate officer of the police designated by the CE. The authorizing authority has to ensure that the interception or covert surveillance satisfies the proportionality and necessity tests laid down in s. 2 of Sch. 6 before granting or renewing an authorization. Police officers must observe the requirements in the Schedule in applying for an authorization or renewal, executing an authorization, and dealing with any products obtained pursuant to an authorization.
According to NSL 43(2), the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the HKSAR is responsible for supervising the implementation of the measures stipulated in NSL 43(1) by law enforcement authorities including the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force. Section 19 of Sch. 6 of the IR provides that the CE may appoint an independent person to assist the Committee in fulfilling its supervising responsibility.
The Secretary for Security has issued the Operating Principles and Guidelines under s. 20 of Sch. 6 for the purpose of providing operating principles and guidance to police officers regarding the making of applications and the execution of authorizations. Police officers must comply with the provisions of the Operating Principles and Guidelines in performing any function under Sch. 6 or for the implementation of any provision of that Schedule. The Operating Principles and Guidelines were gazetted at the same time as the IR. See G.N. (E.) 74 of 2020 published in July 2020.
Schedule 7 Rules Relating to Requirement to Furnish Information and Produce Materials | Download |
NSL 43(1)(7) provides that the department for safeguarding national security of the Hong Kong Police Force (see also [IR.7]) may also take the following measures when handling cases concerning offences endangering national security: “requiring a person, who is suspected, on reasonable grounds, of having in possession information or material relevant to investigation, to answer questions and furnish such information or produce such material”.
Rule 2(7) of the IR provides that a police officer may, in accordance with Sch. 7 (Rules Relating to Requirement to Furnish Information and Produce Materials), exercise the power to require a person to furnish information and produce material.
The provisions of Sch. 7 were formulated with reference to the relevant provisions of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 455) and the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Ordinance (Cap. 575).
In case a production order may be obtained pursuant to a number of separate statutes, the investigating authority can choose whichever provision that most conveniently suits its purpose, provided only that the conditions precedent prescribed by that statute are met. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 31 (Case Summary))
This prior judicial authorization provides an opportunity for the conflicting interests of the State and the individual to be assessed before the event so that the individual’s right to privacy (guaranteed by BL 30 and BOR 14) would be interfered with only where the appropriate standard has been met. The court must approach an application for a production order judicially with an independent mind balancing the conflicting interests. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 14 (Case Summary))
As production orders under the IR, like ordinary search warrants, are applied for on an ex parte basis, the Commissioner of Police bears the important responsibility of presenting the application fully and fairly to the court, which entails the duty to place all material information before the judge. (A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801, para. 45 (Case Summary))
When considering such an application, the court is not tasked to make any “findings of fact” as such but to form an objective assessment of the statutory criteria based on the information available and ask whether any reasonable man looking at that information objectively would have the requisite suspicion or belief. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 18 (Case Summary))
It was held that the court retained a discretion not to order a production order even though all the statutory criteria contained in s. 3(4) of Sch. 7 were met. However, the room for exercising this discretion was restricted and the justification for refusal had to be strong. This was in view of the plain statutory intent that the integrity and effectiveness of the investigation should not be compromised. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 20 (Case Summary))
The threshold for s. 3(4)(b) of Sch. 7, namely “reasonable grounds for suspecting”, at the investigatory stage is relatively low: “suspicion” being a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking and is a far cry from prima facie proof. However, it requires additionally that the “suspicion” is based on “reasonable grounds” so that anyone looking at those grounds objectively would so suspect. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 16 (Case Summary))
The threshold of “reasonable grounds for believing” applicable to both s. 3(4)(c) and (d) is higher than that of “reasonable grounds for suspecting” applicable to s. 3(4)(b) because “belief”, though less than “knowledge”, is more than “mere suspicion”. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 18 (Case Summary))
In J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, paras. 22-24 (Case Summary), the court held that by reason of the utmost importance of national security and since s. 3(4)(c)(i) of Sch. 7 of the IR was similar in terms and purpose to s. 14(1B)(b) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap. 201) insofar as both of them concerned the potential relevancy of the material to the investigation, what the CFA said in P v Commissioner of the ICAC (2007) 10 HKCFAR 293 about not compromising the integrity and effectiveness of the investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption applied equally, if not with greater force, to a production order issued under Sch. 7 of the IR. The same could be said about s. 3(4)(d)(i) of Sch. 7 which was about the potential utility of the material sought by the police.
In the above case, the court further held that while a bare assertion by a police officer would not suffice, at the investigation stage some latitude had to be given to the police and due weight should be given to them as to what was likely to be relevant or useful, both of them pertaining to the substance of the investigation. The court should not impede on existing criminal investigation and should not be required to carry out the impossible task of determining prematurely what was relevant or useful to the investigation. As to this, an analogy could be drawn between a production order and a search warrant. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 24 (Case Summary))
The court considered the legal principles on legal advice privilege for the purpose of determining whether materials obtained by the police pursuant to a production order issued under Sch. 7 of the IR and sealed pursuant to a court order were subject to legal professional privilege (“LPP”) in A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801. Since the Commissioner of Police did not have access to the sealed materials in dispute, he was not in a position to transverse an LPP claim made by a person who had produced materials in compliance with a production order. Therefore, it fell on the court to inspect the disputed items to determine the validity of the claim, bearing in mind the legal principles on legal advice privilege. (A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801, paras. 11-12 (Case Summary))
The countervailing interests relevant to the balancing exercise under s. 3(4)(d) of Sch. 7 include the potential utility of the material, the privacy right of third parties, and the corresponding duty of confidentiality owed by the subject. By virtue of s. 2(4)(d)(iv) of Sch. 7, confidentiality and privacy are matters which the court is entitled to take into account when considering whether or not to grant a production order under Sch. 7. However, by virtue of s. 3(11)(b), the fact that a person may breach his obligation of confidentiality owed to others is in itself not sufficient to excuse him from compliance. It is self-evident that a production order, by its very design, would involve seeking information from parties other than its owners and without their consent. This coercive feature is not unique to the IR regime and is common to other similar statutory regimes. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, paras. 12, 27 and 30-31 (Case Summary))
The equitable duty of confidence does not bar the disclosure to investigatory or regulatory authorities of matters that are within the province of those authorities to investigate. Compliance with Data Protection Principle 3 under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) is exempted where the use of the personal data is for the prevention or detection of crime or where the use is by an order of a court. The courts have consistently held that the public interests in having serious crimes detected and prosecuted outweigh a suspect’s right to privacy. This must apply, all the more so, to conduct endangering national security which strikes at the foundation of “One Country, Two Systems” upon which the very existence and stability of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region depends. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, paras. 32-33 (Case Summary))
The protection of JM is not absolute. The court held that as a matter of statutory construction, Part XII of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (“IGCO”) concerning the power of search and seizure in any “Ordinance” had no direct application to Sch. 7 of the IR. There was also no room to adopt a remedial interpretation by reading into Sch. 7 a comprehensive scheme similar to that contained in s. 84 of the IGCO. The reasons being: (a) by clear wording of NSL 43, the NPCSC intended to confer on the police additional powers in handling cases concerning offences endangering national security; and (b) Sch.7 of the IR had already provided for a comprehensive and self-contained framework governing the exercise of powers in respect of production orders. Nevertheless, by the clear language of s. 3(2) of Sch. 7 of the IR, the court was empowered but not bound to make an order granting a production order when it was satisfied that all the conditions set out in s. 4 were met. In exercise of its discretion, and since judicial control was a fundamental feature of Sch. 7, the court was entitled to take into account that the material sought might cover JM. (A and B v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 1801, paras. 36-44 (Case Summary))
Where the statutory criteria are satisfied, the test for the exercise of the discretion to refuse a production order is whether compliance with the notice would be oppressive to the subject. Further, the court may discharge the ex parte order on the ground that the order is invalid as it goes beyond what is contemplated by the statute, or on the ground of fraud. The latter ground would involve proof of bad faith and the cases in which this could properly be alleged would be rare. As a matter of principle, the court generally should not entertain an application to discharge or vary production orders on the ground of relevance or utility, when there has already been a decision by the court on those at the ex parte stage. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, paras. 20-22 and 26 (Case Summary))
An application for variation should not be entertained when it relates to the substance of the investigation, as it may run the risk of compromising the integrity and effectiveness of the investigation. However, although a production order should not be subject to challenge on grounds relating solely to the substance of investigation, in fulfilment of the court’s role as the final safeguard against abuse and oppression, it is permissible for the court to re-conduct the balancing exercise under s. 3(4)(d) of Sch. 7 when facing an application for discharge or variation. The task of the court is to perform an objective assessment of the requirements of s. 3(4)(d), taking into account also the affirmation evidence filed by the subject, but without the application of a burden of proof. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, paras. 23 and 28 (Case Summary))
Section 4 of Sch. 7 contains provisions which restrict the dissemination of information obtained by the police under ss. 2 and 3. There is no basis for a person to worry that personal data, once produced to the police, would be made available to the public. (J and Others v Commissioner of Police [2021] HKCFI 3586, para. 35 (Case Summary))
The text of sections 9-10 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), with the relevant case law developed after the coming into force of the Hong Kong National Security Law, may be accessed by scrolling the table of contents presented below.
Note : the full text of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) is accessible at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap200
(1) | A seditious intention is an intention— | |
(a) | to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the person of Her Majesty, or Her Heirs or Successors, or against the Government of Hong Kong, or the government of any other part of Her Majesty’s dominions or of any territory under Her Majesty’s protection as by law established; or | |
(b) | to excite Her Majesty’s subjects or inhabitants of Hong Kong to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other matter in Hong Kong as by law established; or | |
(c) | to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the administration of justice in Hong Kong; or | |
(d) | to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty’s subjects or inhabitants of Hong Kong; or | |
(e) | to promote feelings of ill-will and enmity between different classes of the population of Hong Kong; or | |
(f) | to incite persons to violence; or | |
(g) | to counsel disobedience to law or to any lawful order. | |
(2) | An act, speech or publication is not seditious by reason only that it intends— | |
(a) | to show that Her Majesty has been misled or mistaken in any of Her measures; or | |
(b) | to point out errors or defects in the government or constitution of Hong Kong as by law established or in legislation or in the administration of justice with a view to the remedying of such errors or defects; or | |
(c) | to persuade Her Majesty’s subjects or inhabitants of Hong Kong to attempt to procure by lawful means the alteration of any matter in Hong Kong as by law established; or | |
(d) | to point out, with a view to their removal, any matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce feelings of ill-will and enmity between different classes of the population of Hong Kong. |
(1) | 煽動意圖是指意圖 — | |
(a) | 引起憎恨或藐視女皇陛下本人、其世襲繼承人或其他繼承人,或香港政府,或女皇陛下的領土其他部分的政府,或依法成立而受女皇陛下保護的領域的政府,或激起對其離叛;或 | |
(b) | 激起女皇陛下子民或香港居民企圖不循合法途徑促致改變其他在香港的依法制定的事項;或 | |
(c) | 引起對香港司法的憎恨、藐視或激起對其離叛;或 | |
(d) | 引起女皇陛下子民間或香港居民間的不滿或離叛;或 | |
(e) | 引起或加深香港不同階層居民間的惡感及敵意;或 | |
(f) | 煽惑他人使用暴力;或 | |
(g) | 慫使他人不守法或不服從合法命令。 | |
(2) | 任何作為、言論或刊物,不會僅因其有下列意圖而具有煽動性 — | |
(a) | 顯示女皇陛下在其任何措施上被誤導或犯錯誤;或 | |
(b) | 指出依法成立的香港政府或香港憲制的錯誤或缺點,或法例或司法的錯誤或缺點,而目的在於矯正該等錯誤或缺點;或 | |
(c) | 慫恿女皇陛下子民或香港居民嘗試循合法途徑促致改變在香港的依法制定的事項;或 | |
(d) | 指出在香港不同階層居民間產生或有傾向產生惡感及敵意的事項,而目的在於將其消除。 |
Annotations to s. 9 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) (“CO”) focus on the meaning of “seditious intention”. For the nature and other elements of the sedition offences, see annotations to s. 10. Sections 9 and 10 of the CO are part of “the laws previously in force in Hong Kong” before the PRC’s resumption of exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong. The provisions had been adopted as laws of the HKSAR pursuant to BL 1601 and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Concerning the Handling of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC (adopted at the 24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on February 23, 1997) (“BL 160 Decision”)2. Reference can therefore be made to the BL 160 Decision, which seeks to implement BL 160 to enable the laws in force in Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 to remain applicable after that date in the HKSAR. By Arts. 4 and 5 of the BL 160 Decision, it is stipulated that the laws previously in force shall be applied with such modifications, adaptations, restrictions and exceptions as may be necessary in accordance with the principles stated therein and the substitution rules stated in Appendix III of that Decision. Since Sch. 8 to the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) (“IGCO”) was enacted to give effect to the BL 160 Decision, it must follow that the construction rules in Sch. 8 to the IGCO should operate in the same way as the substitution rules in Appendix III of the BL 160 Decision. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 64 (Case Summary)) |
1 | BL 160 provides (among others) that upon the establishment of the HKSAR, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall be adopted as laws of the Region except for those which the NPCSC declares to be in contravention of the Basic Law. |
2 | The BL 160 Decision is available at https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/A206!en-zh-Hant-HK.assist.pdf?FROMCAPINDEX=Y. |
In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 70-71 (Case Summary), the court held that the provisions of s. 9 of the CO were to be construed as follows.
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3 | Editor’s note: It appears that s. 9(1)(e) should also remain unchanged as it does not include any expression requiring adaptation. |
Sections 1 and 2 of Sch. 8 to the IGCO4 facilitate the modification and the adaptations of the previous laws so as to bring them into conformity with the status of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC. Since the sedition offence created by ss. 9 and 10 must be one of the laws to be used for the defence of the HKSAR against offences endangering national security, which is one of the affairs for which the CPG has responsibility under the Basic Law, the criteria for triggering s. 1(b) of Sch. 8 to the IGCO are satisfied. Any reference to “Her Majesty” in s. 9 of the CO should therefore be construed as a reference to “the CPG or other competent authorities of the PRC”. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 54 and 61-62 (Case Summary)) As to the meaning of “Central Authorities”, the definition of “State” in s. 3 of the IGCO provides that “State” includes the Central Authorities of the PRC that exercise functions for which the CPG has responsibility under the Basic Law. It is therefore clear that functions that fall within the responsibility of the CPG under the Basic Law are to be exercised by the Central Authorities. Since the Central Authorities exercise functions for which the CPG has responsibility under the Basic Law, it will be proper to construe any reference to “Her Majesty” in s. 9 of the CO to be a reference to the Central Authorities. The Central Authorities must fall within the limb of “other competent authorities of the PRC” in s. 1 of Sch. 8 to the IGCO. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 56 and 63 (Case Summary)) Further, paragraph 1 of Appendix III of the NPCSC Decision Concerning the Handling of the Laws Previously in Force in Hong Kong in Accordance with Article 160 of the Basic Law (23 February 1997) states that in any provisions that involve the affairs within the responsibilities of the Central Authorities as prescribed by the Basic Law, any reference in these provisions to “Her Majesty”, etc shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Authorities”. Since Sch. 8 to the IGCO was enacted to give effect to the BL 160 Decision, the construction rules in Sch. 8 to the IGCO should operate in the same way as the substitution rules in Appendix III of the Decision. On this basis, reliance can be placed on s. 22 of Sch. 8 to the IGCO (which provides that Sch. 8 applies unless the context otherwise requires) to construe any reference to “Her Majesty” in s. 9 of the CO to be a reference to “the Central Authorities”. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 64 (Case Summary)) It was further held that in the context of s. 9(1)(a) of the CO, “the Central Authorities” should be considered to be “the body of central power under the constitutional order established by the Constitution of the PRC” and under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. As provided for in Chapter III (“State Institutions”) of the Constitution of the PRC, such body of central power includes but is not limited to the NPC, the NPCSC, the President of the PRC, the State Council and the Central Military Commission. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 69 (Case Summary)) In HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, paras. 38-40 (Case Summary: ET), the court held that taking the facts of the case as a whole, the purpose of the defendant’s writing (including, among others, “Down with the Communist Party” and “End one-party dictatorship”) on the coffin and cloth strip as well as his ultimate purpose were to alter or even overturn the arrangements established by the PRC Constitution. As indicated by those words “down with” and “end”, he was obviously more than just making criticism and expressing discontent. The PRC Constitution clearly provides that the Communist Party of China has its specific status and role constitutionally. Altering or even overturning in whatever way any matter established constitutionally would undoubtedly affect national security, which is an offence under the NSL and would also run counter to the original intent of the Basic Law under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. From a macro perspective, those words would trigger, alter and even overturn matters established by the Constitution. Under “One Country, Two Systems”, this amounted to procuring the alteration, by unlawful means, of the system in Hong Kong as by law established, and would also trigger the contravention of the NSL. |
4 | Sections 1 and 2 of Sch. 8 to the IGCO provide: “1. Any reference in any provision to Her Majesty, the Crown, the British Government or the Secretary of State … where the content of the provision— (a) relates to title to land in the [HKSAR]; (b) involves affairs for which the [CPG] of the [PRC] has responsibility; (c) involves the relationship between the Central Authorities and the [HKSAR], shall be construed as a reference to the [CPG] or other competent authorities of the [PRC]. 2. Any reference in any provision to Her Majesty, the Crown, the British Government or the Secretary of State … in contexts other than those specified in section 1 shall be construed as a reference to the Government of the [HKSAR].” |
According to the definition of “seditious intention” in s. 9(1) of the CO, seditious intention may appear in one or more of the seven forms listed in paragraphs (a) to (g) of s. 9(1). Each of these forms of intention, if carried out, will have serious adverse impacts on the political, social and economic stability and development of the HKSAR which is an inalienable part of the PRC, and the potential victims of the offence are the Central Authorities of the PRC as well as the Government and the inhabitants of the HKSAR, or any of them. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 355, para. 34 (Case Summary)) The court held that a seditious intention did not depend on the subjective feeling of the target institutions or persons, but depended on the subjective intention of the person uttering the words or printing the publication. A person could refer to s. 9(2) to find out if his words or publications would be regarded as seditious. If he could not rely on any of the four limbs in s. 9(2), he had to consider carefully whether what he was going to do or say might be prohibited by ss. 9 and 10. This was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of legal certainty. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 95 (Case Summary)) The relevant considerations to be taken into account by the court in its analysis of whether the words in question had a seditious intention included: (a) the nature of the audience; (b) the public sentiment at that time; and (c) the time, place and form of expressing the words in question. (HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3, paras. 248-249 (Case Summary: ET)) In considering a sedition charge, the court not only had to look at the words themselves that were alleged to have a seditious intention, but also could not lose sight of the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere at that time when construing those words. (HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, para. 37 (Case Summary: ET)) The publisher/author of a book was the best person to know what messages he intended the book to convey. His statement in this regard constituted evidence of the intention of the book, and might constitute an admission or a declaration which was admissible in evidence. However, it was just one piece of evidence. The court had to consider the likely effect of the book on ordinary people and on the audience to which the book was addressed, bearing in mind the age of the target readers. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 113, 116 and 118 (Case Summary)) For illustrations of what constituted seditious intention, see HKSAR v Cho Suet Sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4 (Case Summary: ET), ; HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2022] HKDC 958 (Case Summary: ET) ; HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981 (Case Summary); HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9 (Case Summary: ET)); HKSAR v Chan Tai Sum [2022] HKDC 1336 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Chui Hoi Chun [2022] HKMagC 13 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3 (Case Summary: ET). |
As pointed out by the court, ss. 9 and 10 of the CO have long been in existence prior to Hong Kong returning to China. Often, statutory offences cannot be rigidly stipulated because with the changing circumstances, times or social climate, the provisions have to keep pace with the times (unless the provisions are amended frequently). This also enables conceptual terms such as “enmity”, “feelings of ill-will”, “disaffection”, “contempt” and “hatred” to be explained and interpreted by the court as appropriate to the circumstances. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208, para. 54 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, para. 19 (Case Summary: ET)) In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 94 and 96 (Case Summary), it was held that the words “hatred”, “contempt”, “disaffection” and “discontent” in s. 9 were just words with ordinary meaning. These concepts were best left to the trial judge or jury to be applied in their ordinary meaning to the time, place and circumstances of the conduct in question. They were not vague or imprecise, and the degree of legal certainty satisfied the “prescribed by law” requirement. The courts also held that although the CO did not define the words used in the definition of “seditious intention”, such as “hatred”, “contempt”, “disaffection”, etc., these words were all used in ordinary language. It was only necessary to take into account the nature and purpose of the offences of sedition; their meaning was very clear. For example, “hatred” included the meaning of abhorrence and detestation; “contempt” included the meaning of disparaging and despising; “disaffection” included the meaning of disloyalty, hatred and enmity. (HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, para. 51 (Case Summary: ET); HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3, paras. 251-252 (Case Summary: ET)) |
It was held that by using and chanting the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”, the defendant was indeed procuring the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of the structure in Hong Kong as by law established. His seditious intention at that time could not be more obvious. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208, para. 82 (Case Summary: ET); see also HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, paras. 38-40 (Case Summary: ET)) For the meaning of the slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times” in the context of the offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21, see annotations to NSL 21 and HKSAR v Tong Ying Kit [2021] HKCFI 2200 (Case Summary). |
The Police is a law enforcement agency and an important part of the HKSARG. The Chinese text of s. 9(1)(c) mentions “香港司法”, whereas the English text states “administration of justice”. The Police is naturally part and parcel of the “administration of justice” (“執行司法公正”). (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208, para. 82 (Case Summary: ET)) |
The Police Force forms part of the Government and the administration of justice, while policemen are also members of the public, belonging to a particular occupational group. (HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3, para. 264 (Case Summary: ET)) |
It was held that in order to determine whether a leaflet had an intention to incite persons to violence, the court had to examine not only the leaflet itself but also the intention of the publisher because if it could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intention to incite persons to violence, he would have no mens rea to commit the offence under s. 10(1)(c) which was charged under the limb prescribed in s. 9(1)(f) of the CO. In fact, the court had to consider all the circumstances of the case surrounding the publication of the leaflet in determining that issue. (HKSAR v Cho Suet Sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119, para. 46 (Case Summary)) |
In HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, paras. 14-19 (Case Summary: ET), the court was satisfied that there was entirely no basis to construe violence or advocacy of violence by others as a requisite for the offences of sedition, and held that violence was not a necessary element of the offences of sedition. Both the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council in Wallace Johnson v The King [1940] AC 231 and the Hong Kong court in Fei Yi Ming v The Crown (1952) 36 HKLR 133 had decided that incitement to violence was not a necessary element to be proved by the prosecution. In 1970, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong also added a separate sub-clause, namely “to incite persons to violence” (see the existing s. 9(1)(f) of the CO). Therefore, in respect of a sedition charge, except for the circumstances under s. 9(1)(f), violence was never a necessary element for sedition. Although the sedition offences were created in the last century, their fundamental legislative purposes had always been protecting national security and maintaining public order, etc., which remained unchanged to this day. In the last century, it was usually the case that sedition was eventuated through violence. However, in light of the current technology, violence was not necessarily required for eventuating it. Therefore, when the courts construed the statutory provisions, while the fundamental legislative intent could not be altered, the flexible application of the legislation should keep abreast of the times to give effect to its legislative spirit. In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 81-87 (Case Summary), the court held that seditious intention as defined in s. 9 had never included “an intention to incite persons to violence or to create public disturbance or disorder for the purpose of disturbing constituted authority” (“the Common Law Intention”) as a necessary ingredient. There was no legal basis to incorporate such intention into the statutory definition of seditious intention:
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5 | Editor’s note: The amendment was made by the Crimes (Amendment) (No. 2) Ordinance 1997, but it has not been brought into operation. |
The court held that as a seditious intention was the fundamental core element of each of the seditious offences, the burden had to be on the prosecution to prove not only that the defendant had a seditious intention within one or more of the limbs stated in s. 9(1)(a) to (g) of the CO, but also that his act, speech or publication was not within any limb stated in s. 9(2)(a) to (d). (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 80 (Case Summary)) The present law does not prevent anyone to say and publish whatever they like, including criticisms of the Central Authorities and the Government of HKSAR in any form, provided that they do so without a seditious intention. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 106 (Case Summary)) |
(1) | Any person who— | |
(a) | does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do, or conspires with any person to do, any act with a seditious intention; or | |
(b) | utters any seditious words; or | |
(c) | prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes, displays or reproduces any seditious publication; or | |
(d) | imports any seditious publication, unless he has no reason to believe that it is seditious, | |
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable for a first offence to a fine at level 2 and to imprisonment for 2 years, and for a subsequent offence to imprisonment for 3 years; and any seditious publication shall be forfeited to the Crown. | ||
(2) | Any person who without lawful excuse has in his possession any seditious publication shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable for a first offence to a fine at level 1 and to imprisonment for 1 year, and for a subsequent offence to imprisonment for 2 years; and such publication shall be forfeited to the Crown. | |
(3) | Where any person has been convicted of an offence under subsection (1) or (2) in respect of any seditious publication, the court may order the seizure and forfeiture of any copies of the seditious publication in the possession of— | |
(a) | the person convicted; or | |
(b) | any other person named in the order, if the court is satisfied by evidence on oath that the copies are in the possession of the other person for the use of the person convicted. | |
(4) | Any copies seized under subsection (3) shall be disposed of as the court may direct; but no copies shall be destroyed until the expiration of the period within which an appeal may be lodged or, if an appeal is lodged, until the appeal has been finally determined or abandoned. | |
(5) | In this section— | |
seditious publication (煽動刊物) means a publication having a seditious intention; | ||
seditious words (煽動文字) means words having a seditious intention. |
(1) | 任何人 — | |
(a) | 作出、企圖作出、準備作出或與任何人串謀作出具煽動意圖的作為;或 | |
(b) | 發表煽動文字;或 | |
(c) | 刊印、發布、出售、要約出售、分發、展示或複製煽動刊物;或 | |
(d) | 輸入煽動刊物(其本人無理由相信該刊物屬煽動刊物則除外), | |
即屬犯罪,第一次定罪可處第2級罰款及監禁2年,其後定罪可處監禁3年;煽動刊物則予以沒收並歸予官方。 | ||
(2) | 任何人無合法辯解而管有煽動刊物,即屬犯罪,第一次定罪可處第1級罰款及監禁1年,其後定罪可處監禁2年;該等刊物則予以沒收並歸予官方。 | |
(3) | 凡任何人就煽動刊物而被根據第(1)或(2)款定罪後,法庭可命令檢取及沒收由下列的人管有的任何該等煽動刊物文本 — | |
(a) | 上述被定罪的人;或 | |
(b) | 命令內載明名稱的其他人(如法庭根據經宣誓後作出的證供,信納該人管有的刊物文本是供上述被定罪的人使用的)。 | |
(4) | 根據第(3)款檢取的刊物文本,須按照法庭指示處置;但在提出上訴的期限屆滿前不得毀滅該等刊物文本,或如有人提出上訴,則在上訴獲最終裁定或被放棄前,不得毀滅該等刊物文本。 | |
(5) | 在本條中 — | |
煽動文字 (seditious words) 指具煽動意圖的文字; | ||
煽動刊物 (seditious publication) 指具煽動意圖的刊物。 |
The court held that it was the choice of the prosecution as to under which law prosecution was to be instituted; the court should not interfere. Instituting prosecution under the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) (“CO”) rather than the NSL was neither an abuse of process nor unfair to the defendant. The offences of sedition under the CO did not become invalid after the enactment of the NSL. (HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, paras. 30-31 (Case Summary: ET)) |
The offence of sedition under s. 10 of the CO has consistently been considered by the case authorities as an offence endangering national security. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 355, para. 35 (Case Summary))
In HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3, para. 252 (Case Summary: ET), the court cited the English case R v Sullivan and Pigott (1868) 11 Cox CC 44 which stated that sedition was a crime against society, nearly allied to that of treason. Sedition was a comprehensive term, and it embraced all the practices, whether by word, deed or in writing, which were calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State and led ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and the laws. The objects of sedition were generally to induce discontent and insurrection and stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition was to incite the people to insurrection and rebellion. Sedition had been described as disloyalty in action, and the law considered as sedition all those practices which had for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt against the Government, the laws or constitution, and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder. Given the wide range of circumstances caught by the gravamen of the offences of sedition, the provision should not be construed in a manner only restricted to a particular type of acts or a limb of a particular act. Such interpretation would undermine the gravamen of the offences. (HKSAR v Chui Hoi Chun [2022] HKMagC 13, Annex I, paras. 18-19 (Case Summary: ET)) It was held that in the context of s. 9(1), the acts or words that were prohibited were those that had the effect of demeaning the Central Authorities and/or the HKSARG in the eyes of the general public, and/or estranging the relationship between these institutions and the people here, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the authorities and their relationship with the people, which in turn would or might endanger the political order and social tranquillity. While it was not possible to list out each and every prohibited act, there was a sufficiently clearly formulated core to enable a person, with advice if necessary, to regulate his conduct so as to avoid criminal liability. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 94 (Case Summary)) |
By virtue of s. 10(5) of the CO, “seditious publication” means “a publication having a seditious intention” and “seditious words” means “words having a seditious intention”. “Seditious intention” has the meaning given by s. 9 of the CO. See annotations to s. 9. |
Section 10(1)(a) of the CO provides that any person who “does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do, or conspires with any person to do, any act with a seditious intention” commits an offence. Section 10(1)(b) of the CO provides that any person who “utters any seditious words” commits an offence. In HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, para. 39 (Case Summary: ET), the court agreed that based on the provisions of ss. 9 and 10(1)(a) and (b), legislative intent, etc., it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that:
In Pang Moon Yuen Garry’s case, the court agreed that the legislative history would facilitate the understanding of the legislative intent, but the court should ascertain the intention of the legislature according to the wording of the relevant legislation. Pursuant to s. 10(1)(a) and (b) of the CO, the elements of the offence were “doing an act/acts with a seditious intention” and “uttering seditious words” respectively, whereas the definition of “seditious words” was “words having a seditious intention”. Hence, “seditious intention” was merely used to define the acts and words that would amount to the commission of the offence, but not the mens rea. The mens rea of the offences of sedition did not include “having a seditious intention”. The repealed s. 9(3) of the CO originally provided that every person shall be deemed to intend the consequences which would naturally follow from his conduct at the time and under the circumstances in which he so conducted himself. However, the meaning of the section only assumed that the person speaking such words and publishing such document intended the consequences which would naturally follow from what he had said and published, but did not define the mens rea of the offences of sedition as “seditious intention”. Pursuant to the relevant provisions, the CO had never provided that the mens rea of the offences of sedition was “seditious intention”. If the intention of the legislature was that the mens rea of the offences of sedition was “seditious intention”, it should have been made clear in the Ordinance. Hence, the mens rea of the offences under s. 10(1)(a) and (b) did not include having a seditious intention. However, if someone, at the time of doing the act(s) or uttering the words, had the intention of doing the act(s) or uttering the words, and also had knowledge that such act(s) or words had a seditious intention, the court could hardly believe that he did not have the seditious intention. (HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, paras. 44 and 46-50 (Case Summary: ET)) In HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3, paras. 243-245 (Case Summary: ET), where the defendant made public statements on the social media alleged to have seditious intention, the court held that the s. 10(1)(a) offence (in the factual context of that case) comprised the following three elements:
The prosecution was only required to prove elements (1) to (3). The prosecution did not have to prove that the defendant had a seditious intention when making the public statements in question. Cf. HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981 (discussed in the section on “Elements of the offence under section 10(1)(c)” below) in which the District Court held that the defendant himself must also have a seditious intention. |
Section 10(1)(c) of the CO provides that any person who “prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes, displays or reproduces any seditious publication” commits an offence. In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 73 (Case Summary), the court held that a person would not commit an offence contrary to s. 10(1)(c) unless:
A defendant had to intend to perform the prescribed act, and to know that the publication was a seditious publication. It was also necessary to prove that the defendant himself had a seditious intention for the following reasons: (a) there was a common law presumption of mens rea, which would only be rebutted by express words or by necessary implication; (b) s. 9(3) which served as a deeming provision assisting the prosecution to prove that the defendant had the requisite intention had been repealed in 1992 on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence under BOR 11; (c) in Fei Yi Ming v The Crown (1952) 36 HKLR 133, the direction to the jury given by the Chief Justice of the Hong Kong Supreme Court referred to “the state of the publisher’s mind when he published the article”. It was therefore clear that the defendant had to have a seditious intention as an element of the offence. Nevertheless, if the publication had a seditious intention involving more than one limb of s. 9(1), it was not necessary for the defendant to have a seditious intention mirroring exactly in every respect with the publication so long as he shared some of the seditious intention of the publication. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 74-78 (Case Summary)) Cf. HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9 and HKSAR v Chui Chun Man [2023] HKMagC 3 (discussed in the section on “Elements of the offence under section 10(1)(a) or (b)” above) in which the Magistrates’ Courts held that the prosecution did not have to prove that the defendant had a seditious intention when doing the relevant act (s.10(1)(a)) or uttering the seditious words (s.10(1)(b)). |
In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, para. 154 (Case Summary), the court held that under s. 159A of the CO, if there was an agreement to pursue a course of conduct that involved the commission of a series of substantive offences on a continuous basis, the person concerned was guilty of a conspiracy to commit the offences in question, and that conspiracy would only come to an end when that person and the others agreed that they would no longer pursue that course of conduct, or he himself withdrew from the agreement. |
In HKSAR v Chui Hoi Chun [2022] HKMagC 13 (Case Summary: ET), the defence argued that the defendant was abroad when uploading the seditious contents onto the Internet, which were extra-territorial acts outside the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong courts. The court held that the defendant’s criminal acts or “substantial activities constituting the crime” occurred within Hong Kong and the Hong Kong courts had jurisdiction to try all the charges in the case. Whenever images, pictures, sounds and the like were received by a web user on the monitor of a computer or device, they had to have gone through technical processes via computer codes such as uploading, downloading and conversion etc., which very often took place in more than one location. Content albeit not being published in the territory could satisfy the jurisdiction requirement so long as it was capable of being viewed within the territory, and the jurisdiction consideration would depend upon questions of the intention to publish and the place in which the effects occurred. The situation was similar to that of a telephone scam. Even if a swindler was making a phone call from abroad to a victim within Hong Kong, the offence could be regarded as having taken place in Hong Kong so long as the victim picked up the call within Hong Kong. The Hong Kong courts would have jurisdiction over a case as long as the “substantial activities constituting the crime” in the case occurred within Hong Kong. (See Reasons for Sentence, Annex I, paras. 33-37 and 39-40) |
In determining whether the sedition offence under s. 10(1)(c) of the CO infringed a defendant’s rights to freedom of expression, of speech, of publication and to engage in literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities guaranteed by BL 27, BL 34 and BOR 16, the court, noting that these rights were not absolute and might be subject to restrictions, considered whether the restrictions were “prescribed by law” and proportionate under BL 39(2). In order to satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement, the offence must have a sufficiently clearly formulated core to enable a person, with advice if necessary, to regulate his conduct so as to avoid liability for that offence. In determining whether the restrictions were proportionate, the court applied the 4-step analysis set out in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board (2016) 19 HKCFAR 372: (a) the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim; (b) the restriction must be rationally connected to that legitimate aim; (c) the restriction must be no more than necessary to accomplish that legitimate aim; and (d) a reasonable balance must be struck between the societal benefits and the inroads made into the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 88-89, 92 and 97 (Case Summary)) The proportionality test was a test of reasonable, not strict, necessity. (HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, para. 25 (Case Summary: ET)) In HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 208, paras. 53 and 56-58 (Case Summary: ET), the court held that the freedoms of citizens could not be infinitely magnified so as to override the rights of others and even those of the State and society, and national security. The question was whether the restrictions were proportionate and reasonable. Section 9(2) of the CO had set forth the exceptions to seditious intention. Like statutory defence, its purpose was to strike a proportionate and reasonable balance, a balance which had its regard to the regional and local social conditions. In this regard, the judgments of overseas court cases were not of material assistance. The restrictions on rights and freedoms imposed by sedition offences were for the purpose of safeguarding national security. This also served the collective societal benefit to achieve peace and order of society. The definition of seditious intention was not overly broad as it was necessary to maintain timeliness and sufficient flexibility in its coverage, analogous to the offence of “misconduct in public office” at common law which did not find it appropriate to adopt a single and exhaustive definition. Hence, the sedition offences were constitutional, in line with the letter and spirit of the Basic Law and the BOR, and the restrictions were prescribed by law. In HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, paras. 16-21 (Case Summary: ET), the court held that the offences of sedition under s. 10(1)(a) and (b) of the CO fulfilled the “prescribed by law” requirement. There was neither ambiguity nor a lack of objective test concerning the definition of “seditious intention” in the CO (including the words used in s. 9(1)(c) and (g)).
In HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 98-99 and 105 (Case Summary), it was held that the criminalisation of seditious acts by ss. 9 and 10 of the CO clearly pursued a legitimate aim which was the protection of national security and public order (ordre public) as stated in BOR 16. It was rationally connected with the legitimate aim. The restrictions on the right to freedom of expression were also necessary for the protection of national security and public order (ordre public). There was a strong pressing need to safeguard national security in the HKSAR to prevent riots and civil unrests of any magnitude from happening again. It was essential to protect the constitutional order of the HKSAR under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy and to restore national unity as soon and as fullest as possible. It was of fundamental importance that Hong Kong residents could have a prolonged period of living in peaceful environments. It was therefore important to adopt measures to protect the general welfare and the interest of the collectivity as a whole under the concept of public order (ordre public). A person’s right to freedom of expression could be restricted for the protection of public order (ordre public) for the benefit of the legitimate societal interests to consolidate the new constitutional order in Hong Kong and to implement the “One Country, Two Systems” policy. In the above case, it was further held that in considering whether the offences created by ss. 9 and 10 of the CO were no more than necessary to accomplish the legitimate aim, it was important to understand the political and social condition in the HKSAR at the time of the alleged offence up till the hearing. Sections 9 and 10 did not impose restriction more than necessary to limit the right to freedom of expression, publication, etc. for the protection of national security and public order (ordre public). The law did not prevent anyone to say and publish whatever they like, including criticisms of the Central Authorities and the HKSARG in any form, provided that they did so without a seditious intention. On a proper construction of ss. 9 and 10, the prosecution had to prove that the defendant could not benefit from the “defence” stated in s. 9(2), and that the defendant had a seditious intention when he did the act complained of6. Under NSL 2, when anyone exercises his rights and freedoms, he could not refuse to recognise the HKSAR being an inalienable part of the PRC, or that the HKSAR enjoys only a high degree of autonomy rather than complete autonomy. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 104 and 106-108 (Case Summary)) In HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, paras. 23 and 27-31 (Case Summary: ET), the court held that the restriction imposed by the sedition offences under s. 10(1)(a) was prescribed by law, had a legitimate purpose, namely in the interests of national security, public safety and public order (ordre public) in a democratic society, and was also necessary. Safeguarding national security and social order, preventing administration of justice from being undermined, preventing enmity or opposition among members of the public, public obedience to the law and so on were the most fundamental and essential societal interests. If problems arose in national security, social order, administration of justice, public sentiment and so on, social divisions would result and dire consequences would ensue. Section 9(2) also provided that certain circumstances were not considered seditious and that positive criticism would attract no liability. Even though inciting violence was not a necessary element of the sedition offences, a balance could still be struck between protecting national security and social order on the one hand, and protecting individual rights and freedoms on the other. |
6 | Editor’s note: See, however, the discussion in the section on “Elements of the offence under section 10(1)(a) and (b)” above. |
According to the “Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR”, a legitimate national security interest is one that aims “to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political independence against force or threat of force”. The court held that the Siracusa Principles did not enjoy the status of rules of law in the HKSAR; they were issued 38 years ago and likely to be outdated. These days, the existence of a nation, its territorial integrity or political independence could be threatened not just by force or threat of force, but by propaganda spreading rumours, misinformation and disinformation that made people no longer trust and even hate their government, resulting in serious social unrest and chaos. In this sense, making sedition an offence should be an important tool for protection of national security, and it should not be held unconstitutional. The scope of the sedition offence should not be unduly restricted, or else it would be ineffective in protecting national security. (HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 981, paras. 101-102 (Case Summary)) |
The court in HKSAR v Koo Sze Yiu [2022] HKMagC 4, para. 36 (Case Summary: ET) followed the CFI decision in HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2020] HKCFI 3132, para. 26 (Case Summary) which held that the “Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information” were not binding on Hong Kong courts. |
The maximum sentence for an offence under s. 10(1), upon first conviction, is a fine at level 2 and imprisonment for 2 years. For a subsequent offence, the maximum sentence is imprisonment for 3 years. |
The court held that the sentencing considerations involving the offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21 set out in HKSAR v Ma Chun Man [2022] HKCA 1151, para. 75 (Case Summary: ET) were applicable to the sedition offences under s. 10(1)(a) and (b) of the CO. (HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 11, paras. 3-4 (Case Summary: ET)) They were:
The court had to give regard to the pre-emptive nature in the gravamen of the sedition offence which aimed to prevent the perpetrator from doing seditious acts to cause, excite, incite or infect others to form or identify with the perpetrator’s beliefs, thereby realising his assertions by unlawful means. Therefore, the court had to give primary consideration to deterrence in sentencing, so as to nip in the bud the spread and infiltration of such ideas advocated by the seditious acts, and the ensuing risks and consequences of breaching the peace. (HKSAR v Chui Hoi Chun [2022] HKMagC 13, para. 12 (Case Summary: ET)) Sentencing decisions of the District Court are not binding on District Judges. As the Court of Appeal has repeated time and again, circumstances vary from case to case and sentences in other cases offer little guidance. (HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2022] HKDC 958, para. 24 (Case Summary: ET)) In HKSAR v Cho Suet Sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119, paras. 74-77 (Case Summary), it was held that overseas cases were not helpful because the offence of sedition had to be case specific and local conditions played a significant factor. As for local cases, while the Appellant in Fei Yi Ming v The Crown (1952) 36 HKLR 133 had been sentenced to a fine of $4,000 in default of 9 months’ imprisonment for seditious publication, there were cases in which substantial terms of imprisonment had been imposed for sedition when riots broke out in 1967. The sentencing range for sedition could be very wide. In the above case, it was also held that the sentence for a conspiracy to commit the offence of sedition under s. 10(1)(c) which was very close to the offence of incitement to secession under NSL 21 had to achieve the purposes of punishment and deterrence, in the sense of both a general deterrent effect on the community as a whole, and a specific deterrent effect on the individual in question. To achieve the requisite sentencing purposes, the only appropriate sentencing option was imprisonment (HKSAR v Cho Suet Sum Chloe and Another [2022] HKDC 119, paras. 71-73 (Case Summary)) Committing the offence of uttering seditious words after the promulgation of the NSL would render the offence more serious in terms of culpability. (HKSAR v Tam Tak Chi [2022] HKDC 343, para. 13 (Case Summary: ET)) The court held that vulgar verbal abuses were no social commentaries or political discussions; political aspirations were not a mitigating factor. General deterrence had to be the primary consideration in determining the ultimate sentence. (HKSAR v Wan Yiu Sing Edmund [2022] HKDC 958, paras. 40-41 (Case Summary: ET)) The court in HKSAR v Lai Man Ling and Others [2022] HKDC 1004, paras. 29-33 (Case Summary) took the following matters into account in sentencing the defendants for conspiracy to print, publish, distribute, display and/or reproduce seditious publications, contrary to ss. 10(1)(c), 159A and 159C of the CO: (a) the harm caused by the defendants as a result of their offence; (b) extent of publication; (c) duration of the conspiracy; and (d) when the publications were done. The harm caused by the defendants’ crime was the harm and possible harm to the children in their mindset, and once they had internalized this mindset, the seed of instability would be sown in the PRC and HKSAR. The defendants had engaged in a brainwashing exercise with a view to guiding the very young children to accept their views that the PRC had no sovereignty over the HKSAR which was not part of the PRC. There was clear evidence that fear, hatred, discontent and disaffection had been instilled in the minds of the children. Further, the defendants mobilized other persons, including parents of the children, to impart ideas which should never have been imparted onto the children. The extent of publication was wide as the three books were published in the form of hardcopies, e-edition and video version; the hardcopies were distributed free of charge to the public, and the e-edition and video version were published via social media. The conspiracy lasted for a substantial period of time and was brought to an end only by the arrest of the defendants. The publications were done at the time when the political and social conditions in HKSAR were extremely unstable and despite the promulgation of the NSL. |
Pursuant to s. 11(1) of the CO, no prosecution for an offence of sedition under s. 10 “shall be begun except within 6 months after the offence is committed”. In HKSAR v Pang Moon Yuen Garry and Another [2022] HKMagC 9, paras. 6-7 (Case Summary: ET), the defence alleged that some of the videos involved in Charge 1 (contrary to s. 10(1)(a) of the CO) had been uploaded to the YouTube channel six months before the prosecution was instituted, but the court considered that the prosecution of the Charge did not contravene the requirement under s. 11(1). The Charge was a continuing offence, which was prosecuted on the basis that the defendant had maintained the YouTube channel until 16 February 2022. The institution of prosecution on 8 April 2022 was thus in compliance with the requirement of beginning prosecution “within 6 months after the offence is committed”. The defendant’s continuous commission of the offence at all material times was the same as the situation of maintaining a bank account and continuously laundering money. Hence, the question of duplicity (or double pleading) did not arise in respect of the Charge. In HKSAR v Chui Hoi Chun [2022] HKMagC 13 (Case Summary: ET), the defence submitted that the charge of doing an act with a seditious intention under s. 10(1)(a) centred on “publishing” and the relevant provisions did not contain “continue to publish” or words to that effect. It was argued that the offence was completed at the moment when he uploaded the contents onto the Internet. The fact that the uploaded contents continued to exist on the Internet was merely the outcome of the offence and would not perpetuate the criminal act. Hence, prosecution for the charge was time-barred. The court pointed out that the charge was that the defendant “[did] an act or acts with a seditious intention”; whereas the particulars of the charge were “publishing, making available and/or continuing to make available statements, photos, videos and pictures” on the social media. Hence, the element of the charge was “doing” rather than “publishing”. The defence mixed up the two concepts of “elements” and “particulars” and misunderstood the basis for prosecution. The keyword in the charge was “doing” which was not confined to “publishing”. Taken literally, s. 10(1)(a) was not restrictive in any way. Whether the act in question was momentary or continuing would depend on the circumstances of each case. Since the criminal act alleged was of a continuing nature, the charge was not time-barred and no issue of retrospective application of legislation arose. (See Reasons for Sentence, Annex I, paras. 10, 12, 13, 15 and 40) |
Sections 9 and 10 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap.200) have been repealed and replaced by sections 23 to 26 and section 139 of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (6 of 2024) which has come into effect since 23 March 2024.